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Overview 
Australian governments must make tough choices to balance their 
budgets. They face a decade of deficits, the result of big ticket 
spending initiatives, rising health costs, pressure on welfare 
budgets and an inevitable fall in the terms of trade. Collectively 
these could lead to deficits of 4 per cent of GDP, or $60 billion in 
today’s terms, within a decade.  
Tough choices cannot be put off indefinitely. Deficits impose 
heavy costs on the next generation in terms of debt and high 
interest payments. Government budgets cannot simply grow out 
of trouble, and the next decade may well be economically more 
difficult than the last.  
History shows that governments that successfully repair their 
budgets make the public case for reform, and start early on the 
hard work of cutting expenditure and raising taxes. They design a 
package of measures that share the burden of reform fairly across 
the community. 
This report surveys all realistic proposals that could contribute 
$2 billion a year or more to government budgets. It puts a priority 
on reforms that are big enough to make a difference but do not 
have unacceptable economic and social effects.  
One reform package could add $37 billion a year to the federal 
budget. It would broaden the GST to include fresh food and 
private spending on health and education; raise the age of access 
to superannuation and the Age Pension; remove the exemption 
for owner-occupied housing from the assets test for the Age 
Pension; and limit tax concessions on superannuation 
contributions. The burden of these changes would be spread 
across rich and poor, workers and retirees. While all these 
reforms are unlikely to occur at once, it will be hard to close the 
looming budget gap without tackling any of them. 
Structural reform of benefits and tax exemptions for older 
Australians offer many of the best opportunities for budget reform. 
They are the least-well targeted parts of our tax and welfare 
system, with some benefits going to people that don’t need them.  
Substantial budget repair almost always involves tax reform. 
Increasing fuel excise in line with inflation would raise significant 
revenue, although it hits those with low incomes particularly hard. 
Higher rates of existing taxes could raise large revenues. Raising 
the GST and municipal rates would slow economic growth less 
than other tax increases. 
Plausible reductions in spending on transport infrastructure, 
industry support, school class sizes, higher education subsidies, 
pharmaceuticals, health services, and defence could collectively 
improve budget positions by $23 billion per year. But the 
execution risks are high – there would be unacceptable economic 
and social effects unless the cuts were executed unusually well. 
By contrast, the oft-cited cuts to the public service and ‘middle 
class welfare’ can do relatively little to improve budget balances. 
Sustainable budgets depend on governments making tough 
choices. None will be politically easy, but making some of them is 
vital to Australia’s prosperity. 
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1. Introduction 
This report examines how Australian governments should 
respond to the budget pressures they face.  
It follows Budget pressures on Australian governments, published 
by Grattan Institute in April 2013, which showed the scale of the 
budget problem Australian governments face. Chapter 2 outlines 
and updates this analysis, which shows that Australian 
governments face deficits of 4 per cent of GDP, or $60 billion in 
today’s terms, within a decade.  
Chapter 3 considers the best approach to balancing budgets. It 
shows how repair can only succeed if politicians and the populace 
have the right mindsets and approach. 
Governments then need to make tough choices to either 
increase taxes or reduce spending. Chapter 4 outlines a 
framework for evaluating these choices on the basis of their 
budgetary impact, and social and economic side-effects.  
Chapter 5 indicates how the key reforms might be packaged 
together so that the burden of reform is spread fairly across the 
community. 
The bulk of this report examines 20 budget repair choices, and 
a number of possible tax increases, that might help balance 
budgets. These choices, their budgetary impact, and their side-
effects are summarised in Table 1. They are discussed in more 
detail in Chapters 6 to 9, drawing on the evaluation of each of 
them in the Balancing Budgets: Supporting analysis that 
accompanies this report. Chapter 6 covers changes to the 
pension and superannuation system. Chapter 7 discusses capital 
gains tax and housing. Chapter 8 looks at other tax exemptions, 
introductions and increases that may help to repair budgets. 
Chapter 9 covers spending cuts. 
Chapter 10 looks at the role of asset sales in budget repair.  
Finally, Chapter 11 discusses institutions that promote 
budgetary discipline in the longer term. 
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Table 1: Summary of impact of proposals over $2 billion considered in this report 
 
Theme 
 
Proposal Value to 
budget 
(annual, 
$2013)  
Summary of social, 
economic and 
distributional 
impacts 
Pg
Super and 
pensions 
Age Pension and 
superannuation 
access age 
$12b Neutral 29 
Super contribution 
tax concessions 
$6b Moderately negative 32 
Superannuation 
earnings tax 
concessions 
$3b Moderately negative 36 
Age Pension assets 
test 
$7b Positive 36 
Housing 
and 
capital 
gains 
CGT discounts $5b Neutral 40 
Owner-occupied 
housing and CGT 
$15b Very negative 43 
Negative gearing $2b Positive 45 
Other tax 
exemption
s 
GST base $13b Negative 49 
Payroll tax threshold $6b Very negative 55 
Fuel tax credit $3b Negative 57 
New taxes Fuel excise 
indexation 
$3b Moderately negative 58 
Federal royalties 
export tax 
$3b Negative 59 
Theme 
 
Proposal Value to 
budget 
(annual, 
$2013) 
Summary of social, 
economic and 
distributional 
impacts 
Pg 
Tax rate 
increases 
Corporate tax rate $10b Very negative 62 
Income tax rates $10b Very negative 62 
GST rate $10b Negative 62 
Property tax rate $10b Negative 62 
Payroll tax rate $10b Very negative 62 
Stamp duty rate $10b Very negative 62 
Bracket creep $16b Very negative 63 
Spending 
cuts 
Transport 
infrastructure costs 
$6b Moderately negative 65 
Industry support $5b Moderately negative 69 
Private health 
insurance rebate 
$3b Negative 70 
Pharmaceuticals 
spending 
$2b Positive 70 
Cost effectiveness of 
treatments 
$2b Neutral 70 
Defence spending $2b Neutral 71 
School class sizes $3b Moderately negative 71 
Student subsidies for 
higher education 
$3b Neutral 71 
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2. We have a budget problem
The Commonwealth Government has had an underlying budget 
problem for several years, as Grattan Institute’s 2013 report, 
Mining boom: impacts and prospects, reveals.1 Australian 
government budgets face a decade of deficits, as we showed in 
our previous publication, Budget pressures.2 Signature initiatives, 
rising health expenditure, pressure on welfare budgets, and an 
inevitable fall in the terms of trade could lead to deficits of 4 per 
cent of GDP, or $60 billion in today’s terms, within a decade. 
2.1 We have a structural deficit 
The Commonwealth Government – responsible for 60 per cent of 
Australian government expenditure and 75 per cent of the 
taxation3 – has had a structural budget deficit of more than 
2 per cent of GDP for the past five years. As Figure 2.1 shows, 
the Commonwealth spent more than its income after allowing for 
fluctuations in prices (particularly the mining boom and the terms 
of trade), and the business cycle (particularly the Global Financial 
Crisis). 
Calculations of the structural deficit by the International Monetary 
Fund, the OECD, Australian Treasury, the Parliamentary Budget 
Office, Deloitte Access Economics and Grattan Institute all use 
slightly different methods and assumptions. But they all come to a 
                                            
1 Minifie, et al. (2013) 
2 Daley, et al. (2013) 
3 Ibid., pp. 11, 58 
similar conclusion: the Commonwealth Government has run a 
substantial structural deficit for half a decade.4 
Figure 2.1 Commonwealth budget balance 
Per cent of nominal GDP 
 
Source: Minifie et al. (2013) 
                                            
4 Ibid., p. 28; PBO (2013a) ; IMF (2013a) 
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The mining boom and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) masked 
the problem. Australia failed to realise that the income from the 
mining boom would not last, but that spending increases started 
during the GFC would. 
2.2 Spending has gone up 
One of the problems is that we often think about government 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP. In normal times, this is a 
good rule of thumb. If the massive run-up in the price of iron ore 
and coal were permanent, then Commonwealth Government 
expenditure today is only a tick higher than in 2003. But if iron ore 
and coal prices return to historic levels, then it would be apparent 
that Commonwealth government spending rose two percentage 
points in eight years.5 That is a structural shift, as Figure 2.2 
shows. 
This structural shift also escaped attention because of the 
stimulus package. It looked as though spending was falling in 
2012-13. But that fall was the consequence of the stimulus 
package rolling off, and payments being timed to fall in different 
years. Underlying spending has risen rapidly. 
                                            
5 If minerals prices fall, then (if CPI remains unchanged) so will nominal GDP, 
which takes into account the price of Australian exports. If nominal GDP falls, but 
government spend is constant, the ratio of government spend to GDP would rise. 
Figure 2.2 Commonwealth structural expenditure 
Per cent of nominal GDP 
 
Source: Minifie et al. (2013) 
2.3 Revenue is going down 
Revenues have also fallen with the Global Financial Crisis 
reducing income and corporate tax levels. Although revenues are 
expected to return to long-run averages by 2014-15 – depending 
on minerals prices – indirect taxes have fallen steadily and remain 
1 per cent of GDP below their long-term trend (Figure 2.3).6  
                                            
6 Daley, et al. (2013), p. 22 
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Figure 2.3 Variation in Commonwealth major tax revenues 
Per cent of nominal GDP above/below average 2000-01 to 2009-10 
 
Source: Daley et al. (2013) 
2.4 Future pressures 
Future pressures on Australian government budgets could reduce 
budget balances by 4 per cent of GDP within a decade as Figure 
2.4 shows.  
Updating the analysis of our Budget pressures report for 
subsequent developments alters some components but comes to 
the same conclusion. Governments have reduced their forecast 
surpluses for 2015-16 to zero, which incorporates our 
expectations that revenue from company tax, mining resource 
rent tax and the emissions trading scheme would be less than 
previous forecasts. Additional signature initiatives have increased 
in cost to 1 per cent of GDP. The expected increase in health 
spending to 2023 is now only 1.5 per cent of GDP (previously it 
was 2 per cent) as some of the increase was incorporated in 
2013-14 budgets. The expectation of future hits to the budget due 
to increased welfare costs and a fall in the terms of trade remains 
unchanged. 
Figure 2.4 Potential annual deficit of Australian governments by 
2023 
Per cent of GDP  
 
Source: Daley et al. (2013); subsequent Grattan analysis 
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The new Coalition government has promised a number of 
signature initiatives that will ultimately have a net cost to the 
budget of about $15 billion in today’s dollars by 2023 as shown in 
Figure 2.5.  
There are the costs of abolishing the carbon and mining taxes. 
The government’s company tax cut, increase in defence 
spending, and paid parental leave will also drag on the bottom 
line. In addition, most of the planned costs for the National 
Disability Insurance Scheme and school funding reforms start to 
bite after 2017, only reaching ‘steady state’ by about 2022. 
Initiatives of a similar magnitude were likely irrespective of who 
won the 2013 federal election.7 For these purposes, we have 
assumed that costs of the National Disability Insurance Scheme 
will be as planned: in practice, costs may be higher as political 
pressure and legal decisions tend to stretch definitions in favour of 
increased spending.8  
The largest threat to future budgets is the sustained pressure on 
health expenditure. Over the last decade, health has been 
responsible for most of the spending increases above GDP, for 
both Commonwealth and state governments (Figure 2.6).9 The 
primary drivers were not ageing, but the provision of more and 
better health services per person. A 60-year old today visits the 
doctor more often, has more tests, has more operations, and 
takes more drugs, than a 60-year old 10 years ago.  
                                            
7 Ibid., p. 33-35 
8 Burkhauser, et al. (2013), p.357. There are already indications that the National 
Disability Insurance Scheme will exceed cost estimates. See Fifield (2013); 
Mather (2013) 
9 Daley, et al. (2013), p. 15 
Figure 2.5 Potential impact of signature initiatives to 2023 
2013$ billion 
 
Note: ‘Other ECs’ is other election commitments. Impact is on all Australian budgets 
(Commonwealth, states and territories). Analysis includes all federal Coalition election 
commitments identified by the Parliamentary Budget Office except infrastructure, which 
has not been included as it is not possible to determine how new commitments for a given 
year related to the available funding envelope. Analysis also includes the government’s 
commitment to increase defence spending to 2% of GDP in 10 years, its commitment to 
implement the National Disability Insurance Scheme, and a likely increase in school 
funding based on existing agreements with some states and likely pressure from others. 
Source: Grattan analysis of Treasury (2012a); Daley et al. (2013); Loughnane (2013c); b); 
PBO (2013b); Treasury (2013c); a) 
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Figure 2.6 Change in Australian governments’ expenditure 2002-03 
to 2012-13 
Real change in expenditure, 2013$ billion 
 
Source: Daley et al. (2013) 
Governments are under enormous public pressure to spend more 
on health to improve lifespans and quality of life. If spending 
continues to grow at the same rate as over the past decade, 
health will consume an additional 1.5 per cent of government 
budgets by 2023. 
Welfare costs are also likely to increase. Those on workforce 
payments such as Newstart face high levels of hardship.10 The 
                                            
10 Ibid., p. 18-19 
Business Council of Australia has acknowledged that Newstart 
payments are too low.11 As a result, there may be more pressure 
to increase welfare payments for those who are least well off, 
especially if the economy turns down.  
We are also likely to see political pressure to keep increasing age 
pension benefits.12 These grew faster than GDP over the last 
decade, not because of the ageing of the population, but because 
of deliberate policy choices to broaden eligibility and lift pensions 
faster than average weekly earnings.13 The political pressure that 
led to these changes will grow as the population ages.  
2.5 Why does all this matter? 
Of course, Australian governments owe much less than many 
governments elsewhere. We are not in the emergency ward, 
crawling from one debt reconstruction to the next, with the 
economy shrinking and government slashing the social safety net. 
But surely we do not want to go there. 
The most important argument for budget reform is that 
government deficits effectively require future generations to pay 
for the spending of the current generation. In recent times, the run 
up in Queensland government deficit spending led to annual 
interest payments of more than $1.5 billion a year, substantially 
constraining the state budget. 
                                            
11 BCA (2013) 
12 Daley, et al. (2013), p. 44 
13 Ibid., p. 20 
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Relatively little of the most rapid increases in annual spending can 
be justified on the basis that they will benefit future generations by 
increasing future economic growth. While education, research and 
infrastructure will benefit future generations, spending on 
increased health and age pensions increased the most. While 
health spending increases workforce participation a little, its major 
effect is to help today’s generation live longer and enjoy happier 
retirements. While this is a good thing, it is unfair to fund this 
through deficits that must be paid for by future generations. 
Recurring structural deficits inevitably lead to higher levels of 
debt. At high levels, these limit the ability of governments to 
respond to future economic downturns.14  
Given the size of current underlying and projected budget deficits, 
repairing the budgets of Australian governments will be hard. The 
rest of this report explains how it might be done. 
                                            
14 Ibid. 
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3. Mindsets and approaches for budget repair
If Australian governments are serious about fixing their budgets, 
they need to make some tough choices. The ones we present are 
not particularly appealing. Nobody likes paying higher taxes or 
receiving fewer services. But we need governments to make 
these difficult choices rather than putting them off for future 
governments. We cannot simply ‘grow out of trouble’; we need 
structural reform.15   
Valuable lessons can be learnt from previous Australian and 
international experiences of budget repair. These experiences, 
summarised in Balancing budgets: Supporting analysis, show that 
to balance budgets, governments need to do explain the problem, 
prioritise the large reforms, tackle both spending and taxation, and 
resist the temptation to delay. 
3.1 Preparing people for pain 
There is little chance of successful budget repair unless the 
government builds public understanding of the size of the 
problem, and the need for action.16 
Budget reform is most likely when all those affected by it – from 
politicians, to senior public servants, frontline public sector staff 
and the general public – agree that it is necessary. That means 
creating a shared understanding of the scale of the problem, and 
why major change is needed. These attitudes do not spring into 
life on their own. Governments that have successfully repaired 
                                            
15 IMF (2013b), p. 10 
16 Mauro (2011), p. 258 
budgets put considerable time and deliberate effort into explaining 
the need for change to all involved.17 Unless the ground is 
prepared, it is easy for the community to run out of patience with 
reform. 
To build this public case, it helps to start from a position of political 
strength. For example, the Borbidge Government in Queensland 
was a minority government, and a mere 18 months in power gave 
it insufficient time and political capital to implement reforms. The 
final report of the 2011 Victorian Review of State Finances has 
not even been released, which some attribute to a combination of 
the government’s narrow majority, and the report’s 
recommendations, reputed to be radical.18 In contrast, the huge 
majorities won by Barry O’Farrell in New South Wales in 2011 and 
Campbell Newman in Queensland in 2012 reduced pressure from 
the electorate, giving those governments greater licence for 
bigger reform.  
Reform is also easier if the economic and budgetary challenges 
are obvious from the outset. In the 1990s, the major economic 
problems facing Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia 
helped to create a ‘burning platform’ for reform, and made it 
easier for governments to adopt tough recommendations. 
Queensland, in better shape, showed far less enthusiasm for 
                                            
17 See, for example, Kamener and Tan (2012) on the Kennett government 
budget reforms and Sancak, et al. (2011) on Canadian reform, discussed further 
in Balancing budgets: Supporting analysis. 
18 Jones and Prasser (forthcoming); Uren (2012) 
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reform.19 Similarly, in 2011, the Victorian government faced less 
severe fiscal and economic problems than those of New South 
Wales and Queensland, which probably contributed to the lack of 
enthusiasm for its audit commission’s recommendations. 
Nor can a government rely on a commission of audit to build this 
public case for budget repair. Governments should treat any 
commission of audit as a buttress rather than the lead element. 
The Kennett Government did not wait for its commission of audit 
to report before it cut expenditure (see Box 3.1). It had come into 
office with a detailed reform plan already prepared, and it brought 
down a mini-budget within a month of being elected.20  
Commissions can be useful in exploring tough choices, while 
being distant enough to give the government plausible deniability 
while it considers options. But the risk of the commission’s 
independence is that no-one with real power ‘owns’ the 
recommendations, and they sink without trace. Successful budget 
reform efforts, including those in Canada, Victoria and the UK, 
had strong buy-in from politicians and senior public servants, and 
strong budget processes to accompany the repair effort. The 
Commonwealth Government should already be considering how it 
will ‘sell’ change and the necessary tough reforms. 
The current Commonwealth Government’s rhetoric provides some 
cause for concern. Although both the Prime Minister and 
Treasurer talked in May 2013 of a ‘budget emergency’, their 
language has shifted since election.21  There has not been a mini- 
                                            
19 Jones and Prasser (forthcoming) 
20 Ibid. 
21 For example, contrast statements in Griffiths (2013) with those in AAP (2013) 
Box 3.1: Case study – Budget repair in Kennett’s Victoria 
In 1992, Victoria had a deficit of $2.2 billion, total government debt 
of $31 billion, and an A1 credit rating. 
The Kennett Government was elected in 1992 with a massive 
majority and a mandate for budget repair. It cut spending by more 
than 10 per cent in real terms in four years. It increased revenues 
and sold about $45 billion worth of assets. Between 1993 and 
1997, expenditure as a percentage of revenues fell from 110 to 
89 per cent. Government debt was reduced to $4 billion by 2000. 
Several factors contributed to this successful budget reform: 
x A Budget and Expenditure Review Committee set firm 
expenditure reduction targets from the centre of government, 
but gave agencies autonomy in determining how to meet them. 
x There was a concerted effort to get alignment between 
politicians, senior public servants, front-line public sector staff 
and the public on the scale of the problem and the need for 
major change. 
x Reforms were structured so that the pain would be shared 
across the state. A $100 per household debt-reduction levy 
raised a relatively modest amount but sent a clear message 
that no-one was exempt from sacrifice. 
The reforms faced opposition. The government won the 1996 
election, retaining a significant majority, but commentators have 
attributed its subsequent loss in 1999 at least partly to the 
harshness of its fiscal reforms. 
Source: Kamener and Tan (2012); Jones and Prasser (forthcoming) 
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Budget, and there is little sign that there will be policy changes 
announced in the Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook. A 
concerted and consistent effort is required to explain the extent of 
the budget issues. 
Reform is also easier if there is a perception that the burden is 
being shared across society. Obviously those with more capacity 
to pay should bear more of the burden. But if everyone – the 
wealthy and poor, young and old, businesses and households, 
city and country – is seen to be making sacrifices, it blunts the 
power of any one group to complain about cuts. It also helps to 
contribute to a shared understanding of the magnitude of change 
required. 
3.2 Prioritisation and delegation 
Governments should pick a few significant reforms that will make 
a large difference to the structural deficit. Prioritising budget 
choices is important because major reform is hard; it takes 
political will, time and strong leadership to design and implement 
good policy. As Paul Keating once said, the trick to government is 
to pick three big things and do them well.22 Choosing a limited 
number of substantial reforms is important because a government 
can only alienate major interest groups so often before it is 
branded in public debate as out of touch.23 Senior government 
ministers have limited time and energy both to persuade 
                                            
22 Button ibid.. Nicola Roxon recently reflected on her time in government, noting 
that the Labor Party needs to “choose a few big areas and focus on them, taking 
people with them.” Roxon (2013) 
23 Daley, et al. (2012a), p. 6 
stakeholders and to reallocate resources. Leadership cannot be 
spread too thinly, lest it lose its political influence. For their part, 
senior public sector managers can only properly supervise the 
design and implementation of a limited number of policies at the 
same time. 
Without prioritisation, there is a risk that governments will use up 
their political capital on urgent, but relatively unimportant, 
issues.24 If a government is to undergo the political pain of difficult 
reform, it may as well make sure that the money the proposals will 
save (or raise) is large enough to be worthwhile. 
The media also has an important role to play in this debate. Media 
outlets frequently run stories about government spending or taxes 
that make little effort to put numbers into context. For those who 
do not follow budget debates closely, $100 million seems like a 
huge number, but it is about one five-thousandth of the total 
expenditure of Australian governments. This makes it hard for 
voters to understand the scale of the issues discussed. The New 
York Times is working to better explain budget-related numbers;25 
the Australian media should follow suit. 
Budget reform today also needs to be delegated. Budget repair 
efforts need to involve those who will have to implement them, not 
just public servants in Treasury and Finance. Because line 
agencies often know aspects of the policy area that central 
agency staff do not they are well positioned to identify feasible 
reform. Line agency staff are also more likely to ‘own’ rather than 
resist reforms that they have had a hand in designing. Both 
                                            
24 Ibid., p. 6 
25 Sullivan (2013) 
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Victoria and Canada gave agencies autonomy to determine how 
they would meet savings targets. Coupled with strong central 
oversight, it led to successful fiscal reform. 
3.3 Tackling the tough choices 
If big change is required, all options for reform need to be on the 
table, including both spending cuts and revenue increases. 
Reform can succeed even if it involves difficult and ambitious 
decisions. Overseas experience shows that ambitious plans are 
just as likely to achieve their targets as modest ones,26 and 
Australian governments have successfully repaired big budget 
holes in the past. 
However, governments cannot rely on economic growth alone to 
balance their budgets. Successful budget repair has historically 
emerged from a combination of tight fiscal policy and increased 
economic growth.27 Fiscal repair is much easier when economic 
conditions are favourable, but few, if any, governments have 
managed to simply grow their way out of trouble without 
undertaking budget reform.28 Although economic growth will 
increase tax revenues, spending tends to grow at a similar rate. 
Many government costs (such as welfare payments and service 
delivery salary costs) are linked to wage levels that tend to grow 
in line with the economy. 
Previous experience does not dictate a particular balance 
between revenue and expenditure measures for budget repair.29 
                                            
26 Mauro (2011), p. 252 
27 Ibid.; Abbas, et al. (2013) 
28 Abbas, et al. (2013), p. 17 
29 IMF (2013b), p. 35; Mauro (2011), p. 257 
Tax increases have been important drivers of some, though not 
all, budget repair.30 Without major tax increases, budget repair will 
be hard for Australia given that its government is relatively small, 
major revenue sources like the GST are in structural decline (see 
Chapter 1), and we could not identify expenditure cuts large 
enough to fix Australia’s long run budget challenges. The 
promised tax review will need to be wide-ranging and taken 
seriously by government. 
Almost all successful repair efforts have involved broad 
expenditure cuts. Yet today’s Commonwealth Government may 
have tied its own hands, ruling out cuts to health, education and 
defence; major changes to superannuation; and changes to its 
election commitments.31 The broad terms of reference given to 
the National Commission of Audit may give it scope to tackle 
these areas and at least build momentum for change after the 
next election. 
Repair plans are also more likely to succeed if they include 
structural reforms such as changes to the welfare system and a 
repositioning of the role of the state.32 The proposals in this report 
for reforms to the age pension and superannuation, and taxes on 
assets and consumption, are examples of such structural change.  
Repairing the Commonwealth’s budget will probably require even 
tougher decisions than in the past. Tougher decisions are 
required if a previous budgetary reform has already picked the 
‘low-hanging fruit’.  
                                            
30 Mauro (2011), p. 253 
31 Crowe (2013) 
32 Mauro (2011), p. 254 
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The Howard Government picked much of the ‘low-hanging fruit’ of 
budgetary reform, particularly in public sector management reform 
and asset sales, after the last National Commission of Audit (see 
Balancing budgets: Supporting analysis). Recommendations that 
weren’t adopted – including restructuring federal financial 
arrangements, and changing pension indexation – are no easier 
now than they were then.  
At the state level, many of the recommendations of the 2012 
Queensland Commission of Audit have already been enacted in 
other jurisdictions (examples include contestability in providing 
public transport, and divestment of energy assets).33 In contrast, 
the sweeping reforms adopted by the Kennett Government in the 
1990’s may have left relatively few ‘easy wins’ for Victoria’s 2011 
Review of State Finances. 
There is certainly scope for new reforms today. Some program 
creep can usefully be pulled back. A new wave of service delivery 
reform might focus on demand management given that uncapped 
programs like health and welfare are driving many of the budget 
challenges. But the Commonwealth Government shouldn’t 
imagine that the National Commission of Audit will provide a set of 
easy reforms that are big enough to fix the problem. Tough 
choices will need to be made. 
                                            
33 Costello, et al. (2013) 
3.4 Don't wait for tomorrow 
An incoming government needs to move quickly, as the Victorian 
experience of the 1990s and others show.34 Governments must 
implement tough reforms early in the electoral cycle, while the 
failings of the previous government are fresh in voters’ minds.35 It 
is far easier for a government to build the case for and implement 
policy change early in its term.36 A government needs to develop 
support for its policies, while holding off the opposition.37 A 
government that leaves difficult decisions to the latter half of its 
term faces the additional stress of re-election and more pressure 
from lobby groups. 
Once this early action has established credibility, fiscal repair is 
best undertaken gradually, within a credible medium-term 
strategy, supported by strong institutions,38 and with credible 
contingency plans to deal with unforeseen economic shocks.39  
Driven by the need for speed, governments often require a 
commission of audit to report quickly. This creates the risk that it 
will lack the time for thorough analysis and will fall back on pre-
conceived ideas not based on good evidence.40 Many of the 
commissions of audit in the 2000s had significantly longer 
                                            
34 IMF (2013b), p. 30 
35 Jones and Prasser (forthcoming) 
36 Daley, et al. (2012a), p. 9 
37 Haggard and Webb (1993), p. 143 
38 IMF (2013b), p. 29-30; Mauro (2011). See further discussion of budget 
institutions in Chapter 11. 
39 Mauro (2011) 
40 Martin (2013) 
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timeframes, allowing more thorough work but also leading to more 
complexity and more politically unpalatable recommendations.41 
It is concerning that in recent months both sides of politics have 
downplayed the urgency of Australia’s budget problems. Perhaps 
chastened by the experience of its predecessor, the new 
Commonwealth government has not set a date for the budget to 
return to surplus. It has committed only to reaching a surplus of 1 
per cent of GDP in 2023-24 – a decade and three elections 
away.42  
In the meantime, the prospects of slower economic growth and 
rising unemployment have led some to urge a return to Keynesian 
stimulus. The clouds on the economic horizon might tempt some 
to argue for a delay to reform. GDP growth has slowed to 
2.5 per cent.43 Unemployment has increased from 5.1 to 
5.8 per cent between April 2012 and October this year.44 More 
people have less work than they would like.45 The OECD has 
cautioned against dramatic fiscal contraction in the short term, but 
welcomed tightening in the medium term.46 
We should worry about a tendency to look for any excuse to put 
off reform until next year. There will always be reasons to put off 
the hard political work of actual budget repair. Governments 
everywhere are keen to promise budgetary virtue, but less keen to 
deliver it. Budget choices are hard, and no-one likes any short-run 
                                            
41 Jones and Prasser (forthcoming) 
42 Greber and Heath (2013) 
43 ABS (2013a), as at June 2013 (trend) 
44 ABS (2013l) Table 1, as at Oct 2013 (trend) 
45 ABS (2013m) 
46 OECD (2013b), p. 127 
reduction in economic growth. The benefits of lower interest 
payments from reduced public debt are inevitably promises about 
the future that people tend to value less.47 Governments have 
many incentives to run deficits, including the desire to give the 
public the spending increases and tax cuts they say they want, 
and to avoid leaving surpluses for their political opponents to 
spend.48 
That is why Australia’s historic aversion to government debt may 
not always be the perfect answer from the perspective of 
economic theory.49 However, it may be a very good answer given 
the political temptations to run deficits when it is not in the 
country’s long-term interests. Unless governments are under 
constant electoral pressure to avoid debt, they will tend to find 
reasons to spend tomorrow’s tax dollars today, until they hit the 
hard limit of financial market tolerance, and borrowing becomes 
either high cost or impossible. While that limit is a long way off 
today, reaching it would clearly be the worst of all outcomes. 
In any case, the current economic situation may be as good as it 
gets for some time. Current GDP growth of 2.5 per cent may well 
be the long-term growth rate for many years. Economists such as 
Robert Gordon, Tyler Cowen, Stephen King, and some at the IMF 
suggest that economic growth will be slower in developed 
countries for the next few decades, since there is no obvious 
wave of productivity enhancing platforms, and ageing is starting to 
                                            
47 See Buchanan and Wagner (1997); Kahneman (2012) 
48 Eslava (2011) 
49 Macfarlane (2006) 
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reduce participation rates.50 As a result, future governments may 
have even less ability to repay than current governments. 
Similarly, while an unemployment rate of 5.8 per cent is high 
relative to the last decade of the mining boom, it is much less than 
the 7.7 per cent average of the previous decade.51 This rate of 
unemployment was achieved after a year in which the 
Commonwealth government reduced its spending by $3.8 billion 
in nominal terms52 – even if that statistic is much helped by timing 
payments to fall in the earlier rather than the later financial year.  
Furthermore, we have something of an insurance policy. If budget 
repair leads to a significant rise in unemployment, then Australia’s 
central bank still has some room to cut interest rates further to 
stimulate the economy. Most central banks in the developed world 
do not have that luxury.  
 
                                            
50 Gordon (2012); Cowen (2011); King (2013); Abbas, et al. (2013), p. 6 
51 ABS (2013l) Table 1; Grattan analysis 
52 Treasury (2013b), p. 2 
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4. Framing budget choices
4.1 Criteria for choices 
This report presents some potential choices to fix structural 
budget deficits. We do not suggest that any Australian 
government will – or should – implement all of them. However, we 
have tried to identify as many choices as possible that would both 
make a material difference to budget outcomes, and do not have 
unacceptable social or economic side-effects. Australian 
governments may find many of the choices unpalatable, but given 
the size of their long-term budget challenges, it will be hard for 
them to repair budgets without facing at least some of these 
choices. If they are all ruled ‘off the table’ then Australians are 
entitled to ask whether their governments are serious about 
restoring budget balances. 
All of the budget choices presented are politically difficult. If they 
were easy, they would have been made already. Australia’s 
governments are small by OECD standards, and our public sector 
operates more efficiently than most.53 This makes it harder to find 
savings by cutting waste and shrinking non-essential services. 
In this report, we provide an approach to assessing budget 
choices that other policy actors can use as a model for prioritising 
potential reforms. Even if many do not agree with our assessment 
of individual reforms, we hope that the model will be useful in 
providing a disciplined approach that tackles the highest priority 
reforms first.  
                                            
53 OECD (2012a); OECD (2012b) 
Our approach uses three criteria that we believe are the critical 
factors in prioritising budget reforms: 
1. Will the proposal have a significant impact on the budget 
deficit? In other words, is the financial impact of the proposal 
big enough to make a difference? We classify proposals as 
having significant impact if they save at least $2 billion a year. 
We estimate the impact of all proposals once they are fully 
implemented, using 2012-13 dollars. 
2. If the proposal saves more than $2 billion, what are its social, 
distributional and economic impacts? 
x Social impacts: how will the proposal affect people and 
their behaviour? 
x Distributional impacts: how will it affect people in the 
bottom 20 per cent of the income distribution?  
x Economic impacts: will it have positive or negative impact 
on economic activity? 
3. How confident are we in the size of the savings? Confidence 
will be high if there is concrete evidence about the size of the 
potential benefits. That confidence is affected by factors such 
as the complexity of the drivers, the uncertainties inherent in 
those drivers, the potential behaviour change as a result of the 
proposal and the availability and quality of underlying data. 
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We detail our findings on each of these criteria for each proposal 
in Balancing Budgets: Supporting Analysis. This also includes 
further details on methodology, including how social, distributional 
and economic impacts were combined. 
Our focus on the size of reforms reflects the context of the 
Commonwealth Government’s structural deficit of over 2 per cent 
of GDP for the last six years ($30 billion in today’s terms),54 and 
the long-term projected structural deficit of 4 per cent of GDP 
across all Australian government budgets over the next decade 
($60 billion in today’s terms).55 Of course, smaller measures also 
matter. Between 2009 and 2013 the Commonwealth government 
made discretionary budget choices that improved its budget 
bottom line by $72 billion in 2013-2014. Of these, $13 billion were 
the result of small measures worth less than $50 million a year.56 
However, inevitably a large portion of such substantial budget 
deficits will need to be corrected through major policy choices. 
In assessing distributional impacts, we focus deliberately on the 
impact on the bottom 20 per cent of the income distribution –
generally those who are worst off. This reflects a consensus in 
Australian political culture that policy should assist those who are 
less well-off to have opportunities to pursue lives that they have 
reason to value.57 Many argue that policy should also aim to 
distribute resources more equally.58 However, this latter approach 
                                            
54 See above, Section 2.4 
55 See Chapter 1. 
56 Daley, et al. (2013), p. 51, which also shows how these budget improvements 
were accompanied by discretionary measures that cost the budget bottom line 
$59 billion in 2013-14. 
57 See the discussion in ibid., p. 37 
58 See Leigh (2013) 
is more contentious, and so we do not use it as a criterion for 
evaluating budget choices. 59 
Our assessment of the size of each reform is generally an 
estimate. Setting priorities usually depends on relative size rather 
than precision. A $5 billion proposal will contribute more to 
balancing budgets than a $2 billion proposal, even if considerable 
uncertainties exist in both estimates. The main task in setting 
priorities is usually not in distinguishing between closely matched 
proposals. Rather, it is mostly to sort out the subset of proposals 
that are materially better than others. A more complex model of 
the economy that captures flow-on effects may be more precise in 
estimating the potential size of reforms, but we do not believe that 
this would assist prioritisation much. The impact of most of the 
proposals we examine will depend on how people respond – 
which is inherently impossible to predict precisely. If a reform is a 
priority, then often it is better to spend available resources on 
implementation, and discover the precise impacts in practice.  
As with our estimates of budgetary impacts, our estimates of 
social and distributional impacts should not be treated with 
spurious precision. For many of these effects there is no common 
metric, and their relative importance depends on the weighting of 
different political values. For some the ultimate impact depends 
on second-round effects that are difficult to predict. Consequently 
our assessments are generally directional. They aim to produce 
an informed discussion. 
Our analysis in this report assesses choices that are likely to have 
a substantial budgetary impact. There may be other reasons to 
                                            
59 Daley, et al. (2013), p. 36-37 
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undertake policy reform, such as improving social outcomes, 
protecting the environment or improving fairness of distribution 
within the community.60 However, these other policy ends are 
beyond the scope of this report unless they are contained within 
proposals that have a substantial budgetary impact.  
We do not assess the political feasibility of implementing these 
choices. Any significant reforms are likely to encounter substantial 
opposition. We aim to identify where political capital might be 
expended so that it would make the most difference to improving 
outcomes in the interests of all Australians. 
4.2 Scope of choices 
The 20 proposals we examine in detail aim to cover all of the 
spending reductions, tax exemptions, and new taxes that are 
commonly raised in discussions about budget repair. They include 
all those we have identified in publications such as the Henry Tax 
Review and tax expenditure statements. They also include a 
broad range of ideas raised with us in many external discussions 
about the material in this report. As well as proposals with a 
budgetary impact of more than $2 billion a year, we also examine 
a number of reforms that are popularly believed to have a large 
budgetary impact, although our analysis suggests the impact 
would probably be much smaller in practice. These include 
abolishing negative gearing, public service cuts and reductions in 
‘middle-class welfare’.  
As well as these specific proposals, we also briefly examine 
possible increases to existing taxes. In our summary of proposals, 
                                            
60 Daley, et al. (2012a), p. 7 
we have arbitrarily assumed each would raise $10 billion a year; 
the tax rates required to do so are discussed in Section 8.7. 
We also examine asset sales (Chapter 10 below). These are not 
included in our summary of proposals because the contribution of 
an asset sale to the annual budget balance depends on the sale 
price, government interest rate, and future dividends if the asset 
remains in government hands - an analysis beyond our scope. 
We have only considered changes to budgetary policy as per the 
Pre-election Economic and Fiscal Outlook, published in 
August 2013.61 Some of the signature initiatives promised by the 
incoming government are costly, and not enacting these may be a 
better way to improve the budget balance (see Box 4.1). 
Nevertheless, these proposals are hypothetical until legislated, 
and so have not been included. 
Doubtless there are sensible proposals that we have failed to 
identify. We hope, however, that the approach and analysis we 
present provides a starting point for others to build a more 
comprehensive picture of the choices available to Australian 
governments in the difficult task of budget repair. 
 
 
                                            
61 See Treasury (2013c) 
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Box 4.1: Commitments of the new government 
The new Commonwealth Government made a number of election 
commitments that would have a significant effect on the long-term 
budget balance (see Figure 2.5). Further budget improvement 
might be achieved by not enacting some of these proposals: 
x Expanded paid parental leave – an extra $2 billion a year going 
mostly to middle- and upper-income families (Section 9.5).62 
x Cutting company tax – results in foregone revenue of over 
$3 billion per year.63 
x Changes to climate policy – the net effect of abolishing the 
carbon price and associated industry compensation, and 
introducing Direct Action, costs about $4.5 billion a year.64 
x Increasing defence spending – the commitment to increase 
defence spending to 2 per cent of GDP in 10 years, from 
current levels of 1.6 per cent, will cost around $8 billion at full 
implementation.65 
Although these commitments were offset by budget 
improvements elsewhere in the Coalition’s election platform (such 
as a levy on large companies, the abolition of the schoolkids 
bonus, and cuts to the public service and foreign aid) 66 it would 
be possible to enact those improvements without the 
accompanying spending, improving the budget balance. 
Note: All costings are at full implementation, in $2013 
                                            
62 Grattan analysis of Loughnane (2013a); PBO (2013b) 
63 Grattan analysis of PBO (2013b) 
64 Grattan analysis of ibid. 
65 Grattan analysis of Loughnane (2013b); Thomson (2013) 
66 See PBO (2013b); Hockey and Robb (2013) 
4.3 Summary of key choices 
The impacts of the 20 choices we analyse are summarised in 
Figure 4.1. 
Some clear themes emerge from the figure. Proposals for better 
targeting of support for older people (shown in brown) are 
generally larger and more attractive than other alternatives. Just 
four choices could improve the budget balance by $27 billion a 
year.67 The different components of reform of assets taxation 
(shown in red) have very varied assessments. Broadening the 
GST is an attractive reform, but other tax exemptions (shown in 
light orange) are generally less attractive – by and large these tax 
exemptions have survived for good reasons. Tax increases 
(shown in yellow) could do more to improve budget balances, but 
they usually have more negative side effects. A number of cost 
reductions (shown in dark orange) have smaller side effects, but 
their budgetary impact is also often smaller. 
                                            
67 There is some interaction between the Age Pension asset test proposal and 
the retirement age proposal. If the retirement age is lifted, the additional savings 
from reforming the Age Pension asset test are reduced as fewer people are old 
enough to qualify for the Age Pension. 
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Figure 4.1 Budgetary, social and economic impacts of budget choices 
Budget impact per year, 2103$ billion 
 
Note: Proposals considered that would generate less than $2 billion are not shown. These include congestion charges, grants to first home-buyers, middle-class welfare, public sector 
efficiency, avoidable hospital costs and end-of-life care. See Balancing budgets: Supporting analysis p. 48-9. 
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Spending reductions, including reform to the age pension assets 
test and increases to the pension age (which reduce pensions), 
and the variety of other spending proposals identified, add to 
around $33 billion a year. Tax increases as a result of removing 
exemptions add to around $50 billion a year. Higher tax receipts 
as a result of increasing the age of access to pensions and 
superannuation would raise about $9 billion (Figure 4.2). 
Most of the remainder of this report explores these choices in 
detail. Each choice is explored in Balancing budgets: Supporting 
analysis, published in association with this report. 
 
Figure 4.2 Cumulative budgetary impacts of choice themes 
2013$ billion per year 
 
Note: interaction effects between CGT proposals are captured within the proposal for CGT 
on owner-occupied housing, as shown in a lighter colour. 
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5. Packaging reform 
All the proposals in this report would leave some people worse 
off, at least in the short run. In the last decade, governments have 
been averse to making decisions that create identifiable losers.68 
Chapter 3 shows how important it is for pain to be shared: people 
may be more willing to accept the burden if they understand that 
everyone is experiencing some pain. It is also harder for special-
interest groups to claim that their interests should not be 
adversely affected when everyone in the community is sharing the 
burden.  
For these reasons, big and difficult reforms may be best 
introduced in a package. A package can indicate the magnitude of 
the overall problem and show that the burden is widely shared. It 
can also include some (smaller) spending increases that mitigate 
the impacts on those worst off and least able to absorb adverse 
change 
In developing a potential reform package, we considered the 
following criteria:  
x Prioritisation – which proposals are big enough to care about? 
Will they materially improve the budget deficit? 
x Distributional impact – how might proposals be combined so 
that a range of identifiable groups share the burden fairly? 
                                            
68 Daley, et al. (2013), p. 9. For example, see Megalogenis (2012); Tingle (2012) 
5.1 One potential package 
A package that would distribute the burden across the community, 
affecting both rich and poor, and focus on the most attractive 
opportunities identified in our prioritisation, would: 
x broaden the GST 
x raise the pension and super age 
x include the primary residence in the Age Pension asset test 
x limit superannuation tax concessions. 
The proposals in this package would contribute about $37 billion a 
year towards balancing budgets. The package picks up many of 
the proposals that would do most to improve budget balances, 
with relatively limited side effects  
It would affect both rich and poor. Broadening the GST would 
affect all income groups, but would hit low-income earners 
hardest, although compensation could reduce most of the impact. 
Raising the pension and superannuation age would affect all 
income groups. Including the primary residence in the Age 
Pension asset test would primarily affect middle-income earners – 
people doing well enough to own their own house, but not so well 
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that they do not qualify for the Age Pension.69 Limiting 
superannuation tax concessions would mainly affect high-income 
earners, who reap most of the benefits of tax concessions for 
contributing more than $10,000 a year to superannuation. 
The package would probably slightly reduce inequality overall, 
consistent with some – but by no means all – efforts to improve 
budget balances around the world.70 
The major sensitivity with this package is that all of the reforms 
appear to affect older Australians more. This may be more 
perception than reality, but it would be an important issue to 
manage.  
Increasing the pension and superannuation preservation age 
mainly affects those aged about 50 to 55 in the short term. 
Assuming that the eligibility ages are lifted gradually, those 
already retired would be unaffected. All Australians who are under 
50 today will share the burden in the future as they age. Many 
under the age of 45 may believe that increase is inevitable – and 
in any case the effect is at least 20 years away.  
Including owner-occupied dwellings in the assets test primarily 
affects those over 65 – although obviously these rules will apply 
to everyone when they are older.  
                                            
69 People in this cohort are likely to be middle-income earners over their 
lifetimes, and although their income in retirement is likely to be less than when 
working, their disposable incomes can often be relatively high: see Phillips and 
Nepal (2012) 
70 Rawdanowicz, et al. (2013), p. 27-28 
Limiting superannuation contribution tax concessions would affect 
high wage earners in all age groups, but particularly those over 
the age of 60 who currently pay much lower rates of income tax 
than younger people on similar incomes. Again, those who are 
younger now pay their share in that they will also miss out on 
current, generous arrangements as they age. 
Broadening the GST affects the spending of all Australians. Older 
Australians who are not working are likely to prefer other tax 
changes such as income tax increases that inherently affect them 
less. 
The skew of Australia’s current tax and welfare systems explains 
why the proposed package would have a greater impact on older 
Australians in the short term. Our tax and welfare system is 
generally tightly targeted to those most in need. The biggest 
exception is pension and superannuation systems, which are 
substantially ‘age-based’ rather than ‘needs based’. Inevitably, 
reforming these arrangements emerges as a high priority that 
would substantially improve budget balances with relatively 
limited side effects. 
Other packages might be designed around a different 
combination of proposals. The key task is to group together major 
reforms in ways that demonstrate that everyone in the community 
is sharing the burden of budget repair.  
5.2 A package for federalism  
Packaging reforms together can also help to overcome the politics 
of federalism, and ensure that both Commonwealth and state 
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governments pull their weight in improving budget balances. 
Broadening the GST would transfer substantial additional revenue 
to states if current arrangements were maintained. The 
Commonwealth would incur much of the political pain in 
broadening the GST. To improve its budget, the Commonwealth 
might reduce some of the tied grants paid to the states that 
provide about 25 per cent of their revenue – although inevitably 
these are in program areas where the Commonwealth (at least in 
the past) saw substantial political benefits from involvement. 
Such a substantial contribution to state government budgets and 
autonomy provides an opportunity to lock in other reform. One 
option would be to make the increased GST revenue conditional 
on states also reforming payroll tax thresholds. But while this 
might contribute up to $6 billion a year to State government 
budgets, it is unclear that this reform would substantially improve 
long-run economic growth given its potential impact on 
unemployment. Alternatively, the Commonwealth might make the 
increased GST conditional on states reducing their payroll rate, 
but also abolishing the payroll tax threshold, which would provide 
some efficiency gains (see Section 8.2). 
A better alternative might be to make the increased GST revenue 
conditional on states reducing stamp duties and increasing 
property rates over time. This reform, while politically difficult, 
would make it easier to sell property to whoever values it most 
highly. It also reduces the vulnerability of state budgets to falling 
revenues when there are fewer property transactions (typically 
when property prices are falling).71 This reform would not improve 
State budgets much, but it would substantially improve the 
efficiency of the tax system, and lift economic growth. 
Any such package would reduce vertical fiscal imbalance (see 
glossary) between the Commonwealth and states. Many say that 
because states don’t raise half the revenue they spend, they tend 
towards less responsible budgets.72 
                                            
71 For discussion of the merits of this reform, see Daley, et al. (2012a), p. 33-34; 
Kelly, et al. (2013), p. 32-33 
72 See Eyraud and Lusinyan (2011) 
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6. Superannuation and pensions
Improving the targeting of pension and superannuation policy is 
the largest single theme among the budget choices we have 
identified. 
Obviously these choices primarily affect older Australians in the 
short term. They emerge as high priorities because tax and 
welfare policies for older Australians are less well-targeted to 
those most in need than are other policies, and consequently 
there are more opportunities for change that deliver substantial 
improvements to the budget with relatively few side-effects.  
These choices will affect all Australians as they age, not just the 
current older generation. 
Budget measures that affect older Australians may also be 
appropriate because older Australians are putting most pressure 
on government budgets. As we showed in Budget pressures on 
Australian governments, the largest spending increases over the 
last decade have been increased spending on health (where more 
is spent per capita on older people than on younger people) and 
on the Age Pension. Both of these spending categories grew 
substantially faster than GDP, not because of the ageing 
population, but because of explicit and implicit choices to spend 
more per person of a given age.73 
The key choices we identify are increasing the age of access for 
the Age Pension and superannuation, limiting tax concessions for 
superannuation, and including owner-occupied housing in the Age 
                                            
73 Daley, et al. (2013) 
Pension assets test. Although a government is unlikely to make all 
these choices simultaneously, collectively they could improve 
budget balances by $27 billion a year.74 
6.1 Pension and superannuation preservation age 
Increasing to 70 the age of access to the Age Pension and 
superannuation (the ‘retirement age’) is one of the most 
economically attractive choices to improve budgets in the medium 
term. It could ultimately improve the budget bottom line by 
$12 billion a year in today’s terms, while producing a lift in 
economic activity of up to 2 per cent of GDP.75 The principal 
adverse social consequence is that some who would prefer to 
stop working earlier will not be able to afford to do so. Given 
increasing life expectancy, this is a reasonable burden.76 
Increasing the retirement age would almost certainly lead to many 
people choosing to work for longer. There is a noticeable increase 
in the number of people who retire once they can withdraw super 
tax free, and another jump once they become eligible for the Age 
Pension (Figure 6.1). 
                                            
74 This costing is based on all measures being introduced, and includes likely 
interaction effects between the proposals. 
75 Daley, et al. (2012a) 
76 A recent analysis of ageing policy can be found in PC (2013) 
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Figure 6.1 Age of eligibility for superannuation and Age Pension 
affects retirement decisions 
Cumulative per cent retired, males 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of ABS (2011a) 
Note: Assumes that differences in labour-force participation rates between cohorts 1 year 
apart in age reflect retirement rates. 
It is probably only feasible to increase pension and 
superannuation ages gradually over several years. Current 
legislation will increase the pension age from 65 to 65½ in 2017, 
and then by 6 months every 2 years until it reaches 67 in 2023.77 
This timetable could be accelerated to start raising the pension 
                                            
77 DHS (2013a) 
age by 6 months every year starting in 2015, and it would then 
reach 70 by 2025. 
The age of access to superannuation is legislated to rise from 55 
to 60 by 2024, although there are already substantial restrictions 
and tax penalties on superannuation withdrawals between 55 and 
60. The age of unfettered access to superannuation could be 
increased from 60 by 6 months every year starting in 2015, and it 
would then reach 70 in 2035. Once the substantial increases in 
life expectancy of the last 30 years have been incorporated into 
the access ages as proposed, then it may be appropriate to index 
the access age for age pension and superannuation to life 
expectancy. 
This phasing would still have a substantial effect within a decade. 
The benefit to the budget bottom line would be approximately 
$12 billion by 2023, and about $15 billion by 2035 in today’s 
dollars. 
People working for longer would improve medium-term budget 
balances in a number of ways. First, they would pay income taxes 
for longer – increasing income taxes by about $9 billion a year in 
today’s terms by 2035, on our calculations. Second, they would 
continue to contribute to their superannuation accounts for longer, 
and so would self-fund their retirement for longer. Third, Age 
Pension payments would reduce by at least $3 billion a year in 
today’s terms, on our estimate. This third saving is primarily from 
those who retire onto part pensions. Those who qualify for the full 
Age Pension in the early years of retirement were usually 
receiving other welfare benefits such as the disability pension 
immediately beforehand. For this group, changing the age of 
eligibility for the Age Pension will not reduce welfare payments; 
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instead it will merely change the category of payment received.78 
Unlike almost all the other budget choices examined, this 
proposal would increase economic activity. A higher retirement 
age that encourages more mature-aged people to work for longer 
would produce a sizeable increase in economic activity. Our 
previous work identified this as one of the few policy game-
changers for economic growth, with analysis estimating that 
increasing the retirement age to 70 would increase economic 
activity by about 2 per cent once fully implemented.79 
There would be some social costs to people working for longer. 
Contrary to popular belief, there would be little impact on 
volunteering, and life satisfaction would not be materially lower.80 
However, some people prefer to retire early, and some of them 
would no longer be able to afford to do so. 
Yet this is a reasonable burden to impose. Life expectancy has 
increased substantially, while the eligibility age for the Age 
Pension did not move for men between 1908 and today. 
Increasing life expectancy is largely due to health care 
improvements that are themselves putting the greatest pressure 
on budgets.81 
When the Age Pension was introduced in 1908, the age of 
eligibility was set to 65 for men and 60 for women. At that time, a 
                                            
78 Horin (2010) Most of this group receive Disability or Carer’s Pension rather 
than Newstart, and so there is little difference in benefits when moving to the 
Age Pension: Gregory (2012) 
79 Daley, et al. (2012a) 
80 Ibid. 
81 Daley, et al. (2013) 
15-year old boy could expect to live to 64; a 15-year old girl to 67. 
Those who survived to receive the pension did not spend much 
time drawing it: on average male recipients would spend a little 
over 11 years on the pension, while women would draw it for 17.82 
Today, the Age Pension age of eligibility is 65 for men and 
women, though this will increase slowly to 67 by 2023. Life 
expectancy for 15-year old boys is 80 today, and almost 85 for 
girls. Half the men going onto the Age Pension at 65 today will 
receive it for more than 19 years; half the women for more than 
22.83  
The value of this increased life expectancy, and its link to active 
lives, is perhaps best illustrated by the boom in travel over the last 
few decades. As the CEO of a leading tour operator remarked 
recently: 
“Modern medical science is [a] gift that keeps on giving! New 
knees and hips, as well as heart stents – especially heart 
stents – are giving my customers another 10 to 20 years of 
travelling”.84 
Increasing the age of access to superannuation would not be a 
regressive policy change, because any reduction in choice would 
primarily affect those with higher incomes. Those who withdraw 
their super early are almost always those on higher incomes 
(Figure 6.2).  
                                            
82 ABS (2008) 
83 Daley, et al. (2012a) 
84 Kohler (2013) 
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Figure 6.2 Proportion of age cohort withdrawing payment from their 
superannuation account 
Per cent 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of ABS (2011c) 
The primary concern with increasing the retirement age is the 
increased burden on those who are not fit to work at age 65. Yet 
this is a declining proportion of the population.85 The needs of this 
group would be best addressed by allowing earlier access to 
superannuation for those who have a disability. Assessments of 
                                            
85 The proportion of the workforce in the most physically demanding sectors 
(agriculture, construction and manufacturing) has dropped from about 28 per 
cent to 20 per cent in the last two decades, and these trends are likely to 
continue. See Lowe (2012) 
eligibility for the disability pension might also use less stringent 
tests of whether a person aged over 65 has such a severe 
impairment that they are unable to work.86 This is preferable to 
setting a lower than ideal retirement age for all people because of 
concern for this particular group.  
Of course, policies that encourage employment of older workers 
would also help. However, as we showed in Game-Changers, 
pension eligibility ages are the biggest driver of retirement 
decisions around the world. In Australia most people retire 
because they choose to do so rather than because they are 
unable to find employment.87 
6.2 Superannuation contribution tax concessions 
At present, employees are only taxed at 15 per cent for the first 
$25,000 – or $35,000 for those aged 59 and over – that they put 
into their superannuation account each year. Reducing these 
thresholds to $10,000 could raise up to $6 billion a year. The 
change would have little impact on low-income earners, as the 
vast majority of contribution tax concessions benefit older workers 
on high incomes. There would be some negative economic impact 
as older workers would pay more income tax, and so have less 
incentive to work. It may also reduce national savings.88 
                                            
86 Although this might create some ‘leakage’ into the disability pension, by 
definition these people would currently be on the Age Pension, so there would 
be no net increase in welfare payments. 
87 Daley, et al. (2012a), p. 52-53 
88 For a discussion of the relationship between superannuation and national 
savings, see Gruen and Soding (2011) 
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Superannuation differs from regular savings because it attracts 
significant tax concessions. Contributions made from pre-tax 
earnings are only taxed at 15 per cent up to the $25,000 or 
$35,000 thresholds.89 Earnings from superannuation funds are 
only taxed at 15 per cent during the accumulation phase (usually 
pre-retirement) and not taxed at all when supporting retirement 
income streams; earnings from other savings are taxed at the 
person’s marginal tax rate.90 People – especially high-income 
earners – who save through superannuation usually pay 
substantially less tax than if they save through other investments. 
Superannuation savings can be taxed at three points: when they 
are put into a superannuation fund (known as contributions); when 
they earn income (known as accumulations, which include both 
capital gains and income); and when they are withdrawn or 
produce an income stream.  
In Australia, superannuation contributions from pre-tax earnings 
are effectively untaxed for those earning less than $37,000 a year. 
For those earning more, contributions up to the thresholds are 
taxed at 15 per cent, and over the thresholds at the person’s 
marginal tax rate (which can be as high as 46.5 per cent). In 
2014-15 these thresholds will be raised to $30,000 of 
contributions in a single year for those under 50, and the $35,000 
                                            
89 Changes announced in the 2013 budget would tax contributions from those 
earning more than $300,000 a year at 30 per cent (Swan and Shorten (2013)). 
The Coalition government has not announced any change to this policy (see 
Hockey and Robb (2013); Hockey and Sinodinis (2013)).  
90 Changes announced in the 2013 budget would tax earnings above $100,000 a 
year that are supporting income streams at 15 per cent (Treasury (2013a) BP2, 
p. 41.) The Coalition government has announced that it will not proceed with 
these changes (Hockey and Sinodinis (2013)). 
threshold will apply to those over 50.91 By comparison, savings 
outside of superannuation are generally made from post-tax 
earnings, and so in effect contributions are taxed at the person’s 
marginal tax rate, which is 38.5 per cent for many taxpayers. 
These arrangements lead to workers over 60 paying substantially 
less income tax than younger workers with similar incomes. They 
can arrange their affairs so that the first $35,000 of income is 
deposited to superannuation – from where it can immediately be 
withdrawn tax free (conditional on a superannuation balance of 
more than $350,000), but is not included in taxable income. As a 
result a 61-year old working full-time on the Australian average 
wage of $77,000 a year may pay at least $5000 less a year in tax 
than a person under 60 who only makes compulsory 
superannuation contributions of 9.25 per cent.92  
Superannuation earnings also attract less tax. Capital gains made 
on assets inside a superannuation fund are taxed at 10 per cent, 
and other income — interest and dividends — is taxed at 
15 per cent. Franking credits (tax paid on behalf of the 
shareholder by a company) may be used to offset a tax liability 
within the fund, including capital gains.93 By comparison, earnings 
on savings outside of superannuation are again taxed at the 
marginal tax rate – 38.5 per cent for many taxpayers. 
                                            
91 ATO (2013a) The threshold is indexed to CPI and rounded to the nearest 
$5,000: it is expected to lift to $30,000 in 2014-15. 
92 These calculations do not include additional tax concessions from the Seniors 
and Pensioners Tax Offset. Depending on the spouse’s income this might 
reduce the tax payable by a person aged 65 or over by another $1600. 
93 ASIC (2013c) 
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Some retirement systems in other countries balance tax 
concessions on contributions and accumulations by taxing 
withdrawals. In Australia withdrawals from superannuation 
accounts are generally untaxed if the person is aged over 60.94  
Our proposal would reduce the concessional contributions 
threshold to $10,000.95 Contributions above the threshold would 
be taxed at the marginal rate. After taking into account the 
interaction between deposit and accumulation tax concessions, 
this proposal would increase Commonwealth tax revenues by 
around $6 billion when it was fully implemented. Not all the 
superannuation contribution concessions would become revenue 
if they were revoked.96 However, we expect that income tax would 
be paid at marginal rates on almost all of the income that would 
otherwise attract a superannuation contribution tax concession. 
Although some investments would be switched into other asset 
classes, there is no alternative investment that allows taxpayers to 
avoid paying income tax on earnings before they are invested. 
                                            
94 ASIC (2013a). More complex rules apply to taxation of withdrawals by peopled 
aged between 55 and 60. 
95 There is considerable uncertainty about the superannuation balances of those 
making concessional contributions into their superannuation accounts. Some 
who are making contributions are ‘catching up’ on not having had a 
superannuation guarantee for much of their working career. Others are simply 
using the rules to minimise their tax. Given the available data, it is impossible to 
tell what proportion of super contributions are made by each group. However,  
data from the ATO (2013c) suggest that those with the capacity to make large 
contributions are among the richest 30 per cent of those in their 60s. The 
Household Expenditure Survey, which gives a survey-based estimate of 
superannuation balances, suggests that the top 30 per cent of those in their 60s 
are more likely to have large superannuation balances (ABS (2011c)). 
96 Treasury (2013d) 
The proposal would have limited social impact. It would have 
almost no impact on the bottom 20 per cent, as superannuation 
contribution concessions mostly benefit older people on high 
incomes, as Figure 6.3 shows. Capping superannuation tax 
concessions would also support gender equity as the current 
Figure 6.3 Superannuation concessions and government benefits 
$000 per person per year, income earners within age group 
 
Note: Assumes those aged 60 and over with income over $60,000 contribute the full 
amount allowed by the concessional cap. 
Source: Grattan analysis of ATO (2013c) 
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superannuation concessions primarily benefit men (and their 
female partners).97 
Tightening these tax concessions is unlikely to substantially 
reduce the draw on the Age Pension. Those in the top 10 per cent 
of earners aged 35 to 54 are likely to have sufficient savings that 
they will not qualify for an Age Pension.98 And those in the top 
three earning deciles aged 55 and over would probably save 
anyway. The superannuation concessions probably do increase 
their retirement incomes, but only at the cost of younger people 
paying more tax.  
Tightening superannuation tax concessions might reduce 
workforce participation because it would increase marginal rates 
of income tax for those over 60. Assuming a 10 per cent reduction 
in take home pay leads to a 2 per cent reduction in participation,99 
we estimate the proposal would reduce labour force participation 
for those aged 60 to 70 by about 0.5 per cent, reducing income 
tax by about $0.3 billion. 
Nor would the proposal undermine the superannuation system. 
The articulated purposes of the superannuation system are to 
provide an adequate level of retirement income, relieve pressure 
on the Age Pension, and increase national savings.100 Yet these 
aims need to be balanced against the many other purposes of 
government. Merely increasing retirement incomes of older 
workers is not sufficient justification for providing substantial tax 
                                            
97 Jefferson (2012) 
98 See Figure 6.7 showing that few households in the top 10 percent qualify for 
an Age Pension.  
99 Saez, et al. (2012) 
100 Treasury (2013d), p. 21 
concessions that in effect mean that younger workers on similar 
incomes must pay more tax. Most people would like to be rich – 
both before and in retirement. If some are to have higher 
retirement incomes, the question is who is going to pay for it. As 
Figure 6.4 shows, even after the concessions are reduced, those 
on higher incomes will still receive substantially greater 
concessions than other taxpayers. 
Figure 6.4 Superannuation concessions withdrawn by proposal 
$000 per person per year, income decile within age group 
 
Notes: Assumes those aged 60 and over with income over $60,000 contribute the full 
amount allowed by the concessional cap. 
Source: Grattan analysis of ATO (2013c) 
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We recommend changes to taxation of contributions rather than 
withdrawals, which would be administratively complex and 
potentially extremely costly. Changes to withdrawal rules raise 
difficult questions of how to treat superannuation that has already 
been contributed, and now cannot be withdrawn. These 
contributions were made with expectations that they would be 
treated according to the existing rules on accumulation and 
withdrawal. An alternative proposal would tax all contributions at 
the taxpayer’s marginal rate, but exempt all earnings from tax.101 
Again this would be administratively complex, as all previously 
contributed superannuation funds would then be taxed at a 
different rate to all newly contributed funds. 
6.3 Superannuation earnings tax concessions 
Taxing superannuation earnings of those over 60 at 15 per cent 
(as for younger taxpayers) would yield $3 billion in additional tax 
revenue. The measure would have minimal effect on the bottom 
20 per cent of income earners, as they receive very little in 
superannuation earnings. 
Superannuation accounts held by over-60s do not pay tax on 
earned income, such as dividends, interest and capital gains, so 
long as the account-holder is making some withdrawals.102 
Superannuation accounts held by under-60s, by contrast, pay 
15 per cent tax on all income.103 
                                            
101 Freebairn (2013a) 
102 ASIC (2013a) 
103 This anomaly was excluded from the terms of reference of the Henry Review: 
Treasury (2010a) 
The proposal would tax all earnings on superannuation at 
15 per cent, restoring the taxation arrangements that existed until 
late 2006. The proposal would have little effect on low income 
earners. As Figure 6.5 shows, the richest 10 per cent of those in 
their 60s receive most of the benefit of this tax exemption, worth 
on average around $100 a week to them.104 By contrast, those in 
the bottom 20 per cent, with limited superannuation balances, 
barely benefit from this concession.  
Figure 6.5 Income by source for those in their 60s 
$000 per person per year 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of ABS (2011c) 
                                            
104 Based on Grattan analysis of ABS (2011c) 
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6.4 Age pension asset test 
Including owner-occupied housing in the calculation of a retiree’s 
eligibility for the Age Pension would contribute about $7 billion a 
year to the budget.105 The change would also encourage people 
to downsize to housing which may be better suited to their needs, 
enabling more efficient use of the existing housing stock. The 
change would have little impact on those in the bottom 
20 per cent of incomes because they do not have enough wealth 
to put them over the asset test threshold. The impact on low-
income retirees with high-value houses would be mitigated by 
allowing them to claim the pension that would be paid back when 
their house is eventually sold. 
Currently an assets test is applied to the Age Pension. Those with 
net wealth above a threshold have their payments reduced 
progressively. The assets included in the asset test include most 
forms of wealth, such as cash deposits, shares, superannuation 
balance and investment properties – but not the primary 
residence. Although there is a slightly lower threshold for those 
who own their own home, this effectively only takes into account 
the value of the residence up to $142,500. Consequently, many 
Age Pension payments are made to households that have 
substantial property assets. Almost $20 billion of these payments 
– around half of the total – are made to households with more 
than half a million dollars in net assets (Figure 6.6).  
                                            
105 This estimate is based on Grattan analysis of ibid. and HILDA (2012) 
Figure 6.6 Age pension expenditures and household wealth 
Age Pension expenditures, 2012-13, $ billion 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of ABS (2011c) 
Of mature age households with a million dollars in net assets, 
about 80 per cent receive welfare benefits. On average they 
receive more than $200 a week (Figure 6.7). 
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Figure 6.7 Household assets and Age Pension eligibility 
 
Note: ‘Mature-aged households’ refers to households in which the household reference 
person, generally the ‘head’ of the household, is of Age Pension age (65 and over).  
Source: Grattan analysis of ABS (2011c) 
Including owner-occupied housing in the Age Pension assets test 
raises significant concerns that the change would hurt asset-rich 
but income-poor households. An equitable solution would be to 
allow people who fail the asset test due to the value of their 
dwelling to receive the age pension. However, the government 
would accumulate a claim against their dwelling, which it would 
reclaim when the dwelling was transferred or sold.106 The value of 
                                            
106 In effect the scheme would be similar to including dwellings in the asset test, 
and the government providing a no-interest reverse-mortgage. 
the debt would be included in calculating the asset test. Over time 
the net asset value might reduce so that the person was eligible 
for the pension without accumulating further debt. By definition the 
person would always retain a net equity in the dwelling of at least 
the asset test threshold. 
On our estimates, such a reform would improve the budget 
bottom line by about $7 billion a year on an accounting basis, 
though only about $5 billion a year on a cash measure. The 
difference is the value of the debt accumulated by the government 
that will be realised when houses are ultimately sold. 
This proposal would also treat homeowners and renters more 
fairly. Home-owners would be able to access benefits equivalent 
to rent assistance, but the same assets test threshold would apply 
to both home-owners and renters. 
In addition to their cash payment, Age Pension recipients are 
eligible for significant concessions on services such as car 
registration and third party insurance, utilities, rates and health 
expenses. These benefits are available to those receiving a part 
pension of any value, so the majority of mature-aged households 
are currently eligible.107  Reducing the number of people eligible 
for the Age Pension thus has the potential to reduce concession 
expenditure for states, improving their budget position. 
However, the proposal would leave untouched other ‘age-based’ 
welfare schemes, including the Senior Australians and Pension 
                                            
107 Grattan analysis of ABS (2011c), see Figure 6.7. Commonwealth-state 
agreements prevent states from restricting eligibility for concessions to full 
pensioners. See Treasury (2010b) Section D6 
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Tax Offset (which reduces income tax rates for those over 65) and 
the Seniors Health Card (which further subsidises medical costs 
for those over 65 but not eligible for a pension). 
The change would also have substantial positive economic and 
social effects. The current Age Pension asset test encourages 
many retirees to stay in houses which may be larger than they 
need. If a retiree moves into a smaller house and has a surplus, 
this surplus is included in the Age Pension asset test, and the 
pension reduced accordingly.108 Despite some policy attempts to 
smooth the transition to more appropriate housing,109 many 
retirees face reduced retirement incomes if they move into a 
smaller dwelling.  
Removing barriers to downsizing would enable more efficient use 
of the existing housing stock – particularly important when supply 
of new housing stock is constrained.110 
The current Age Pension test also encourages retirees to hold 
more of their wealth in a highly concentrated asset: their 
residence. A reformed asset test would encourage retirees to 
invest in a more balanced portfolio. It would also reflect that older 
owner-occupiers have been the primary beneficiaries of the very 
large real increases in house prices over the past 40 years, which 
are unlikely to be repeated in future now that interest rates cannot 
fall much further. 
                                            
108 ASIC (2013b) 
109 Net receipts up to $200k from the sale of a dwelling held more than 25 years 
may be quarantined from the asset test for 10 years or until they are used. See 
Chancellor (2013) 
110 See Kelly, et al. (2011) 
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7. Capital gains tax and housing
Change to the tax treatment of housing and other assets has 
been widely discussed as a way to improve budget balances. 
Options that have been canvassed include reducing the capital 
gains discount on assets, taxing the capital gain on the largest 
single asset class in Australia – owner-occupied housing – and 
eliminating the ability to negatively gear investments, typically 
investment properties. Our analysis shows that abolishing the 
capital gains tax discount is attractive; levying capital gains tax on 
owner-occupied housing could have large negative social and 
economic side-effects, and abolishing negative gearing would 
raise little budgetary revenue in the long run.  
Many of these proposals also affect home ownership, the 
availability of housing, and the equitable treatment of renters and 
owner-occupiers. While these important policy objectives were 
discussed in the recent report published by Grattan Institute, 
Renovating housing policy,111 this report focuses on the extent to 
which the proposals might improve budget balances. 
Instincts that these proposals would yield substantial revenue may 
be based on the very large increases in property prices over the 
last two decades. Yet these increases were largely based on 
long-term reductions in inflation rates and interest rates, which are 
unlikely to be repeated in future.112 
Pressure to reform this area also stems from inconsistencies in 
the taxation of different investment types. Rules for specific 
                                            
111 Kelly, et al. (2013). 
112 Ellis (2013) 
investment types such as dividend imputation, capital gains, and 
superannuation, result in real effective marginal tax rates for a 
high-income earner ranging from 70 per cent (on bank deposits) 
to -30 per cent (on superannuation).113 This report focuses on 
reforms that would contribute to balancing budgets, although 
obviously rationalizing the taxation of investments as well is 
preferable. 
7.1 Capital gains discount 
Eliminating the capital gains tax (CGT) discount to tax capital 
gains at the same rate as income could raise $5 billion a year in 
extra revenue.114 The additional revenue raised is relatively 
uncertain, and depends on future asset price appreciation and 
interest rates. There might be some reduction in the numbers of 
individual entrepreneurs setting up businesses. There would be 
little impact on people in the bottom 20 per cent of the income 
distribution. 
Capital gains tax is levied on assets that are sold for more than 
their nominal cost plus the cost of improvements. The introduction 
of capital gains tax in 1986 ensured that all sources of income 
were taxed.115 Before this income from capital investments was 
                                            
113 Treasury (2010b) Vol 1, p. 67 
114 In 2012-13, the capital gains discount was valued at $5.4 billion with 
$4.7 billion provided to individuals and trusts. This excludes exemptions for 
owner-occupied housing. Treasury (2013e), p. 5, 7 
115 The principle of comprehensive income was outlined by Haig and Simons in 
the early 20th century and discussed by Evans (2002), p. 119 
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not taxable and people could reclassify ordinary income as capital 
gains to avoid paying tax.116  
Initially, capital gains were calculated as the difference between 
an asset’s purchase price (indexed for inflation) and selling 
price.117 Since 1999, capital gains have been calculated as the 
difference between an asset’s purchase price (not indexed for 
inflation) and selling price, less a discount.118 Under that discount, 
individuals and trusts are taxed on 50 per cent of their capital 
gains, and superannuation funds on 67 per cent of their gains.119 
A range of special provisions apply to small businesses.120 
The discounts were rationalised on the basis that they encourage 
people to become entrepreneurs and invest in riskier assets. 
Proponents argue that the discounts compensate for capital gains 
being eroded by inflation, double taxation on savings and reduce 
potential lock-in effects created by the tax.121 However, other 
forms of investment – such as bank deposits – are similarly 
eroded by inflation and double taxation, but receive no discount, 
and tax is payable each year rather than being deferred until the 
                                            
116 Ibid., p. 118. The incentive to reclassify income as capital gains still exists as 
a result of the 50 per cent discount, but is weaker than when capital gains were 
untaxed. 
117 As a result of ‘grandfather’ provisions, capital gains tax is only levied on 
assets acquired after 1985. 
118 Other changes introduced at the same time included abolishing averaging 
provisions, rationalization and extension of a series of small business retirement 
and roll-over concessions and the removal of depreciable assets from the CGT 
regime: Evans (2002). 
119 Ibid. 
120 Wood, et al. (2006), p. 23  
121 Burman (2009), p. 114 
investment is sold.122  Not surprisingly, all of the arguments for the 
capital gains tax discount are contested123 and some 
commentators argue that the discounts reduce equity.124 
Freebairn describes the capital gains tax regime as “…an 
unsatisfactory hybrid with limited logic.”125 Nevertheless, the Rudd 
government explicitly rejected changes to the discounts in its 
response to the Henry tax review.126  
There are good arguments to abolish the capital gains discount 
altogether. Other forms of investments and income from working 
are taxed at the marginal rate of income tax. On other 
investments (such as bank deposits), investors are not 
compensated for inflation, and effectively pay tax on the nominal 
value of their investment. It is not obvious why returns on 
investment should be taxed less than returns from working. 
If the discount were abolished entirely, additional tax of $5 billion 
would have been collected in 2012-13.127 It is likely that investors 
would attempt to change their investment strategy in response. 
However, it is difficult to see an alternative strategy that would 
become more attractive, and so reduce the amount of tax 
collected if investors moved to alternative investments. 
The proposal may have negative social and economic effects. 
Removing the discount may reduce investment in new 
                                            
122 Capital gains are taxed on sale rather than by estimating the increase in 
value and paying tax each year. 
123 For example, see Burman (2009) p. 113-114 and Evans (2002) p. 120-122 
124 For example, see Evans (2002), p. 127 
125 Freebairn (2012), p. 22 
126 Lester (2010) 
127 Treasury (2013e) 
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businesses, since the returns from selling a successful business 
would be lower.128 This effect may be limited: the discount is 
smaller for superannuation funds and does not apply to larger 
businesses. For individuals and small businesses there are 
already a range of exemptions (not affected by this proposal) that 
limit the effect of capital gains tax. In any case, capital gains paid 
on the sale of businesses are a small proportion of the total tax 
collected: most of the tax is paid by individuals on share-market 
investments and investor housing.129 
The proposal may have the disadvantage of increasing asset 
lock-in effects: investors might avoid selling assets that would 
produce capital gains.130 As a result, it would discourage 
rebalancing portfolios in order to maintain diversity.131 
Abolishing the discounts would have little impact on people in the 
bottom 20 per cent of the income distribution, and would be 
strongly progressive.132 As Figure 7.1 shows, high-income earning 
individuals benefit the most from capital gains tax discounts. 
2 per cent of the highest income earners earn 52% of the capital 
gains. Compared to lower-income earners, higher income earners 
are more likely to have additional income that can be invested.133  
In order to reduce the effect on investment decisions by removing 
the discount, capital gains tax could be calculated as the sale 
price less the cost base of the asset increased at the same rate 
                                            
128 OECD (2006); Djankov, et al. (2010) 
129 See Balancing budgets: Supporting analysis, p. 16 
130 For example, see Dai, et al. (2008) 
131 OECD (2006) 
132 Treasury (2010b) Vol.1, p. 66 
133 Evans (2002); Burman (2009), p. 116-117 
as inflation (the original 1985 design for CGT). This would 
calculate real capital gains, accounting for inflation. Alternatively, 
the discount could be reduced to 40 per cent, but capital gains 
would still be calculated on the nominal cost base.134 These 
arrangements would generally collect more tax than the current  
Figure 7.1 Proportion of taxpayers, income and total capital gains 
Percentage of total, by income tax bracket, 2010-11 tax returns 
 
Note: Tax free thresholds changed between 2010-11 and 2012-13. 2010-11 data is 
presented in 2012-13 tax brackets as closely as data allows. 
Source: Grattan analysis of ATO (2013c) Detailed table 2.8 
                                            
134 Treasury (2010b), p. 80. This would work in conjunction with changes to the 
way savings are taxed. 
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discount arrangement, depending on the rate of asset price 
appreciation, inflation, and how long the asset is held.135 However, 
it is unclear why these intermediary proposals would be preferable 
to simply abolishing the capital gains tax discount altogether. 
7.2 Capital gains exemption for owner-occupied housing 
Making owner-occupied housing liable for capital gains tax could 
generate additional tax revenue of $15 billion. However, 
collections could be anywhere between zero and $36 billion, 
depending on whether the capital gains tax discount of 
50 per cent remains in place, whether owners are allowed to claim 
tax deductions for the interest paid on home mortgages, and 
future rises in house prices. However, the proposal would have 
substantial negative social impacts. It would discourage moving 
house since home sales would crystallise liability to pay capital 
gains tax. Young purchasers would be tempted to choose 
oversized housing to reduce the number of home moves they 
make over a lifetime If mortgage interest can be deducted from 
income tax, this would encourage home-owners to consume more 
and save less. The policy might well reduce home ownership 
rates.  
If capital gains tax is charged on owner-occupied housing with the 
50 per cent discount that applies to capital gains on other assets, 
it could generate about $18 billion a year in gross revenue based 
on a 5-year average. After allowing for alterations and additions, 
the net capital gain would be $15 billion. The tax payable would 
                                            
135 See Balancing budgets: Supporting analysis, p. 17 
increase to $36 billion a year if the capital gains tax discount were 
also abolished.136  
Relatively little tax would be raised for many years if all existing 
holdings were exempted from the tax (similar to the exemption of 
all assets acquired before the capital gains tax was first 
introduced). 
The potential tax revenue would be substantially reduced if 
owner-occupiers were allowed to deduct expenses incurred in 
owning the house, particularly mortgage interest. If this had been 
permitted in 2012-13, mortgage interest deductibility would have 
offset most of the capital gains. Based on a 10-year average, 
about $63 billion in interest was paid annually on owner-occupied 
housing, entitling owners to deductions valued at about 
$19 billion,137 compared to potential capital gains revenue of 
around $18 billion if the 50 per cent discount is retained, as shown 
in Figure 7.2.138 Some tax would nevertheless be paid by 
individual taxpayers with low leverage or with houses that rose in 
value quickly. 
                                            
136 Treasury (multiple years), based on five year average between 2008-09 and 
2011-12. 
137 RBA (2013b), Table D2, RBA (2013a), Table F5 
138 Deductions for alterations and additions were significantly less, valued at 
$2 billion, assuming that all alterations and additions are undertaken by owner-
occupiers and an average marginal tax rate of 30 per cent. This does not include 
deductions for maintenance. ABS (2013d); ABS (2011b) 
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Figure 7.2 Fiscal impact of collecting CGT on owner-occupied 
housing 
$ billions / year 
 
Note: Assumes no CGT discount, total value of alterations and additions are attributable to 
owner-occupiers and an average marginal tax rate of 30 per cent. 
Source: ABS (2012, 2013); RBA (2013) 
However, allowing tax deductibility of mortgage interest 
encourages households to maintain higher leverage, increasing 
their vulnerability to an economic downturn, as the US 
experienced over the past 5 years.139 
                                            
139 Bartlett (2012), p. 108-109 
There would be less tendency to over-leverage, and the tax 
revenue would be substantially larger, if owner-occupiers were not 
allowed to deduct mortgage interest. This might be justified on the 
basis of ‘imputed rent’. If owner-occupiers were treated equitably 
with renters and landlords, they would pay tax on the rental value 
of the dwelling – but claim the mortgage interest against this 
income.140 Tax is not levied on imputed rents in Australia, and so 
mortgage interest is not deductible against it. Consequently, it 
might be considered fair to disallow owner-occupiers from 
deducting mortgage interest from their capital gains.  
However, there would be substantial adverse social and economic 
effects. The policy change could exacerbate lock-in effects, with 
people delaying selling their houses in order to avoid capital gains 
tax. People would over-invest in housing relative to their 
immediate needs. Some would buy a first home larger than they 
currently need (to delay incurring a CGT liability associated with 
up-sizing); others would hold on to homes that no longer meet 
their needs.141 The increase in demand for larger housing would 
make the existing stock more expensive for those who would 
really value the additional space. Housing lock-in may also 
discourage people from moving to housing closer to their 
employment, limiting job mobility and increasing transport costs. It 
would also limit capital gains tax revenue in the short term, 
although in the long-run similar amounts of capital gains tax would 
be levied if sales are merely delayed.  
                                            
140 Kelly, et al. (2013), p. 24 
141 Stamp duties paid when a house is sold already have these effects (see ibid.: 
CGT on owner-occupied housing would make them worse). 
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The proposal might also significantly reduce home ownership 
rates. It would reduce the return on housing for owners relative to 
landlords. 
The budget impact would also depend on other factors that are 
inherently difficult to predict. Apart from the policy choices made, 
these factors include tax collected would depend on house price 
appreciation rates, initial leverage, interest rates, and repayment 
rates. Notional capital gains tax foregone over the last decade  
Figure 7.3 House price appreciation and interest paid 
Per cent per year 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of ABS (2013j); RBA (2013c); RBA (2013a) 
includes gains on three years of very rapid house price 
appreciation, largely driven by a one-off reduction in interest rates, 
as Figure 7.3 shows.  
House price appreciation in future may be much slower. Imposing 
capital gains tax may itself reduce demand and therefore house 
prices, reducing future tax revenue. The actual tax collected could 
well be substantially less than the ‘headline’ tax expense of 
$15 billion. 
7.3 Negatively geared investments 
Negative gearing allows taxpayers to deduct any losses they 
make on investments (including mortgage interest) from their 
overall income when they calculate their tax liability. Under the 
proposed reform, investors would no longer be able to deduct 
these losses against wage income. However, they would be able 
to carry forward any losses and deduct them against any capital 
gain they make when the investment is sold. The proposal would 
contribute about $4 billion a year to the budget in the short term, 
falling to approximately $2 billion a year in the long term. The 
change could increase rates of home ownership by reducing 
demand for investment properties. The change would have little 
impact on those in the bottom 20 per cent, who own relatively few 
investment properties. 
Negative gearing is a popular way to reduce personal income 
tax.142 In the ten years to 2010-11, 1.2 million taxpayers recorded 
                                            
142 While negative gearing is most commonly used for investment properties, it 
can also be used to fund investments in other assets such as shares. Any 
change in tax rules should apply to all asset classes. 
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net losses of $13b on investment properties.143 As an investment 
and tax strategy it is attractive because while losses (including 
interest on borrowings) are fully deducted against taxable income, 
any capital gains are usually taxed with a 50 per cent discount, 
and tax is not payable until the asset is sold.144 As a result 
negative gearing can be an attractive means to reduce and defer 
personal tax liabilities.  
Under the proposal, investors would not be allowed to claim 
losses on investments against other income (particularly wages 
and salaries). However, to maintain parity with the remainder of 
the tax system, they would be able to carry forward these losses 
and claim them against the capital gains liability once the 
investment is sold.145 
The proposal would generate additional tax revenue in the short 
term, although the potential revenue is particularly sensitive to 
changes in the housing market. Applying the average marginal tax 
rate to the average annual net rental losses of $13 billion would 
yield $4 billion in additional tax revenue.146 Under the proposal, 
however, in the medium term this $13 billion loss would be offset 
against future capital gains. Between 2001-02 and 2010-11, on 
average investors made annual capital gains on real estate of 
$14 billion, which was discounted to $7 billion, incurring tax 
liabilities of $2 billion (see Figure 7.4).147  
                                            
143 Inflated to 2012-13 dollars. ATO (2013c), Detailed Table 2.1 
144 See above Section 7.1 
145 Eslake (2013) 
146 ATO (2013c) Detailed table 2.1, Grattan analysis, 10-year average, converted 
to 2012-13 dollars. 
147 Ibid., Table 7.6, converted to 2012-13 dollars 
The precise reduction in future capital gains tax would depend on 
future house price appreciation and the level of gearing of each 
individual investor. However, since net rental losses are larger 
than the capital gains tax liability, it is likely that investors forced to 
defer their negative gearing benefit will end up paying no capital 
gains tax when they sell their properties. Assuming no change in 
investor behavior, the net budget benefit to government would 
therefore be only about $2 billion a year. While this would be the 
long-run effect, in the shorter run it could improve budget 
Figure 7.4 Budget impact of abolishing negative gearing with 
losses offset against capital gains tax liability 
$ billion, based on tax returns, 10-year average 
 
Source: ATO (2013); Grattan analysis 
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balances by $4 billion a year. If the capital gains discount were 
reduced (see Section 7.1), then the budget benefit of abolishing 
negative gearing would be smaller as the carried forward losses 
offset a greater amount of future tax liability.  
If the proposal induced property investors to invest in other 
assets, tax revenue would be even higher. Alternative 
investments will not usually produce a tax deduction against 
income – indeed any switch to investments that generated a 
positive return would increase the tax collected. 
There are other ways to reform negative gearing. The Henry Tax 
Review proposed to both discount net rental losses by 40 per cent 
(this discount would also apply to other types of deductions),148 
and to increase taxable capital gains from 50 to 60 per cent 
(reducing the capital gains discount from 50 to 40 per cent).149 
Based on 2010-11 figures, this proposal would generate about 
$1.6 billion in additional tax revenue, assuming no change in 
investor behaviour.  
Abolishing negative gearing would have a number of positive 
social outcomes.150 It may increase home ownership rates by 
reducing returns at the margin for landlords relative to first 
homebuyers. This could then increase investment in other more 
productive assets.  
Although many say that abolishing negative gearing would 
increase rents, this is a folk memory based on increases between 
                                            
148 Treasury (2010b), p. 33-34 
149 Ibid. 
150 See Kelly, et al. (2013) 
1985 and 1987 in Sydney and Perth. (see Figure 7.5).151 During 
this period when negative gearing was not permitted, rents did not 
increase particularly rapidly in Melbourne, Brisbane or Adelaide, 
and it appears that the Perth and Sydney rental increases were 
driven by unusually low vacancy rates 
Figure 7.5 Rents and vacancy rates, largest cities 
 
Note: shaded are indicates the period from July 1985 until September 1987 in which 
negative gearing was not available for property investments  
Source Kelly, Harrison, et al. (2013) p.26, citing ABS, REIA via Eslake (2013) 
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In theory, negative gearing should have no effect on rents: for 
every landlord that sells, there would be a renter that buys and 
becomes a home-owner. The supply of rental properties would fall 
at the same rate as the number of renters.  
Nor is the abolition of negative gearing likely to affect construction 
of new dwellings, as almost all of investment property loans are 
now for existing dwellings.152 There might be some impact on 
construction rates as abolition of negative gearing would depress 
house prices. However, the market for new housing, typically at 
the edge of cities, is somewhat detached from the market for 
established housing, typically closer to the centre of cities.153 
Consequently, lower prices for established housing will only have 
a limited effect on prices, and therefore supply, of new housing. 
Abolishing negative gearing on other assets, particularly share 
investments, would have little impact. Investors borrow relatively 
little to invest in shares and managed funds outside of 
superannuation. Even at the height of the share market boom, 
only about 10% of investments outside of superannuation were 
funded by borrowing;154 since then margin lending has reduced by 
71 per cent from its peak in 2007).155  
Abolishing negative gearing would have limited impact on those in 
the bottom 20 per cent, although there are a number of low-
income earners who own investor property and make substantial 
losses. Taxpayers with incomes between $37,000 and $80,000 
                                            
152 RBA (2013c) 
153 Kelly, et al. (2011), p. 13 
154 See Daley (2007) 
155 RBA (2013c) Table D10 
claim the most under negative gearing, but those with incomes 
under $20,000 per year made surprisingly large losses totalling 
over $2 billion (Figure 7.6). 
Figure 7.6 Total rental loss by taxable income bracket after 
deductions 
$ billion, 2010-11 
 
Notes: The tax-free threshold was increased from $6,000 in 2010-11 to $18,200 in 2011-
12. 2010-11 data is presented in current income tax brackets as closely as data allow. 
Source: ATO (2013), Grattan analysis  
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8. Other tax exemptions, introductions, and increases
Governments could choose to reduce deficits by increasing their 
revenue. They could do so by reducing tax exemptions, 
increasing taxes or introducing new ones. In general, the 
economic cost of tax increases is considerable. 
Eliminating tax exemptions (often known as ‘tax expenditures’) 
generally distorts economic activity less than introducing new 
taxes or increasing existing taxes. Tax exemptions, by their very 
nature, shape decisions to earn, spend, or invest. Eliminating 
them can level the playing field, increasing economic efficiency 
and reducing unfairness. However, tax exemptions can have 
worthwhile policy objectives that justify any loss of efficiency 
Tax exemptions already discussed include superannuation tax 
concessions, the exemption of owner-occupied housing from 
capital gains tax, and capital gains discounts. Other major tax 
exemptions – described below in Sections 8.1 to Section 8.3 – are 
the exemption of several expenditure categories from the GST, 
the exemption of small businesses from payroll tax, and the 
exemption of various businesses from normal rates of fuel tax.  
Most taxes inherently grow roughly in line with GDP. The 
exception, which creates an ever-widening hole in the 
Commonwealth budget, is fuel tax. As the tax is set as a fixed 
amount per litre that has not been indexed to inflation since 2001, 
the value of the tax inherently falls behind increases in GDP and 
government expenditure, as Section 8.4 discusses. 
New taxes might be proposed. The analysis in Section 8.5 
focuses on a mining tax given the salience of this issue in the 
Henry Tax Review, the recent history of tax reform, and the 
unusual size of Australia’s mining sector, in which more was 
invested over the last decade than in any other country.156 Other 
new taxes emphasised by the Henry Report are those that put a 
price on externalities. Congestion taxes may have useful 
outcomes, but experience shows they do not raise much revenue, 
as discussed in Section 8.6. There is much to be said for pollution 
taxes (including carbon taxes), but given the wider political issues 
involved they are beyond the scope of this report.157 
Finally, governments could simply increase the rates of existing 
taxes. Again, the range of options is very large, but by way of 
comparison in Section 8.7 we indicate the rate increases required 
to raise an additional $10 billion a year from each tax, as well as 
briefly considering their collateral impacts. 
8.1 Broaden the GST 
About $13 billion a year could be raised by extending the GST to 
cover private spending on fresh food, health, education, childcare, 
water and sewerage, while increasing welfare benefits to reduce 
the effects of the change on those worst off. The choice is 
attractive. It adds substantially to the collective budget bottom line 
                                            
156 Minifie, et al. (2013), p. 7 
157 On carbon taxes as the least bad way to reduce carbon pollution see Daley 
and Edis (2011) and OECD (2013a). On congestion taxes, see Treasury (2010b) 
Vol 2, p. 373  
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of Australian governments.158 It drags relatively little on the 
economy as it discourages working or investing less than most 
other taxes. Eliminating exemptions reduces time wasted in 
definitional issues. It has few social impacts, and the effect on 
people in the bottom 20 per cent of the income distribution would 
be largely mitigated by increases in welfare. 
Almost all taxes drag on economic growth. But the GST, a form of 
consumption tax, is a relatively efficient tax. It does not 
discourage earnings or investment nearly as much as income and 
corporate taxes. It is hard to avoid on a large scale. It distorts 
behavior less than other potential state government revenue 
sources, such as payroll tax and stamp duties.159 If governments 
want to increase the amount of revenue they raise, it will harm 
growth less to do so with GST revenue than with most other 
taxes.160 
Australia’s GST covers about 60 per cent of a comprehensive 
consumption tax base.161 This gives Australia the seventh-lowest 
‘coverage ratio’ amongst 32 OECD countries.162 Australia’s 
                                            
158 Under existing legislation – which the Commonwealth Parliament could 
amend – state governments benefit from any increase in GST revenues. 
159 Although increasing the GST reduces the real value of working, it has less 
impact than a higher rate of income tax, if nothing else because it has less 
psychological impact because it is not visible in take-home pay. 
160 See PwC (2013), Mirrlees, et al. (2011), Daley, et al. (2012a) and Treasury 
NSW (2011) for a more comprehensive discussion of the effects of various taxes 
on growth.  
161 Freebairn (2013b)  
162 Treasury (2012b), p.155 
consumption taxes are a lower percentage of GDP (and corporate 
taxes are a higher percentage) than in most of the OECD.163 
Private spending on a range of categories is currently exempt 
from GST, as Figure 8.1 shows. If the tax were extended to cover 
fresh food, health, education, child care, water and sewerage, 
governments could have raised an extra $15 billion in 2012-13.164 
This figure takes into account the effects of consumer behaviour 
change due to increased costs, and leaves exemptions in place 
for a number of areas where applying a GST is particularly 
difficult.165 Using 10 per cent of this revenue to compensate lower-
income households for the regressive impact of the tax – more 
than these households in fact spend – would still improve budget 
balances by $13 billion.166 
                                            
163 Daley, et al. (2012b), p. 27 
164 Treasury (2013e), p. 212-213 
165 Under this proposal, exemptions would remain for international transactions 
including international education, financial services, existing residential housing, 
supplies by charitable institutions, and administrative purposes (e.g. very small 
businesses). Financial services are ‘input taxed’: financial services providers pay 
GST on their inputs, but do not charge GST to consumers. Applying GST to 
housing would be very complex. Owner-occupied housing is effectively treated 
as being input-taxed, rather than applying GST to imputed rents. GST is not 
applied to residential rents to maintain neutrality between owner-occupiers and 
investors. See ibid., p. 230.  
166 Households in the bottom quintile account for around 9 per cent of 
consumption, so should be compensated equivalently (Grattan analysis of ABS 
(2011b)). Note this more precise data on consumption by the bottom 20 per cent 
updates the estimates in Daley, et al. (2012a), p. 33. 
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Figure 8.1 Foregone tax revenue from expenditure excluded from 
GST 
Foregone revenue by exemption category, 2012-13, $b 
 
Note: Excludes foregone revenue from housing, as comparable estimates are not 
available. 
Source: Grattan analysis of Treasury (2013e) and ABS (2013k) Table 11.1 
Instead of broadening the GST base, the government could raise 
similar revenue by increasing the rate from 10 to 13 per cent, 
while maintaining existing exemptions (see Section 8.7 below) 
and providing similar compensation.  
There are a number of reasons to favour broadening the base 
over increasing the rate. A broader GST is simpler and more 
efficient than a limited one. A broader based tax may have lower 
administrative costs as businesses which deal in both exempt and 
non-exempt goods simplify their accounting. Having fewer ‘grey 
lines’ between exempt and non-exempt categories reduces 
opportunities for tax avoidance and lobbying by rent-seekers for 
exclusion of particular goods.167  
Increasing GST revenue would discourage states from raising 
other more inefficient taxes because they are raising less through 
the GST than originally expected.168 The introduction of the GST 
in 2000 was intended to create a sustainable revenue base for 
state governments, who faced rising expenditure pressures. It 
worked for the first few years – GST grew at average of 
8.3 per cent a year up to 2007-08. But between 2008-09 and 
2011-12, the average increase was only 2.2 per cent and has 
been very volatile.169 In this time, household savings rates have 
gone up,170 reducing GST by about $10 billion. Households have 
spent relatively more on GST-exempt categories, particularly rent 
and mortgage interest, and to a lesser extent health and 
education (Figure 8.2), reducing GST by about $2 billion.171 Tax 
exempt international internet transactions have grown (Box 8.1), 
reducing GST by about $0.7 billion. As a result, GST takings have 
declined relative to both GDP and total consumption over the past 
decade (see Figure 2.3 above).172  
                                            
167 Eslake (2011); Freebairn (2013b); PwC (2013) 
168 Eslake (2011) 
169 Treasury (2012b), p. 153 
170 ABS (2013o) 
171 The shift in spending towards untaxed categories is about 3% of total 
household expenditure of $708 billion. ABS (2013b) Table 42  
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Figure 8.2 Changes in consumer expenditure by GST liability 
Change in share of household expenditure, per cent 
 
Source: ABS (2012a) 
There is no obvious reason for these trends to reverse in the 
foreseeable future. Savings rates are now close to long-run 
averages, with the low savings rates in the late 1990s and early 
2000s looking like a historical anomaly. Nor is the rise in health 
spending likely to slow significantly as the population ages: older 
people spend a much higher proportion of their income on 
health.173  
                                            
173 Productivity Commission (2005), p. 264 
Box 8.1: GST on overseas internet purchases 
The GST importation threshold, through which imports of goods 
from overseas worth less than $1000 are exempt from GST, has 
attracted considerable commentary, including from state 
premiers.174 But this exemption only cost $0.65 billion in foregone 
revenue in 2012-13.175 It was established because the cost of 
collecting the tax on small transactions (estimated at $2 billion a 
year in 2011) was greater than the revenue that would be 
collected.176 Once administration costs are factored in, halving the 
threshold to $500 might raise $0.02 billion a year from items 
entering Australia via international mail.177 As online retailing 
becomes a greater share of purchases, and new transaction 
technology reduces collection costs, change might be worthwhile. 
In particular, a substantial portion of the revenue could be 
collected from a small number of online retailers greater than a 
threshold size, responsible for most of the transactions.178  
The competitive disadvantages of the Australian retail sector run 
deeper than paying GST. As the Productivity Commission 
showed, industry productivity and regulatory barriers are bigger 
problems.179 However, pressures on Australian retailers to 
improve their productivity would be weakened if GST were 
charged on all international internet purchases, deterring retailers 
with small volumes from entering the Australian market.  
                                            
174 Koziol (2013); Treasury (2012b), p. 159 
175 Treasury (2013e), p. 195; EY (2012), p. 1 
176 Productivity Commission (2011), p. 169 
177 Grattan analysis of Treasury (2012c), p. 193-4 
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A GST is regressive. People with lower incomes tend to save 
less. As a result, GST paid is a greater proportion of their income. 
However, those on higher incomes pay much more GST per 
person. The wealthiest 20 per cent of households spend almost 
six times as much on fresh food as the poorest 20 per cent; the 
exemption of fresh food from the GST benefits those wealthy 
households to the tune of $2 billion a year.180 
Figure 8.3 shows that low-income households do not spend a 
significantly greater proportion of their consumption on the goods 
proposed for inclusion in the new GST base. This indicates that a 
broader GST would not be significantly more regressive than 
current arrangements.  
However, any regressive effects from a broader GST should be 
dealt with through welfare transfers and income tax cuts at the 
lower end.181 It is better to pursue equity through the tax and 
welfare system as a whole, rather than making the GST more 
complex in an attempt to protect those on lower incomes. As the 
Henry Review noted: 
“A narrower GST does not mean it is fairer, but adds 
complexity. Income redistribution to make Australia fairer is 
primarily the job of the personal income tax and transfer 
system. This means that other taxes and charges can be used 
in the most efficient way, reducing the overall complexity of the 
                                            
180 Treasury (2010b) Vol 1, p. 286 
181 Henry (2011); Freebairn (2013b)  
system. It is very difficult to target GST exemptions on some 
products to certain groups.”182  
Some of the increased revenue raised from a broader GST should 
be used for income redistribution. There is a risk that any 
compensation will be eroded through bracket creep and low 
indexation of benefits, as happened in New Zealand, so continued 
Figure 8.3 Proportion of household consumption spent on goods 
proposed for inclusion in the GST base 
% of household consumption 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of ABS (2013i)  
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attention needs to be paid to the impact of the tax-transfer system 
on those worst off.183 Unfortunately, the opposite may be a bigger 
risk: governments under budget pressure may squeeze welfare 
benefits and community services even harder.  
What are the risks of broadening the GST? Taxing private 
expenditure on fresh food could lead to people spending more on 
processed foods, leading to poorer, long-term health outcomes.184 
Yet Treasury estimates suggest that spending on these 
categories is relatively inelastic, so there may not be much 
change in consumption.185 Similarly, higher prices for education 
could lead to parents moving children into government schools, 
and students choosing not to enroll in higher education. But 
demand for education also seems to be relatively insensitive to 
price: changes in private school fees and higher education 
contribution amounts have not significantly affected choices in the 
past.186 There are other potential side-effects, including whether 
increases in child-care costs might reduce workforce participation 
rates. This would require further attention.  
GST on international student fees may reduce the 
competitiveness of Australian higher education. By analogy with 
other exports, it may be appropriate to rebate or waive 
                                            
183 Davidson (2000). See ACOSS (2012) for analysis showing that the 
purchasing power of NewStart allowance has fallen far below its pre-GST level, 
eliminating the value of the compensation introduced at the time, and Daley, et 
al. (2013), p. 19 illustrating the severe pressures on NewStart households. 
184 Veerman and Cobiac (2013) 
185 Treasury (2013e), p. 212  
186 Norton (2012); Jensen, et al. (2013), p. 57; Treasury (2013e), p. 213 
international student fees. Doing so would reduce the additional 
tax raised by $0.7 billion a year.187 
GST on education would result in government taxing a service 
that it also subsidises. There would be less churn of tax if 
government simply reduced the subsidy.188 This may well be a 
first-best option. However, given the difficulties of reducing 
government subsidies for education (at least in nominal terms), 
broadening the GST to include education may be a more 
palatable option since it would be seen as imposing a universal 
rule across the economy. 
Expanding coverage of the GST to include health would increase 
the price paid by consumers for a number of subsidised health 
services and products, including private health insurance, 
pharmaceuticals and medical services. The GST exemption 
currently acts as a hidden and indirect subsidy for these services 
and products. If government, on policy or equity grounds, wishes 
to ensure no net change in the price to consumers of a subset of 
previously GST-exempt products and services, a better public 
policy is to increase subsidies to these so the total subsidy is 
direct and overt rather than a hidden subsidy through GST 
exemption. The Commonwealth is responsible for the key health 
care services and products that would be affected by these 
changes. The current GST exemption for these services and 
products thus effectively represents a subsidy from the states – 
the beneficiaries of GST revenue – to the Commonwealth. 
                                            
187 Grattan analysis of ABS (2013k) Table 11.1, which indicates that international 
students at all levels of education spent $6.8 billion on fees in 2012. 
188 See Norton (2012) for discussion of whether these subsidies should be 
reduced anyway. 
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Increasing the subsidy to private health insurance, benefit-paid 
pharmaceuticals and medical services to offset the GST increase 
is estimated to cost $2 billion.189 This cost has not been included 
in the budget impact above. 
There might be concerns that a GST on private health and 
education spending would create market distortions between 
private and public service providers. However, competitive 
neutrality is not an object of current education and health policy, 
as government already provides higher subsidies per student or 
patient for government-supplied services. 
8.2 Payroll tax threshold 
Removing the threshold below which payroll tax is not payable 
would contribute a net $6 billion a year to Australian government 
budgets. However, this choice may be relatively unattractive 
depending on the impact on unemployment. Any substantial 
increase in unemployment reduces economic activity, and has 
serious social impacts on the bottom 20 per cent. On the other 
hand, broadening payroll tax to include all employees may 
increase economic efficiency by encouraging activity to move 
from less efficient small firms to more efficient large firms. 
Payroll tax is the largest single state tax, contributing $21 billion to 
state budgets in 2012-13.190 Businesses with payrolls below the 
threshold do not pay the tax. Those with larger payrolls pay tax at 
a single marginal rate on payroll amounts above the threshold 
                                            
189 Grattan analysis of ABS (2011b) and ABS (2013a)   
190 DTF NT (2012); DTF SA (2012); DTF Tasmania (2012); DTF Victoria (2012); 
Treasury ACT (2012); Treasury and Trade Qld (2012); Treasury NSW (2012); 
Treasury WA (2012) 
(Queensland and the Northern Territory use a deduction system 
but a similar structure applies). The threshold varies by state, from 
as low as $550,000 in Victoria to $1.75 million in the ACT.191  
The net effect of eliminating the thresholds would increase the tax 
revenues of Australian governments by $6 billion a year. It would 
increase State payroll tax revenues by $8 billion a year. 
Businesses deducting this tax as an expense would reduce 
Commonwealth company income tax revenues by approximately 
$1.5 billion,192 and the Commonwealth would also be liable for 
increases in unemployment benefits (discussed below), which 
could amount to $0.5 billion. 
Views differ on whether eliminating the payroll tax threshold would 
increase unemployment. Some believe there would be little 
impact because most workers would ultimately accept a drop in 
wages rather than become unemployed. Others believe some 
wages paid would increase due to the interaction of awards, 
minimum wage laws and payroll tax. By increasing the floor on 
these wages, payroll tax would increase unemployment.  
Cross-country evidence does not strongly support the claim: many 
European countries have much higher payroll taxes levied as 
‘social security charges’ and historically, some have lower 
unemployment rates than Australia.193  
Estimates of the sensitivity of employment decisions to payroll tax 
rates vary widely: a 1 per cent increase in labour costs is 
                                            
191 Treasury NSW (2013) 
192 Grattan analysis of ATO (2013c) and ABS (2013f) 
193 Nickell (1997) 
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estimated to increase the unemployment rate by anywhere 
between 0.04 and 1.01 percentage points.194 The median 
estimate of the studies reviewed is an increase of 
0.35 percentage points. In Australia, and given existing payroll tax 
rates, this would imply that eliminating the payroll tax threshold in 
all states would increase unemployment by approximately 40,000 
people. The direct fiscal cost to the Commonwealth budget of 
such an unemployment increase would be around $51 million per 
year.195 The flow-on costs of higher unemployment, slower 
economic growth and poorer social outcomes are difficult to 
quantify but they would be significant. 
Timing would be very important. Analysis conducted for the 
Australian Fair Pay Commission found that increases in minimum 
wages affect unemployment rates more during a recession than 
when employment is growing.196 
Beyond these costs to government and society, individuals face 
specific costs from unemployment. The direct financial cost to 
households of this increase in unemployment, in the form of the 
difference between their previous earnings and the amount they 
receive in unemployment benefits, would be about $0.9 billion a 
year.197 
                                            
194 Karanassou and Sala (2008); Hutchings and Kouparitsas (2012); Dixon, et al. 
(2004); Debelle and Vickery (1998); Dungey and Pitchford (1998); Lewis and 
MacDonald (2002); Carne (2007); Treasury (1996);Stacey and Downes (1995); 
Bernie and Downes (1999); Treasury NSW (1999); ABS (2012b); ABS (2013c); 
ABS (2013l). See Balancing budgets: Supporting analysis, p. 25 
195 Grattan analysis based on Treasury (2013c) 
196 Australian Fair Pay Commission (2009) 
197 Grattan analysis of ABS (2013c) Table 14a-14h 
There would be some additional compliance costs for firms that 
are brought inside the tax net. Some surveys of small business 
owners estimate the compliance cost for business could be as 
high as $0.6 billion a year.198 However, the cost of change is likely 
to be substantially lower given the growing popularity of standard 
package payroll systems amongst small businesses, and the 
options of administering the tax through workers compensation 
systems or the Commonwealth PAYG tax base. 
On the other hand, abolishing the threshold would reduce 
economic distortions that encourage smaller, less productive 
firms. The same employee costs about 5 per cent more to a firm 
with a payroll above the threshold. Small businesses generally 
have lower productivity per employee than larger firms.199 On this 
basis, the NSW Treasury estimates that abolishing the payroll tax 
threshold would produce an extra 8 cents of economic activity for 
every dollar of revenue raised – implying an increase economic 
activity in Australia by around $0.6 billion a year.200 Presumably 
the basis of this calculation is that abolishing the threshold would 
encourage economic activity to move towards larger more 
efficient firms.201 
Despite the significant revenue available from reducing the 
threshold, some states and territories have historically competed 
to increase their payroll tax thresholds with the aim of attracting 
mobile businesses to their jurisdiction (Figure 8.4).202 However,  
                                            
198 Lignier and Evans (2012) 
199 OECD (2013c) 
200 Treasury NSW (2011), p. 11. See also Dixon, et al. (2004)  
201 Treasury (2010b) Vol 1, p. 298;  
202 Gabbitas and Eldridge (1998); Treasury (2012b), p. 169 
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Figure 8.4 Payroll tax thresholds over time 
Tax threshold ($m) 
 
Source: NSW Treasury (2000-2013)  
over the past decade, only the two territories have increased the 
threshold materially faster than inflation.  
 
8.3 Fuel tax exemptions 
Halving the exemptions that reduce the fuel tax paid by a variety 
of commercial users would contribute around $3 billion a year to 
the Commonwealth government budget. However, a higher 
effective tax rate would reduce economic activity, particularly in 
coal mining and agriculture, also reducing corporate and income 
taxes. 
Ordinary users of petroleum fuel pay an excise of 
38.1 cents per litre of fuel.203 Commercial users of fuel such as 
freight trucks can usually claim a tax credit so that they pay 
12 cents less than this. Those using fuel in mining (generally off 
public roads) effectively only pay excises of about 6 cents a litre, 
and forestry and agriculture users (also generally off public roads) 
pay close to no fuel tax.  
The current exemptions are worth about $5.8 billion.204 Halving 
this would add about $3 billion to the Commonwealth budget. 
Fuel taxes paid by commercial users drag substantially on 
economic activity because inherently they are a tax on business 
inputs. Fuel excise can nevertheless be justified as economically 
efficient if it is considered as a form of user pricing for road 
building and maintenance, the costs of congestion, and vehicle 
pollution.205 It is imprecise, but relatively easy to collect. However, 
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this justification for fuel excise on business inputs implies that off-
road use should be exempt. 
Reducing fuel excise exemptions would have several unattractive 
collateral impacts. It might substantially reduce economic activity, 
particularly in thermal coal mining and agriculture. As their 
products are internationally traded, they would have little ability to 
pass on the increased costs. Any reduction in the activity of these 
industries would hurt regional communities largely dependent on 
them. Many of these areas are already struggling economically. 
The impact on economic activity is likely to be substantial relative 
to the additional tax collected. Grattan analysis suggests the 
effect could be around $0.5 billion. 
8.4 Fuel excise indexation 
Reintroducing fuel excise indexation would contribute around 
$3 billion, after compensatory welfare increases, at minimal social 
and economic costs.  
Most fuels in Australia attract several taxes, including an excise, 
and the GST. The GST component automatically increases as the 
price of fuel increases. Between 1983 and 2001, the excise 
component was increased each year by the rate of consumer 
price inflation. Although the excise was cut by 6.7 cents per litre 
as part of the GST package, petrol prices continued to rise.206 As 
                                                                                    
were around $16 billion in 2009 (DIT (2009)), and in 2010, accidents were 
reported to cost $15 billion; see Treasury (2010b) p 390. 
206 The combination of the cut in excise, together with other savings from the tax 
package was intended to amount to 1.5 cents per litre, cancelling out the impact 
a result, the Howard Government abolished indexation.207 This 
exacerbated the structural decline in the fuel tax base, growing 
more slowly than GDP given declining per capita car use, and 
increased fuel efficiency. 
At current volumes, the decision to abolish indexation has 
reduced government revenues by a little over $4 billion in 2013-
14. However, higher priced fuel would probably lead to reduced 
fuel consumption. Judging the impact is difficult: actual oil price 
increases swamp the impact of fuel tax indexation (Figure 8.5). If 
excise had been indexed since 2001, fuel prices would be about 
10 per cent higher; if this reduced use by 5 per cent, 
Commonwealth tax revenue would be $1 billion a year lower. On 
this basis the net increase in Commonwealth tax revenue would 
be $3 billion a year. 
Reintroducing fuel excise indexation would hit the bottom 
20 per cent of households hardest. These households spend 
about 6 per cent of their income on fuel. The richest 20 per cent of 
households only spend about 2 per cent.208 This could be 
remedied through the tax-transfer system. Returning the increase 
to the bottom 20 per cent would consume 8 per cent, or 
approximately $320 million of the additional $3 billion raised.209 
                                                                                    
of the GST and keeping petrol prices constant. Costello and Coleman (2008), 
p. 154 
207 Treasury (2002); Costello and Coleman (2008), p. 154. This was in addition 
to a further cut to the excise of 1.5 cents per litre. 
208 Grattan analysis of ABS (2011b) 
209 Grattan analysis of ibid. 
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Figure 8.5 Fuel prices with and without excise indexation 
Cents per litre 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of ABS (2013e) and Fuel Watch WA (2013) 
Most of the economic costs of reintroducing fuel excise indexation 
can be reduced using the existing fuel tax credit scheme. This 
scheme rebates much of the tax on fuels paid by producers, 
minimising its impact on economic activity.  
8.5 Mining taxes 
A mining tax could be designed as a federal export tax on 
minerals, set at 50 per cent of the portion of the price above 
nominated thresholds. A well-designed tax might capture a lot of 
revenue in the short term. But once prices drop in line with most 
analyst forecasts, a new mining tax would probably collect little 
more than $3 billion a year after 2017. The tax would discourage 
some investment and economic activity. Its effects would be far 
more acute when prices fall 
The combination of Australia’s mineral resources and its strong 
institutions have attracted world-leading levels of investment.210 
Inherently these resources cannot be moved, and when prices 
remain as high as they have been over the last decade, profits 
can be substantially higher than the cost of investment. Mining 
taxes seek to capture some of these profits (or ‘excess rents’) to 
benefit the community. 
Mining taxes can be designed in a number of ways. The most 
efficient design in theory is a profits tax (such as the original 
design of the Resource Super Profits Tax) whereby government 
takes a share of both the profits and losses. Its effect is the same 
as government buying shares in mines whenever miners invest in 
mining projects. In theory the tax is more efficient because it does 
not affect returns to private shareholders, and so does not affect 
their investment decisions.  
However, there are substantial problems in practice. The design 
requires that the government pays out (either in tax credits or 
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cash) when a mine loses money. Investors will be adversely 
affected if they – or their financiers – do not trust governments to 
make good on this promise. As one commentator put it:  
“There will be times when the government is writing cheques to 
miners. Imagine that the economy is tanking and mining profits 
are way down. How politically feasible is it to believe that the 
government will write cheques to miners – apparently they’re 
all foreigners anyway – and not send that same money to 
Australians?”211 
Mining taxes can also be designed as royalties. These are used 
extensively by Australian states, which essentially sell minerals to 
mining companies. The royalty may be determined by the market 
price of the underlying mineral, the energy content, or a price per 
tonne.212 As royalties increase the costs of inputs, they reduce 
investment and operation of more costly mines. However, 
royalties have a number of advantages: they are easy to explain, 
difficult to game, and relatively efficient if the level of royalty is 
linked to the price.213  
There are some constitutional difficulties with the Commonwealth 
Government levying simple mining royalties.214 However, the 
Commonwealth could levy an analogous tax as an export tax. It 
could be set as a percentage of the price above a threshold set 
                                            
211 Davidson (2010) 
212 DoI (2013) 
213 Although KPMG Econtech (2010) estimated that royalties substantially 
reduce economic activity, others argue that these estimates are implausibly high. 
See Pincus (2012) 
214 s.114 of the Commonwealth Constitution prohibits the Commonwealth from 
imposing a “… tax on property … belonging to a State”. 
high enough for each mineral that most investments would 
proceed anyway. 
Mines vary widely in how cheaply minerals can be extracted from 
them. More costly mines are more acutely affected by cost 
increases, including taxes such as royalties payments. For some 
minerals (especially iron ore), most Australian production comes 
from inexpensive mines, which would be relatively unaffected by 
increases in tax (Figure 8.6).  
Figure 8.6 Cost curve for global iron ore mines  
Cost per tonne, $US/t iron ore 62% equivalent, CFR 
 
Source: Credit Suisse (2013), Goldman Sachs (2013), Deutsche Bank (2013) 
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Other minerals, like thermal coal, are extracted at a cost closer to 
the sale price. Increased taxes would more severely affect 
investment and output of these mines. Avoiding substantial 
negative effects would depend on the Commonwealth accurately 
selecting the price thresholds for the tax so that they did not 
substantially deter investment. However, the Commonwealth 
government is unlikely to be able to levy substantial revenue 
through such an export tax in the near-term. Our analysis of price 
and volume forecasts by Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank and the 
Bureau of Rural and Energy Economics suggests that even a 
fairly heavy tax on the exports of minerals would only raise about 
$3 billion a year by 2017, beyond which analysts are wary of 
forecasting prices.215 Most prices are forecast to fall below 
thresholds at which substantial investment and operation would 
become marginal, and volume increases are unlikely to fill the gap 
(Figure 8.7). 
Mining taxes designed in this way also provide very volatile 
revenues. The danger is that the revenue is committed to long-
term recurrent spending, rather than saved to a fund that can 
provide more sustainable revenues over a longer period.216 A 
government today might want to help future generations by 
imposing an export tax today. But such an approach will provide 
little revenue for medium-term budget pressures.  
 
                                            
215 Goldman Sachs (2013) 
216 Minifie, et al. (2013) 
Figure 8.7 Mining prices, export volumes, and potential tax revenue  
 
Assumes threshold prices of $90/tonne for 62% iron ore FOB; $75/tonne for thermal coal 
and $120 for metallurgical coal in constant $2008 terms. 
Source: Grattan analysis of Credit Suisse (2013), Goldman Sachs (2013), Deutsche Bank 
(2013), BREE (2013). 
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8.6 Congestion charges 
If implemented well, congestion charging can be effective in 
reducing traffic congestion and making more efficient use of 
existing road infrastructure.217 In theory, it could also raise 
revenue. For example, some estimate that a charge of 10 cents 
per kilometer travelled in the Sydney metropolitan area could 
raise up to $3 billion in revenue.218 The exact amount of revenue 
raised is highly dependent on the design of the scheme. 
However, international experience shows that it is very politically 
difficult to implement congestion charging unless the majority of 
the revenue is directed towards improving public transport 
infrastructure.219 There is no reason to think that Australia is 
different in this regard; surveys here suggest that road pricing 
proposals have much more public support if funds are used to 
lower car registration charges, eliminate existing tolls, and 
improve public transport.220 A congestion charge regime would 
have to be close to budget-neutral to be feasible.  
8.7 Tax increases 
Budget outcomes can always be improved by raising the rates of 
existing taxes. 
A comprehensive assessment of alternatives for tax reform is 
beyond the scope of this report. Relevant considerations include 
                                            
217 Treasury (2010b) Vol 2, p. 379 
218 Unpublished analysis cited in University of Sydney (2012); see Hensher and 
Mulley (2013) 
219 Albalate and Bel (2009) 
220 See, for example, Hensher, et al. (2013) and Palmer (2010) 
their impact on equity, and the extent to which they reduce 
economic efficiency by distorting decisions to work, spend, or 
invest.221 These considerations are similar to those in our general 
framework for assessing budget proposals: budgetary impact, 
social, distributional and economic impacts, and confidence that a 
policy change will have the budgetary result intended.  
To put other specific proposals into context, we can briefly 
compare the major taxes that already raise more than $10 billion 
a year in revenue, as shown in Table 2. 
There is no obvious limit to the size of tax rises, which depends 
on the rate chosen. To compare proposals, we can ask how much 
would tax rates change to raise $10 billion?  
In general, corporate and income taxes distort economic activity 
more than consumption and land taxes.222 Increasing taxes 
generally tends to distort economic activity more than removing 
tax exemptions that are by definition aimed at encouraging 
specific activities. Tax expenditures also tend to benefit the rich 
more than the poor.223 Many of these tax exemptions (often 
described as ‘tax expenditures’) are discussed above. 
The social and distributional impacts of major taxes vary. Any 
assessment needs to distinguish between who pays the tax and 
who bears the burden (because the tax reduces their resources in 
the long run). For example, corporate and payroll taxes are levied 
on corporations, but individuals ultimately bear the burden.  
                                            
221 PwC (2013) 
222 See ibid., Mirrlees, et al. (2011); Daley, et al. (2012a); Treasury NSW (2011). 
223 Rawdanowicz, et al. (2013) 
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Table 2: Impact of increasing large taxes to raise an additional $10b 
Tax Revenue 
raised (yr) 
Rate change to 
raise $10b/yr 
Econo. 
Impact 
($GDP/yr) 
Impact on 
bottom 20% 
Personal 
income 
$161b 
(2012-13) 
Raise marginal 
rates by 2 
percentage points 
-$2.4b Neutral – bottom 
20% pay little/no 
income tax 
Company 
income 
$68b 
(2012-13) 
Increase rate from 
30% to 34% 
-$4.0b Mod. negative – 
lowers 
employment and 
real wages 
GST $50b 
(2012-13) 
Increase rate from 
10% to 12% 
-$0.8b Mod. negative – 
regressive 
impact mitigated 
by welfare 
Payroll $20b 
(2011-12) 
Increase average 
rate from 5.5% to 
9.1% 
-$4.1b Negative – 
discourages 
employment 
Property 
rates 
$13b 
(2011-12) 
Increase revenue 
by 75% 
-$0.2b Mod. negative – 
few in this group 
own property  
Stamp 
duty 
$12b 
(2011-12) 
Increase average 
rate on median 
home from 4.8% 
to 8.9% 
-$3.4b Mod. negative – 
few in this group 
own property  
Note: Economic impact based on estimates of marginal excess burden by KPMG Econtech 
for the Australia’s Future Tax System Review (Treasury (2010b). Estimates of excess 
burden vary substantially: see for example Treasury NSW (2011). See Balancing budgets: 
Supporting analysis p. 27 for further detail.  
Sources: Grattan analysis of KPMG Econtech (2010); Daley et al. (2012a); b); PwC (2013); 
Rawdanowicz et al. (2013); ABS (2013o) Tables 10 and 18; Treasury (2013a); Treasury 
NSW (2013); ABS (2013h) Table 7 
The key question is how the burden is distributed: between 
Australian and foreign individuals, and between rich and poor. 
Such a complex assessment is beyond the scope of this report.  
Increasing the rate of GST raises many of the same issues as 
broadening its base. In practice it would need to be accompanied 
by increased welfare payments to mitigate the effects on those 
worst off, which would consume about 10 per cent of the revenue 
raised (see Section 8.1 above). 
Our analysis has focused on increasing property rates rather than 
land taxes. The existing state land tax base has very substantial 
exemptions – not least owner-occupied property – and so is a 
very inefficient tax base. By contrast, property rates (currently 
levied by local councils) have very few exemptions. It is 
constitutionally possible for state governments to levy a property 
rate in addition to local council rates (such as the Victorian 
government’s Fire Services Levy). However, it would be politically 
very difficult to increase property rates without simultaneously 
reducing stamp duties.224 While this would boost economic 
productivity, it would do little to improve budget balances. 
8.8 Bracket creep 
As an alternative to raising the rate of income tax, bracket creep 
can help repair the budget, albeit not equitably. Not increasing tax 
thresholds substantially increases income tax receipts as a 
percentage of GDP. When tax thresholds are not increased, wage 
inflation pushes incomes into higher tax brackets. Individuals then 
                                            
224 As recently implemented by the ACT, and proposed by many, including 
Daley, et al. (2012a) and Kelly, et al. (2013). 
Balancing budgets: tough choices we need   
Grattan Institute 2013   64 
pay more of their income in tax, even if the purchasing power of 
their income has not increased.  
Bracket creep can be valuable to the Commonwealth 
Government. Assuming 2.5 per cent wage inflation for the next 
decade, maintaining current personal income tax thresholds 
would increase Commonwealth taxes by about $16 billion in 
today’s dollars.225  
Bracket creep falls squarely on middle-income earners. A person 
at the 50th percentile of the income distribution would pay an 
additional 4 per cent of their income in tax, while someone in the 
top 10 per cent would pay only an additional 2 per cent. The 
bottom 20 per cent would pay only 1 per cent of their incomes.226 
                                            
225 Grattan analysis of ATO (2013c) 
226 Grattan analysis of ibid. 
Balancing budgets: tough choices we need   
Grattan Institute 2013   65 
9. Spending cuts
Governments can improve their budget position by reducing 
spending. Reducing Age Pension spending by including owner 
occupied housing in the assets test is discussed above. This 
chapter discusses a large number of other choices. They include 
reducing spending on transport infrastructure, industry support, 
defence spending, school class sizes, higher education subsidies 
and pharmaceuticals. In the unlikely event that governments 
chose to implement all of these changes, they could improve 
budget balances by $23 billion. For most of these spending 
reductions, execution would need to be unusually good to avoid 
very undesirable social and economic side-effects 
This chapter also discusses a number of other proposals that are 
often raised but where the potential savings appear to be limited. 
These include ‘middle-class welfare’ and public service spending,  
9.1 Infrastructure spending 
Reducing high levels of Australian government spending on 
transport infrastructure could save up to $6 billion a year. The 
economic and social impacts would depend on how well the 
remaining expenditure was prioritised, and how well costs were 
controlled. The substantial lift in expenditure over the last five 
years includes a number of projects where the projected benefit: 
cost ratio was low, and then actual costs were higher and benefits 
lower than expected. If fewer low value projects were selected, a 
return to historic spending levels might well have little economic 
impact. 
Australian government spending on infrastructure is currently at 
record levels. ABS data indicates that $18.8 billion was spent on 
‘transport infrastructure engineering construction for the public 
sector’ in 2011-12. As Figure 9.1 shows, this is the highest annual 
spend as a percentage of GDP since records began in 1987.227 
Figure 9.1 Engineering construction work done for the public 
sector 
% of GDP 
 
Source: ABS (2013g) Table 11 
                                            
227 ABS (2013g) Table 11 
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If spending returned to the long-run average of 0.84 per cent of 
GDP from its current high of 1.26 per cent, it would add 
$6.3 billion a year to the budget bottom line.228 
Governments are spending more than ever, but it’s questionable 
whether they are getting good value from that spending. Making 
better choices about what to build, and building it more efficiently, 
would produce the same outcomes at lower cost. 
There have been persistent calls in Australian public debate in 
recent years to increase government spending on infrastructure. It 
is said that Australia has an infrastructure deficit of more than 
$700 billion,229 a claim that seems to be based more on a wish list 
devised by engineering and construction firms than on any 
rigorous economic analysis. Recently, the new Commonwealth 
Government and some commentators have suggested that going 
further into debt to fund infrastructure would be their preferred 
approach to boosting economic growth.230 
Improving the capacity of transport system in Australia is critical 
for supporting growth and maintaining quality of life, particularly in 
                                            
228 Analysis of infrastructure investment is severely restricted by data availability.  
Determining exactly how much government spends on infrastructure, and on 
what types of infrastructure, is difficult because not all infrastructure expenditure 
appears directly in the headline budget balance; some is treated as capital 
expenditure and so is captured in the budget via interest and depreciation costs, 
and some is spent outside the general government budget by government-
owned corporations. Rigorous post-hoc evaluation of projects is rare, making it 
difficult to assess value for money: see Balancing budgets: Supporting analysis, 
p. 33 
229 Engineers Australia (2010) 
230 See, for example, Bassanese (2013) 
cities.231 But there are other ways to do this aside from building 
big infrastructure. Previous work by Grattan Institute has 
demonstrated that infrastructure doesn’t necessarily increase 
economic growth.232 It can do so, but only if it is the right 
infrastructure in the right place, at the right time, for the right 
price.233  
There are two ways to reduce transport infrastructure spending 
without materially reducing outcomes. The first lies in making 
better choices about what infrastructure gets built. While some 
progress has been made with the establishment of Infrastructure 
Australia and its processes to recommend infrastructure priorities 
to the Commonwealth Government, there is a long way to go. 
Governments continue to promise investment in projects that 
don’t have rigorous benefit cost analyses ahead of those that 
do.234  
Even when these analyses are followed, they do not guarantee 
value for money. Analyses for transport infrastructure systemically 
overestimate the benefit cost ratios of projects. As Figure 9.2 
shows, an international survey of large infrastructure projects 
found that project costs are typically at least 20 per cent higher 
than forecast.235 A litany of local examples – from the cost 
                                            
231 Kelly, et al. (2013) 
232 See Daley, et al. (2012a) and Daley (2013) for a further discussion of the 
relationship between infrastructure and economic growth. 
233 Eslake (2010) 
234 See, for example, Wiggins (2013); Infrastructure Australia (2013); Flyvbjerg 
(2009); Davies (2013); Dobes (2008); Ergas and Robson (2010)  
235 Flyvbjerg (2009) 
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Figure 9.2 Actual spend and traffic relative to forecasts for large 
transport projects 
 
Note: Cost overrun data based on analysis of 258 projects in 20 countries; traffic forecast 
data based on analysis of 208 projects in 14 countries.  
Source: Flyvbjerg (2009) 
overruns for the Myki ticketing system in Melbourne to the highly 
optimistic initial traffic forecasts for the Clem7 Tunnel in Brisbane, 
the Cross City Tunnel in Sydney, Eastlink in Melbourne, and the 
Sydney and Brisbane airport trains – demonstrates that Australia 
is not immune from this dynamic.236 Unfortunately, rigorous 
evaluation is hampered by lack of availability of data. 
                                            
236 Davies (2010); Davies (2012) 
Governments seem reluctant to invest financial or political capital 
in alternatives to major transport projects.237 Evidence suggests 
that pricing for demand management, such as road user charges, 
is a highly effective way to make use of existing transport system 
capacity and reduce the need for costly new investment.238 But 
while state governments have used road pricing to fund new 
projects, they have been reluctant to impose it on existing road 
infrastructure. Another option is to consider the value of small, 
local infrastructure upgrades to remove bottlenecks. These local 
solutions often have much better benefit cost ratios.239 
A second broad avenue for cutting expenditure is to reduce the 
costs of projects once they are chosen. In Australia, construction 
costs have risen faster than prices in other industries, and are 
higher than those in many comparable countries. The causes of 
these high costs are complex and intertwined, and some are 
probably unavoidable. The mining boom has created skills 
shortages in construction industries. Many projects are 
constructed in areas with existing residential and commercial 
activity, which tends to cost more and take longer due to efforts to 
minimise disruption to travellers. The structure of the construction 
industry creates few incentives to keep costs down. There is a 
strong union presence, and oligopolies at the level of major 
construction firms as well as many materials suppliers. State 
                                            
237 Wiggins (2013) 
238 Infrastructure Australia (2013) 
239 Eddington (2006) 
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governments effectively are single purchasers for major projects 
in each jurisdiction, hindering attempts to benchmark costs. 240 
There is also plenty of evidence to suggest that the way projects 
are regulated and run is causing delays in projects, driving costs 
up.241 Project proponents face complex and overlapping 
regulatory standards: the Productivity Commission’s draft report 
on major project development assessment processes indicates 
that streamlining is feasible.242 Other governance and 
procurement issues include poor scoping to define the real need 
and the most efficient way to meet it; poor project planning and 
performance management; gaps in project governance skills in 
the relevant areas of government; and a lack of independence 
between project governance and project delivery agencies. 
Infrastructure Australia has suggested that better project 
management could produce cost savings of 20 to 50 per cent.243 
Across the infrastructure spectrum, Australian governments seem 
to have a tendency to ‘gold-plate’ infrastructure: building projects 
to the highest possible specifications even if these are not 
necessary. This drives costs higher. In the energy industry, 
government-owned electricity companies invest more in capital 
infrastructure per customer than do private companies, at rates 
that cannot fully be explained by higher regulatory standards, 
rising peak demand, and the need to replace ageing assets.244 
State governments have invested large amounts of money in 
                                            
240 Infrastructure Australia (2013); Turner & Townsend (2012); Grattan analysis 
of ABS (2012a); ABS (2013a); ABS (2013n) 
241 Taylor, et al. (2012); Caravel (2013); Infrastructure Australia (2013) 
242 Productivity Commission (2013a) 
243 Infrastructure Australia (2013) 
244 Wood, et al. (2012) 
desalination plants and other big water infrastructure projects, 
when other, cheaper options were available.245 In transport, the 
trend is visible in the preference for large road tunnels rather than 
smaller surface projects, and in efforts to build infrastructure that 
can withstand natural disasters, even in places where such 
disasters do not happen.246 
The Commonwealth Government has recently commissioned an 
Productivity Commission inquiry into infrastructure costs, 
competitiveness and productivity, which will be useful in better 
understanding how costs might be reduced.247 
Shifting infrastructure spending off the government balance sheet, 
either via government-owned corporations or public-private 
partnerships, doesn’t necessarily help the budget position. If the 
infrastructure generates enough revenue to cover its costs, then 
the budget position would be similar, whether or not government 
retains ownership, depending on the price for which the 
government sells the right to construct the project. If government 
has to fund a gap between future revenue and costs, then again 
the future budget impact is similar whether or not government 
retains ownership. The budget position is only improved if private 
sector ownership leads to lower construction or operation costs, 
and these benefits outweigh the fees charged by investment 
banks for their services in establishing the partnership and the 
higher borrowing costs faced by private companies compared to 
governments.  
                                            
245 PricewaterhouseCoopers (2010) 
246 Discussed in Wiggins (2013) and Ludlow ibid. 
247 Productivity Commission (2013b) 
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Public-private partnerships can also impose discipline to prioritise 
projects where a private sector firm is prepared to invest on the 
basis that future revenue will be greater than the constructions 
costs. However, with the failure of toll roads from Clem 7 to the 
Lane Cove Tunnel, the private sector is increasingly reluctant to 
take on projects, unless governments guarantee the future 
revenue, which removes any private sector discipline to ensure 
benefits are greater than costs. 
Governments are more likely to get fair value for infrastructure 
once usage patterns have been established in practice. 
Transferring existing infrastructure to the private sector can help 
reduce debt, although its impact on deficits will vary, as discussed 
in Chapter 10. 
9.2 Industry support 
Australian governments spend more than $16 billion a year on 
industry-related policies and programs, through tariff assistance, 
tax concessions and direct spending.248 Despite popular 
perceptions, service industries get more in subsidies and tax 
concessions than do manufacturing or primary production 
industries, although the latter get much higher rates of support 
relative to the value they add to the economy.249 A 50 per cent cut 
to Commonwealth and state budgetary support to small business, 
specific industry sectors and industries, and regional adjustment 
programs, could improve the budget bottom line by more than 
$5 billion.250 
                                            
248 Productivity Commission (2013c); Daley, et al. (2013) 
249 Productivity Commission (2013c) 
250 Grattan analysis of ibid. and Daley, et al. (2013) 
There is little confidence that traditional industry support leads to 
additional innovation, employment or productivity. Evidence 
suggests that industry subsidies are not effective at supporting 
regional economic growth, or at creating growth industries, and 
that government subsidies distort industry decision-making.251  
Much modern industry support at least nominally pursues policy 
aims other than supporting industry for its own sake. Examples 
include subsidies to encourage carbon emissions reduction or 
research and development.252 There is little evaluation of most 
industry support, so it is difficult to tell if the subsidies drive activity 
beyond what would occur anyway. In some cases, these goals 
may be better pursued through other means. 
Some industry support, such as some manufacturing industry 
assistance, maintains relatively low-skilled jobs in regional areas. 
Without support, the jobs would probably not exist. If it is 
withdrawn, these areas are likely to face high unemployment rates 
and consequent social dislocation, with consequent costs to the 
welfare and education systems. If the industry is the major 
employer in a region, as tends to be the case in automotive and 
agriculture, there may be significant economic and social effects 
on the local community. People are often reluctant to move, and 
this results in higher unemployment.  
Ironically, governments that continue to prop up struggling 
industries can exacerbate this problem. By providing hope that a 
region will continue to offer the same jobs as in the past, 
                                            
251 For a more detailed discussion of the effectiveness of industry policy, see 
Daley, et al. (2012a) and Daley, et al. (2012b) 
252 See Wood and Mullerworth (2012)  
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governments encourage people to put off the hard decision of 
moving. In practice, when substantial industries close, most 
workers rapidly find alternative employment253 – although it is 
often at a lower wage precisely because the new job is in an 
unsubsidised industry. 
In this sense, industry support can be less about supporting an 
industry and more about assisting a community through a 
transition. Even so, this type of industry support is highly 
inefficient. For example, steel industry assistance under carbon 
price compensation measures will cost $36,000 per year per 
worker.254 Such a sum would be better directed to more 
sustainable initiatives such as education and training to prepare 
workers for jobs in growth industries. 
Cutting all industry support would thus have some detrimental 
social and economic outcomes, at least in the short term. Yet the 
evidence – or lack of evidence – of benefits from current support 
suggests there is significant scope for savings.255 The reduction 
proposed leaves untouched support for research and 
development, carbon emissions reduction, and export assistance. 
In all these cases, there is at least an arguable case for broader 
public benefit.  
As with many of the spending proposals identified, high quality 
execution would be required. Governments would need to make 
good decisions about which industry assistance is and is not 
                                            
253 Beer (2008), p. 324 
254 Productivity Commission (2012) 
255 Daley and Lancy (2011) 
justified, in the face of a range of special interest groups with 
much to lose. 
9.3 Health spending 
Reducing high levels of health spending could save up to 
$9 billion per year through a variety of measures. Few health 
proposals on their own create significant savings, but when 
combined, can save a large amount offsetting the recent growth in 
health spending. These measures include abolishing the private 
health insurance rebate, improving pharmaceutical pricing and 
reducing avoidable hospital costs. While some proposals will have 
positive economic impacts, there are moderately negative social 
impacts should these proposals affect access to and timeliness of 
treatment for some people. 
Growth in health spending over the past 10 years accounts for the 
largest increase in Australian government expenditure above 
GDP growth. The increase is largely due to an increase in 
spending on hospitals. If health expenditure continues to grow, it 
will consume an extra 1.5 percentage points of GDP by 2023.256 
This additional spending brings substantial benefits. Life 
expectancy continues to increase and quality of life has improved. 
Life expectancy in Australia is among the highest in the world, and 
health spending per person is relatively modest. This suggests 
that only genuine innovations will produce savings that do not 
harm the quality of health care.257  
                                            
256 See above Figure 2.6 
257 OECD (2010) 
Balancing budgets: tough choices we need   
Grattan Institute 2013   71 
Within the health system, there is no one magic bullet that will rein 
in spending. Rather, a number of smaller measures to improve 
efficiency may reduce health costs below projections: 
x Private health insurance rebate: Removing the private 
health insurance rebate could save $3.5 billion in expenditure. 
Savings of $5.5 billion258 from the cost of the rebate would be 
offset by an increase in demand for public hospital services.259 
x Pharmaceutical pricing: A previous Grattan Institute report 
estimated that up to $2 billion per year could be achieved by 
changing the way government pays for pharmaceuticals.260 
x Avoidable hospital costs: A forthcoming Grattan Institute 
report suggests there is wide variation in costs between 
hospitals for the same procedures.261 Reducing costs that may 
be avoidable could reduce hospital spending by up to 
$1 billion per year. 
x End of life care: Initial Grattan analysis suggests that that the 
cost of hospital admissions in the year before death (for 
people aged over 65) may be around $2 billion a year. 
Offsetting costs are not captured in this analysis, including 
alternative health care and support provided outside hospital, 
which would probably reduce the budget impact to less than 
$1 billion. Although the cost of end of life care is substantial, 
there are few concrete proposals to reduce it.  
                                            
258 Treasury (2013a), p. 6-27 
259 Grattan analysis of Segal (2004) and Cheng (2013)  
260 Duckett, et al. (2013) 
261 Duckett, et al. (Forthcoming) 
x Cost effectiveness of treatments: Costs could be reduced 
by systemically using lowest cost procedures and medicines 
that provide the same benefit to patients as more expensive 
options. Costs could also be reduced by not using procedures 
if on balance they are not beneficial or if there is no evidence 
that they work.262 Based on the UK experience, these 
approaches could save up to $2 billion in Australia.263  
x Preventative strategies: Strategies to prevent illness, such 
as increasing alcohol taxes, could help to reduce health costs 
in the long run.264 
The Grattan Institute Health Program continues to contribute to 
work to define these policy options more precisely. 
9.4 Other spending reductions 
We have analysed a number of other proposals, including 
plausible reductions in defence spending, increasing school class 
sizes, and reducing student subsidies for higher education. 
Individually, each of these is worth $2 billion to $3 billion. 
Collectively they could improve the budget bottom line by 
$8 billion. They are described in more detail in Balancing budgets: 
Supporting analysis.  
                                            
262 The UK’s National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) is an 
independent body that provides evidence-based guidelines and advice in public 
health, develops standards and performance metrics for public health and social 
services and information services. It provides a ‘do not do’ database outlining 
clinical practices that should be discontinued or not used routinely by health 
professionals. See NICE (2013b) 
263 Grattan analysis of NICE (2013a) and Department of Health - UK (2010) 
264 Doran, et al. (2013) 
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However, in order to reduce school or defence spending without 
significant adverse effects, execution would have to be unusually 
high quality. Governments would have to selectively keep the 
better teachers as teaching workforces reduced. They would have 
to keep high value, and cut low value defence spending, despite 
regional political pressures. By contrast, reducing student 
subsidies for higher education would be relatively straightforward 
to execute. 
9.5 Middle-class welfare 
Conversations about Australian government budgets frequently 
assert that there are large savings in ‘middle-class welfare’. A 
small number of high-profile payments to families with children 
seem to drive this discussion. Yet compared to the scale of 
Australian government budgets, the amount going to well-off 
families via these payments is small: around half a billion per 
year. Australia has the most tightly targeted welfare system in the 
world. The major recipients of middle class welfare in Australia 
are people over the age of 65, and proposals to address this are 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
The idea that governments should provide some support to 
families in need for the costs of raising children is relatively 
uncontroversial. The Henry Tax Review found that appropriately 
targeted family payments were important for supporting lower-
income families with the cost of raising children; supporting 
parents of young children to balance work and family; and 
improving horizontal equity between taxpayers who support 
children and those who do not.265 
                                            
265 Treasury (2010a) 
Most family payments are made through Family Tax Benefit (FTB) 
Part A, which will cost the budget $14.3 billion in 2013-14.266 
Families with an adjusted taxable income of $48,837 or less 
receive the full rate of payment.267 Families earning more than this 
have their FTB payment reduced as their earnings increase. The 
upper income limit varies depending on family composition, but a 
two-child family that earns more than $113,000 pre-tax will not get 
FTB Part A payments.268  
Family Tax Benefit Part B, which will cost the budget $4.6 billion 
in 2013-14, has more generous thresholds, and so is available to 
more middle and upper-income families.269 It is paid to single-
parent families with an annual adjusted taxable income under 
$150,000, and to two-parent families where one parent has little 
or no income and the other parent earns up to $150,000 p.a.270 
Payment rates for FTB taper rapidly, so relatively little of the 
payment goes to families earning incomes above the median for 
their household type.271 Less than $2 billion of FTB are paid to 
families in the top 40 per cent of households ranked by income 
(Figure 9.3) 
                                            
266 FaHCSIA (2013) 
267 For reference, a couple with children at the median of the working age 
population earns $90,500 in equivalised disposable income. See Phillips and 
Toohey (2013). 
268 DHS (2013b) 
269 FaHCSIA (2013) 
270 DHS (2013c) 
271 Phillips and Toohey (2013) 
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Figure 9.3 Distribution of Family Tax Benefits payments by family 
disposable income decile 
$ billion, per year 
 
Note: Includes Family Tax Benefits Parts A and B. Income deciles refer to equivalised 
household disposable income for families whose survey reference member (generally the 
‘head’ of the household) is under 60. 
Source: ABS (2011c) 
Abolishing FTB Part B payment for families with combined taxable 
incomes of above $100,000 would save the budget around 
$0.5 billion a year. Applying tougher participation requirements for 
those with children of school age, similar to those now required for 
parenting payments, would save an additional $1.5 billion a 
year.272  
The two payments most often condemned as ‘middle-class 
welfare’ are the Schoolkids Bonus and the Baby Bonus, but 
they’re a small problem that’s getting smaller. Both are now 
restricted only to recipients of FTB Part A, and so are more 
closely targeted to lower-income families than before. The 
Schoolkids Bonus (which the current government has pledged to 
abolish273) will cost $1.3 billion in 2013-14.274 The Baby Bonus will 
cost $0.4 billion in 2013-14. From 1 March 2014 it will no longer 
exist as a separate payment, but will be paid as a loading on FTB 
Part A. Families who take up Paid Parental Leave will not get the 
loading.275  
‘Middle-class welfare’ will increase over the coming years if the 
incoming government implements its Paid Parental Leave 
scheme.276 The scheme will provide mothers with 26 weeks of 
paid parental leave at their actual wage (capped at $150,000) plus 
superannuation. The existing scheme pays mothers the minimum 
wage for 18 weeks, and is not available to those earning over 
$150,000.277 The gross cost of the scheme is estimated at 
$5.7 billion in 2016-17, compared with $2 billion for the scheme 
currently in place. Taking into account the further $1.6 billion in 
reduced costs and increased revenue to government expected to 
                                            
272 Unpublished NATSEM modelling, cited in Karvelas (2013) 
273 Hockey and Robb (2013) 
274 FaHCSIA (2013) 
275 Ibid. 
276 As discussed in Box 4.1 on p. 18, this is not included as a potential saving 
because it is not yet legislated. 
277 Loughnane (2013a) 
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arise from the scheme, the net budget impact is around 
$2.1 billion.278 The majority of this additional funding will go to 
middle- and high-income earning women. A woman earning 
$32,000 per year will be around $5,000 better off under the new 
scheme, while a woman earning $85,000 will be around $31,000 
better off.279 
Looking more broadly than specific payments to families, Australia 
has one of the world’s most tightly targeted welfare systems. 
Figure 9.4 shows that Australian government payments do more 
to redistribute welfare payments to the poorest 20 per cent of 
households than does any other OECD country except Denmark. 
42 per cent of transfer spending goes to the poorest 20 per cent, 
while only 3 per cent of transfer spending goes to the richest 
20 per cent. 280 
Looking more broadly at ‘in kind transfers’ – government spending 
on services that people use – these are fairly constant in dollar 
terms across income groups and age groups.281 
If Australia has a problem with ‘middle-class welfare’, most of the 
recipients are aged over 65. Australian welfare policies 
systemically favour older people over the young, and older people 
pay less tax and receive more benefits than younger households 
with similar incomes.282 As discussed in Chapter 6, current 
arrangements for the Age Pension and superannuation provide 
significant benefits to those in the middle- and upper-income 
                                            
278 PBO (2013b), p. 30 
279 Loughnane (2013a) 
280 Whiteford (2013) 
281 Daley, et al. (2013), p.43 
282 Tapper, et al. (2013) 
deciles, and reforms are attractive choices for repairing budget 
balances. 
Figure 9.4 Redistribution of welfare payments in OECD countries 
Public payments to households as a proportion of population disposable 
income, mid-2000s 
 
Note: Incomes are equivalised 
Source: Grattan analysis of Whiteford (2010) 
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9.6 Public service cuts 
Other conversations about budgets frequently assert that large 
deficits could be remedied by cutting a bloated public service. 
By international standards, the Australian public sector is 
relatively efficient. The OECD identifies Australia as an example 
for other countries to follow in this regard, with small general 
government employment and large efficiency gains in recent 
years.283 
Across-the-board reductions in funding for government 
departments have long been used to improve efficiency and 
reduce costs. In recent years, annual reductions, or ‘efficiency 
dividends’ of 1.25 to 1.5 percent have been applied to the 
departmental expenditure of most Commonwealth and state 
agencies. Some governments have made further cuts above this 
base rate. 284 
While such cuts may be useful discipline to reduce wasteful 
spending and drive efficiency, they do not raise significant funds. 
In 2011, the Commonwealth imposed an additional efficiency 
dividend of 2.5 per cent (on top of the base rate of 1.5 per cent) 
for the 2012-13 budget year.285 This was estimated to raise 
$0.5 billion a year.286 In this year’s budget, the Victorian 
Government projected that increasing its efficiency dividend from 
2 to 2.5 per cent would raise $0.05 billion a year.287 Extrapolating 
                                            
283OECD (2012b) 
284 Horne (2012); Horne (2013) 
285 Horne (2012)  
286 Treasury (2011) 
287 Victorian Government (2013) 
nationally, this suggests that a 2.5 per cent cut across all levels of 
government (with similar exemptions for front line staff as in 
Victoria) would save only $1.5 billion a year. The new 
Commonwealth Government has committed to an additional 
0.25 per cent efficiency dividend on the Australian Public Service, 
which will raise $0.2 billion in 2016-17.288 
Beyond a certain point, efficiency dividend-style approaches may 
reduce the capacity of the public service to fulfill the functions of 
government.289 Cuts are indiscriminate, making little distinction 
between high-value and low-value functions of government, or 
between departments which are already operating efficiently and 
those with fat available to trim. Given the relatively large efficiency 
dividends imposed in recent years, the scope to reduce savings 
via the usual suspects of travel, hospitality and advertising is 
small.290 That leaves staff cuts. 
Another proposed option for savings is to simply reduce the public 
sector headcount. The new government has already announced 
that it will cut 12,000 staff from the Australian Public Service, 
which if implemented as planned will save $1.2 billion in 2014-15 
and $1.9 billion by 2016-17.291 It is not obvious that these savings 
are feasible. When the public sector is being squeezed, attrition 
rates fall, as people hold onto existing jobs for fear of not finding 
another. When the Howard Government began public service cuts 
in 1996, the resignation rate fell by 11 per cent, the retirement rate 
                                            
288 PBO (2013b), p. 42 
289 MacDermott and Stone (2013) 
290 Bartos (2011) 
291 PBO (2013b), p. 41. This cut is in addition to the effect of the efficiency 
dividend and cuts to the former Department of Climate Change. 
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by 60 per cent, and dismissals by 80 per cent.292 To achieve staff 
cuts of the size proposed, retrenchments may be needed and 
redundancy payouts will erode proposed savings. 
Staff cuts tend to be pursued via voluntary redundancies, which 
weaken the public service as high-quality people who are 
confident of finding another role are more likely to leave. They 
may also reduce the quality of services: even though frontline staff 
are usually nominally quarantined from such cuts, having fewer 
back office staff may push administrative work onto frontline staff, 
leaving them with less capacity to deliver services. A much better 
approach to public sector savings is to take the time to identify 
functions that no longer need to be delivered, or can be delivered 
differently, and target savings appropriately.  
9.7 Federalism reform 
Some suggest that there are significant savings in abolishing one 
or more departments – usually health or education – and 
transferring their functions to the states. The first stated task of 
the new National Commission of Audit is to ‘assess the current 
split of roles and responsibilities between and within the 
Commonwealth Government and state and territory 
governments’.293  
There is obvious room to reduce duplication between 
Commonwealth and state public services.294 However, the budget 
savings are likely to be small relative to the budget problem 
                                            
292 Mannheim (2013) 
293 Hockey and Cormann (2013) 
294 See, for example, the reforms proposed in OECD (2012b) 
Australia faces.295 For example, the Commonwealth Department 
of Health and Ageing will only spend $0.6 billion on employee 
expenses in 2013-14.296 If the entire department were abolished, 
some of this money would be saved, but much of the work those 
staff were doing would need to be taken up by state governments, 
which would have to spend more. And some functions, such as 
regulating the safety and efficacy of medications, should stay with 
the Commonwealth Department rather than being duplicated by 
eight states and territories.  
The primary value of reducing federal-state overlap may be not in 
budgetary savings, but in better use of senior management. 
Federal-state interactions inevitably consume a large portion of 
senior management time in both Commonwealth and state 
bureaucracies. With less overlap, more of this time would be 
spent in managing and pursuing substantive reform. 
In any case, governments of both political colours have been 
reluctant to give up control. For example, the 1996 Officer 
Commission of Audit recommended that the Commonwealth 
transfer many functions, including health and education, to the 
states, but this recommendation was never implemented.297 
The Commonwealth can relieve pressure on its budget by simply 
ending its spending in an area of shared responsibility (such as 
hospitals), and leaving states to manage the entire area – but with 
no change in funding. This would be particularly tempting in 
                                            
295 There is little good evidence on the savings possible from changes to federal 
financial arrangements, and much of what does exist is contradictory. See Daley, 
et al. (2012b), p. 28-9  
296 DoHA (2013) 
297 Officer, et al. (1996) 
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health, where spending is growing much faster than GDP. 
However, this would simply transfer the Commonwealth’s 
budgetary problems to the states – which generally have less 
ability to adjust given their constitutionally limited tax bases.  
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10. Asset sales 
Asset sales, or privatisations, are frequently put forward as part of 
proposals to improve budget balances and reduce debt.298 
However, the relationship between selling assets and improving 
the budget bottom line is not straightforward, with the impact 
depending on the type of asset and the budget measure used.299  
Selling a government business enterprise (a financial asset) 
provides a cash inflow to government which, if used to pay off 
debt will reduce net debt. However, the proceeds of the sale are 
not directly included in either of the main measures of the budget 
balance (underlying cash or fiscal balance). 
The impact of selling a government business enterprise (such as 
Medibank Private) on the budget balance is indirect. The 
government will no longer earn dividends from the sold asset, 
reducing future revenues. If the government uses the revenue 
from the sold asset to pay off debt, it will pay less interest on the 
debt. Ultimately, budget balances are only improved if the 
government’s dividends from the sold asset are less than the 
interest on the sale price of the asset. 
Given the many variables involved, it’s difficult to quantify the 
potential of asset sales to contribute significantly to budget repair. 
                                            
298 Analysing the broader costs and benefits of privatisations, while a subject of 
lively debate, is beyond the scope of this paper: see Abbott and Cohen (2013) 
299 For example, the effect of an asset sale will be different for each of: headline 
cash balance, underlying cash balance, fiscal balance, net debt, net financial 
worth, net worth. 
The sale of government business enterprises has played an 
important role in reducing the existing stock of debt in Australia. 
As Figure 10.1 shows, most of the net debt reduction achieved in 
the early years of both the Kennett and Howard governments 
came from asset sales. 
Figure 10.1 Value of asset sales and net debt reduction  
$ billion (nominal) 
 
Source: Treasury (2013a); Kamener and Tan (2012); Abbott and Cohen (2013) 
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However, assets can only be sold once. The Commonwealth has 
relatively few remaining options for asset sales. Most of the 
infrastructure it still owns is not likely to be attractive to the private 
sector.300 The sale of Medibank Private is expected to raise 
around $4 billion.301 Commentators have suggested that the 
Australian Rail Track Corporation, Snowy Hydro Australia Post, 
Air Services Australia, Defence Housing Australia and the HELP 
higher education debt could also be sold.302 
In some states there is more potential for asset sales. 
Infrastructure Australia estimates that Australian governments 
hold more than $100 billion worth of commercial infrastructure 
assets, including in energy, water, transport and plantation 
forestry.303 For example, the New South Wales, Queensland and 
Western Australian governments still own major energy 
businesses that could be sold.304  
                                            
300 Infrastructure Australia (2012)  
301 Crowe (2013) 
302 AAP and Swan (2013); Creighton (2013); Norton (2013) 
303 Infrastructure Australia (2012), p. 5 
304 Wood, et al. (2012), p. 10 
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11. Budget maintenance 
Assuming that governments balance Australian budgets, what can 
help to maintain this balance? 
Governments of all political colours have a tendency to let budget 
discipline lapse. As Figure 11.1 shows, the commitments of the 
Commonwealth and state governments to reduce spending 
growth over the forward estimates are extremely ambitious 
compared to their recent records. 
11.1 Budget processes and mindsets 
By and large, Australian governments already have robust and 
transparent structures for budgeting.305 Many of the mechanisms 
that bodies such as the OECD recommend for this purpose have 
been in place in Australia for many years and are unremarkable to 
most Australian policy-makers. These include the use of accrual 
accounting; the publication of forward estimates for spending and 
revenue beyond the budget year; establishment of the Future 
Fund and the Intergenerational Report; outcomes-based 
budgeting; and the processes for pre-election budget 
accountability and the formulation of fiscal policy set out in the 
Charter of Budget Honesty.306 The relatively recent establishment 
of the Parliamentary Budget Office provides a further layer of 
scrutiny. Even the Department of Defence, notorious for lack of 
                                            
305 See Blondal, et al. (2008) for a comprehensive overview of budgeting in 
Australia, and OECD (2012b) for more recent developments. 
306 See Officer, et al. (1996); Blondal, et al. (2008); OECD (2012b) and IMF 
(2013b) for more detailed discussion of optimal budget institutions. 
transparency in forward expenditure planning, has improved its 
practices in recent years.307 
Australia’s public policy culture has long been averse to budget 
deficits and public debt.308 Politicians are expected to explain how 
Figure 11.1 Real expenditure growth by government term 
Cumulative annual growth in real expenditure, % p.a. 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth and state budget papers 
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they will pay for their promises, and accusing an opponent of 
increasing government debt is a potent political weapon. This puts 
Australia in a much better fiscal position than most other 
developed nations, whose governments have been able to run 
large deficits with little public pressure. 
Yet some things could be done better. There could be more use 
of lapsing programs with a fixed deadline for evaluation before 
further funding is committed. It would help to have a better culture 
of assessed pilots and program evaluation, with approaches more 
resistant to being gamed by departments and interest groups. 
This would also require a change in political culture, to give 
governments the space to admit that they had spent money on 
something that did not work, rather than pretending that it did to 
save face.  
Budgets will continue to face pressure from ‘entitlement’ programs 
– such as Medicare and the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme – 
that grow in response to demand rather than due to specific 
government decisions. Given that health is the biggest source of 
expenditure growth for Australian budgets, governments will have 
to find ways to address this.309 
In some senses, maintaining discipline over revenue is more 
straightforward. There are simply fewer opportunities for the 
Commonwealth Government to cut into its own revenue streams 
than to increase spending. The Commonwealth will need to 
ensure that any new revenue sources are well-designed (in 
contrast to the previous government’s mining tax regime) so that 
they raise the funds they are intended to.  
                                            
309 Daley, et al. (2013), p. 14 
11.2 Fiscal rules 
Unlike many other countries, Australia does not have legislated 
fiscal rules that specify a numerical budget target. Instead, it takes 
a principles-based approach that requires the Commonwealth to 
release an annual ‘Fiscal Strategy Statement’ that complies with 
legislated ‘Principles of Sound Fiscal Management’. The 
Statement must specify the government’s long-term fiscal 
objectives and the measures by which fiscal policy will be set and 
addressed. There are no legislated penalties for non-compliance 
with these targets, but the government must report on its 
performance via the budget papers and related documents.310 
Since this framework was introduced in 1998, governments on 
both sides of politics have used the Statement to set medium-term 
fiscal strategies to achieve a ‘balanced budget over the economic 
cycle’. Both sides have committed to fiscal rectitude outside the 
Statement, usually by promising to achieve a specified surplus in 
a defined timeframe, and to constrain growth in taxes or spending. 
A principles-based approach has the great advantage of flexibility 
in the case of a period of below-trend growth or an international 
fiscal crisis. While flexibility carries risks, in the right 
circumstances it can have significant advantages.311 Some argue 
that the success of Australia’s inflation targeting regime is due to 
the level of discretion given to policy-makers to adjust to 
circumstances. While initially criticised when established, the 
flexible regime has come to be seen as a benefit rather than a 
                                            
310 A more detailed discussion of the regime can be found in Blondal, et al. 
(2008) 
311 IMF (2013b), p. 41 
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cost, and has been emulated by other countries. When combined 
with Australia’s traditionally conservative fiscal mindset, and 
proper transparency, the flexibility of our fiscal rules may bring the 
same benefit.312  Certainly, the OECD’s view is that Australia’s 
current system has served it well.313 There is also some evidence 
that "appropriate institutional arrangements deliver better fiscal 
outcomes than simple, mechanical fiscal rules.”314 
The risk with Australia’s approach is that while governments 
commit to a balanced budget ‘over the economic cycle’, there is 
no clear way of defining where the current year sits in the cycle. 
This gives governments plenty of wriggle room to continue to run 
budget deficits by claiming that the economy is not yet in good 
enough shape to justify a surplus. 
Some have proposed avoiding this problem by establishing an 
independent body to set fiscal rules for government, as the 
Reserve Bank does for monetary policy.315 This is problematic for 
a number of reasons, not least that it would require constant 
adjustment of tax rates to maintain budget balances within the 
recommended range.  
In any case, the recent experience of fixed fiscal targets in other 
countries has not been edifying. The European Union’s Stability 
and Growth Pact requires countries to deal with normal cyclical 
fluctuations while keeping the government deficit below 3 per cent 
                                            
312  Gruen and Sayegh (2005) 
313 OECD (2012a) 
314 Daban (2011) 
315 Gruen (1997); Carling and Kirchner (2009) 
of national income.316 In practice, countries have either 
manipulated their fiscal data to appear to comply, or ignored the 
rules altogether when crisis hit.317 Many countries also have their 
own deficit rules that have proved similarly problematic.318 Chile 
has had a more successful experience, but it appears to be 
somewhat of an outlier.319 
A better approach may be to follow the United Kingdom’s new 
approach, which combines short-term flexibility with a firmer 
timeframe for a return to a balanced budget. The UK government 
replaced the Fiscal Responsibility Act with a ‘fiscal mandate’ that 
states that the structural current budget must be forecast to be in 
balance or in surplus by the end of the rolling, five-year forecast 
horizon. As the Institute for Fiscal Studies states: 
The fiscal mandate has much to recommend it [ ] It constrains 
the government over the medium term to borrow only to 
finance investment spending, while allowing the flexibility to 
provide short-term stimulus in periods when the economy is 
underperforming and giving time for fiscal policy to adjust to 
shocks.320  
Australia’s budget processes would be strengthened if the new 
Commonwealth Government adopted such a rule as part of its 
first Fiscal Strategy Statement, rather than continuing the vague 
commitment to a balanced budget over the economic cycle. 
                                            
316 European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact (1997) 
317 Uren (2013) 
318 See, for example, discussion of the UK situation in Emmerson, et al. (2013) 
319 Daban (2011) 
320 Emmerson, et al. (2013) 
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Combined with Australia’s stronger culture of deficit aversion, it 
would sharpen the government’s incentive to balance the budget 
in the medium term. State governments should adopt a similar 
rule. 
Ideally, the Parliamentary Budget Office should be given a 
mandate to report on whether budget outcomes are consistent 
wth the Fiscal Strategy Statement, again following the approach in 
the UK, where the Office for Budget Responsibility has a remit to 
assess government’s compliance.321 This year Australia’s 
Parliamentary Budget Office also produced an estimate of the 
structural budget balance.322 Repeating this exercise annually 
would inform fiscal policy. Similar reports should be produced for 
state governments. 
Those advocating budget rules sometimes relate them specifically 
to saving the proceeds of the Australian mining boom. Some 
countries, such as Norway, reserve commodity price windfalls into 
a sovereign wealth fund. As Grattan Institute’s report ‘The mining 
boom: impacts and prospects’ notes, Australia’s situation is 
sufficiently different to such countries to justify a separate 
approach.323 The OECD, while suggesting that Australia consider 
establishing a stabilization fund, also notes the differences 
between Australia and other nations, and acknowledges the 
difficulty in establishing such a fund. 324 
                                            
321 ibid.; Uren (2013) 
322 PBO (2013a) 
323 Minifie, et al. (2013) 
324 OECD (2012a) 
11.3 Data and reporting 
No government entity has a remit, or much incentive, to consider 
Australian budgets as a whole rather than on a jurisdiction-by-
jurisdiction basis. This distorts our understanding of the real fiscal 
situation, and reduces accountability if governments try to balance 
their budgets by cost-shifting onto other jurisdictions (see Section 
9.7). The OECD has suggested extending the scope of the 
Parliamentary Budget Office to enable it to report on state as well 
as Commonwealth budget issues. 325 Extending the scope of the 
Intergenerational Report to include state governments would 
further improve the information available to policy-makers. 
Good budgeting requires good data, and fiscal analysis in 
Australia is hampered by a lack of it. A good start would be for 
jurisdictions to make the data in their budget papers available in a 
form that can be easily analysed by those outside government (for 
example, as a spreadsheet rather than a PDF file). Improving the 
comparability of data over time and between jurisdictions would 
also enable better analysis. The Uniform Presentation Framework 
(UPF) and the ABS’s Government Finance Statistics are useful in 
ensuring that basic financial data such as operating statements 
and balance sheets is comparable. Governments also need to 
ensure they maintain appropriate central records of their own 
activities so that expenditure can be tracked over time when 
responsibilities move between departments and ministries. 
                                            
325 Ibid. 
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11.4 Tax expenditures 
Budget discipline could also be improved by being more explicit 
about tax expenditures. Tax expenditures are concessions and 
exemptions that reduce the revenue that a government otherwise 
would have collected. Examples include the exclusion of fresh 
food from the GST, exemption of owner-occupied housing from 
capital gains tax, and exemption of small businesses from payroll 
tax. 
In 2011-12, the Commonwealth reported tax expenditures of 
$111 billion, and the states reported $28 billion.326 While the 
reliability of these estimates varies, the sums involved are clearly 
big enough to make a difference to the budget outcome. However, 
they are not usually counted when considering the amount 
government spends on a particular policy area and are not subject 
to ongoing Parliamentary scrutiny as they do not appear in 
appropriation bills.327 In general, they get far less attention from 
the media and policymakers than direct budget expenditures. 
Not all tax expenditures are bad. They can be significant 
loopholes that enable tax avoidance, but they can also produce 
beneficial social outcomes and improve efficiency. However, their 
relative lack of transparency and accountability can impair budget 
sustainability.328 
The Commonwealth Government publishes a Tax Expenditures 
Statement each year, and states provide similar information in 
                                            
326 Treasury (2013e); Grattan analysis of state and territory budget papers 
327 ANAO (2013) 
328 Martin (2013); Treasury (2010b); Officer, et al. (1996) 
their budget papers. But tax expenditures are inherently 
challenging to measure and interpret, and the figures provided 
cannot be reliably compared with budget expenditures.329 There 
are no uniform reporting standards that enable comparisons over 
time, or between different state governments.330  
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Conclusion
This report shows the tough choices that Australian governments 
need to make to balance their budgets. If they ignore their 
substantial and widening deficits, they will hand a heavy burden of 
debt and interest payments to the next generation.  
Many of the choices we have discussed are sacred cows. Even to 
raise them may sound crazy-brave. But governments not 
prepared to tackle any of these reforms are unlikely to rein in their 
deficits. There just aren’t enough feasible alternatives big enough 
to bridge the gap. If governments rule out all the tough choices 
discussed in this report, then they are obliged to propose 
plausible alternatives.  
We inherited a prosperous Australia. We need our governments 
to make tough choices so that it stays that way. 
Balancing budgets: tough choices we need   
Grattan Institute 2013 86 
References 
AAP (2013) 'Budget update before Christmas: Hockey', Sydney Morning Herald, 
16 October 2013, accessed 31 October 2013, from 
http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-national/budget-update-before-
christmashockey-20131016-2vlmg.html 
AAP and Swan, J. (2013) 'Christopher Pyne floats privatisation of HECS debt', 
Sydney Morning Herald, 29 October 2013, accessed 31 October 2013, 
from http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/christopher-
pyne-floats-privatisation-of-hecs-debt-20131029-2wcic.html 
Abbas, S. A., Akitoby, B., Andritzky, J., Berger, H., Komatsuzaki, T. and Tyson, 
J. (2013) Dealing with high debt in an era of low growth, IMF staff 
discussion note SDN/13/07, International Monetary Fund, accessed 30 
October 2013, from 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2013/sdn1307.pdf 
Abbott, M. and Cohen, B. (2013) A survey of the privatisation of government 
owend enterprises in Australia since the 1980s, Unpublished paper,   
ABS (2008) Australian Historical Population Statistics, catalogue number 
3105.0.65.001, Australian Bureau of Statistics 
ABS (2011a) Census of Population and Housing, Australian Bureau of Statistics  
ABS (2011b) Household Expenditure Survey, catalogue number 6530.0, 
Australian Bureau of Statistics 
ABS (2011c) Household Expenditure Survey 2009-10 CURF, catalogue number 
6503.0, Australian Bureau of Statistics 
ABS (2012a) Australian System of National Accounts, 2011-12, catalogue 
number 5204.0, Australian Bureau of Statistics 
ABS (2012b) Employment and Earnings, Public Sector, Australia, 2011-12, 
catalogue number 6248.0.55.002, Australian Bureau of Statistics 
ABS (2013a) Australian National Accounts: National Income, Expenditure and 
Product, Jun 2013, catalogue number 5206.0, Australian Bureau of 
Statistics 
ABS (2013b) Australian System of National Accounts, 2012-13, catalogue 
number 5204.0, Australian Bureau of Statistics 
ABS (2013c) Average Weekly Earnings, Australia, May 2013, catalogue number 
6302.0, Australian Bureau of Statistics 
ABS (2013d) Construction work done, Australia, catalogue number 8755.0, 
Australian Bureau of Statistics 
ABS (2013e) Consumer Price Index, catalogue number 6401.0, Australia Bureau 
of Statistics 
ABS (2013f) Counts of Australian Businesses, including Entries and Exits, Jun 
2008 to Jun 2012, catalogue number 8165.0, Australian Bureau of 
Statistics 
ABS (2013g) Engineering Construction Activity, Australia, catalogue number 
8762.0, Table 11, Australian Bureau of Statistics 
ABS (2013h) House price indexes: Eight capital cities, Sep 2013, catalogue 
number 6416.0, Australian Bureau of Statistics 
ABS (2013i) Household Expenditure Survey 20011-12 CURF, catalogue number 
6503.0, Australian Bureau of Statistics 
ABS (2013j) Housing Occupancy and Costs, catalogue number 4130.0, 
Australian Bureau of Statistics 
ABS (2013k) International trade in services by country, by state and by detailed 
services category, calendar year, 2012, catalogue number 
5368.0.55.004, Australian Bureau of Statistics 
ABS (2013l) Labour Force, Australia, catalogue number 6202.0, Australian 
Bureau of Statistics 
ABS (2013m) Labour force, Australia: Table 22. Labour underutilisation by Age 
and Sex, catalogue number 6202.0, Australian Bureau of Statistics 
ABS (2013n) Producer Price Indexes, Australia, Jun 2013, catalogue number 
6427.0, Australian Bureau of Statistics 
ABS (2013o) Taxation Revenue, Australia, 2011-12, catalogue number 5506.0, 
Australian Bureau of Statistics 
ACOSS (2012) Surviving, not living, Submission to Senate Employment 
Committee on the adequacy of 'allowance' payments. ACOSS Paper 
192, Australian Council of Social Service, accessed October 2013, from 
http://acoss.org.au/images/uploads/Allowance_Adequacy_Submission_
Final.pdf 
Albalate and Bel (2009) 'What local policy makers should know about urban road 
charging: lessons from worldwide experience', Public Administration 
Review, 69(5), p 962-974 
Balancing budgets: tough choices we need   
Grattan Institute 2013 87 
ANAO (2013) Preparation of the tax expenditures statement, Australian National 
Audit Office, Australian Government, accessed 24 October 2013, from 
http://www.anao.gov.au/Publications/Audit-Reports/2012-
2013/Preparation-of-the-Tax-Expenditures-Statement 
ASIC (2013a) Retirement income & tax, Australian Securities and Investments 
Commissionfrom https://www.moneysmart.gov.au/superannuation-and-
retirement/income-sources-in-retirement/income-from-super/retirement-
income-and-tax 
ASIC (2013b) Selling the family home, Australian Securities and Investments 
Commissionfrom https://www.moneysmart.gov.au/superannuation-and-
retirement/income-sources-in-retirement/selling-the-family-home 
ASIC (2013c) Tax & Super, Australian Securities and Investments 
Commissionfrom https://www.moneysmart.gov.au/superannuation-and-
retirement/how-super-works/tax-and-super 
ATO (2013a) Contributions caps - Concessional contributions cap, Australian 
Tax Office, Australian Government, accessed October 2013, from 
http://www.ato.gov.au/Rates/Key-superannuation-rates-and-
thresholds/?page=2#Concessional_contributions_cap 
ATO (2013b) Excise tariff working pages, ATO Legal Database, Australian 
Taxation Office, accessed 17 November 2013, from 
http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view.htm?Docid=PAC/BL030002/1&PiT=99
991231235958  
ATO (2013c) Taxation Statistics 2010-11, Australian Taxation Office, Australian 
Government, accessed 4 September 2013, from 
www.ato.gov.au/About-ATO/Research-and-statistics/In-detail/Tax-
statistics/Taxation-statistics-2010-11/  
Australian Fair Pay Commission (2009) Wage-setting decision and reasons for 
decision, 2/2009, Australian Fair Pay Commission, Australian 
Government, accessed 15 November 2013, from 
fwc.gov.au/sites/afpc2009wagereview/documents/afpc2009wsd2.pdf 
Bartlett, B. (2012) The benefit and the burden: tax reform - why we need it and 
what it will take, Simon & Schuster 
Bartos, S. (2011) 'Spending cuts? Yes Minister', accessed 28 October 2013, 
from http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/3707918.html 
Bassanese, D. (2013) 'Infrastructure spending holds potential for economy', The 
Australian Financial Review, 16 September 2013, accessed October 
2013, from http://www.afr.com/p/australia2-
0/infrastructure_spending_holds_potential_SUXMmGMPPjc4xK9uFbqn
TL 
BCA (2013) Securing investment in Australia's future: Managing the economic 
transition, Business Council of Australia, accessed October 2013, from 
http://www.bca.com.au/DisplayFile.aspx?FileID=1039 
Beer, A. (2008) 'Risk and return: houing tenure and labour market adjustment 
after employment loss in the automotive sector in South Adelaide', 
Policy Studies, 29(3), p 319 
Bernie, K. and Downes, P. (1999) The Macroeconomics of Unemployment in the 
Treasury Macroeconomic (TRYM) Model, TYRM Related Paper No. 20, 
Modelling Section, Macroeconomic Analysis Branch, The Treasury, 
Australian Government, accessed August 2013,  
Blondal, J. R., Bergvall, D., Hawkesworth, I. and Deighton-Smith, R. (2008) 
'Budgeting in Australia', OECD Journal on Budgeting, 8(2),  
BREE (2013) Resources and Energy Quarterly, Bureau of Resources and 
Energy Economics, Australian Government, accessed October 2013, 
from http://www.bree.gov.au/publications/req.html 
Buchanan, J. and Wagner, R. (1997) Democracy in deficit: the political legacy of 
Lord Keynes, Academic Press 
Burkhauser, R., Daly, M. and Lucking, B. (2013) 'Is Australia one recession away 
from a disability blowout? Lessons from other Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development Countries', Australian 
Economic Review, 43(3), p 357 
Burman, L. (2009) 'Taxing Capital Gains in Australia: Assessment and 
Recommendations ', in Australian Business Tax Reform in Retrospect 
and Prospect, C. Evans and R. Krever, Eds., Thomson Reuters, 
Sydney 
Button, J. (2013) 'Beyond the king-in-excile', Sydney Morning Herald, 23 March 
2013, accessed 31 October 2013, from http://www.smh.com.au/federal-
politics/political-opinion/beyond-the-kinginexile-20130322-2gl70.html 
Caravel (2013) A review of project governance effectiveness in Australia, 
Commissioned by Infrastructure Australia, Caravel, accessed October 
2013, from 
http://www.infrastructureaustralia.gov.au/publications/files/CARAVEL_G
ROUP_Project_Governance_Effectiveness_March_2013.pdf 
Balancing budgets: tough choices we need   
Grattan Institute 2013 88 
Carling, R. and Kirchner, S. (2009) Fiscal rules for limited government: reforming 
Australia's fiscal responsibility legislation, CIS Policy Monographs 98, 
Centre for Independent Studies, accessed 31 October 2013, from 
http://www.cis.org.au/images/stories/policy-monographs/pm-98.pdf 
Carne, K. (2007) Determinants of labour demand: the Australian experience, 
Queensland Department of Education, Training and the Arts, accessed 
August 2013, from 
http://training.qld.gov.au/resources/employers/pdf/wp49-determinants-
labour-demand.pdf 
Chancellor, J. (2013) 'Federal Budget's trial program encourages downsizing to 
smaller homes without affecting aged pensions', Property Observer,  
from http://www.propertyobserver.com.au/demographics/federal-
budget-s-trial-program-encouraging-downsizing-to-smaller-homes-
without-affecting-aged-pensions/2013051461357 
Cheng, T. (2013) Does Reducing Rebates for Private Health Insurance 
Generate Cost Savings?, Melbourne Institue Policy Briefs Series, Policy 
Brief No. 3/13, accessed 20 November 2013, from 
http://melbourneinstitute.com/downloads/policy_briefs_series/pb2013n0
3.pdf 
Costello, P. and Coleman, P. (2008) The Costello memoirs, Melbourne 
University Press 
Costello, P., Harding, S. and McTaggart, D. (2013) Queensland Commission of 
Audit Final Report, accessed 31 October 2013, from 
http://www.commissionofaudit.qld.gov.au/reports/coa-final-report-
volume-1.pdf 
Cowen, T. (2011) The great stagnation, Dutton Adult 
Credit Suisse (2013) Iron Ore Cost Curves, Credit Suisse Securities Research 
and Analytics  
Creighton, A. (2013) 'Risk to $110bn asset sell-off', The Australian, 8 October 
2013, accessed 31 October 2013, from 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/economics/risk-to-110bn-
asset-sell-off/story-e6frg926-1226734347866 
Crowe, D. (2013) 'Medibank sale the first budget fix', The Australian, 23 October 
2013, accessed 31 October 2013, from 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/policy/medibank-sale-
the-first-budget-fix/story-fn59nsif-1226744873439 
Daban, T. (2011) Strengthening Chile's rule-based fiscal framework, IMF 
Working Paper WP/11/17, International Monetary Fund, accessed 15 
November 2013, from 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp1117.pdf 
Dai, Z., Maydew, E., Shackelford, D. A. and Zhang, H. H. (2008) 'Capital Gains 
Taxes and Asset Prices: Capitalization or Lock-in?', The Jouranl of 
Finance, Vol LXIII(2), p 709-742 
Daley, J. (2007) 'Why do Australian investors borrow so little?', FINSIA 
Conference.  Unpublished, on file with authors., 20 May 2007, 
accessed,  
Daley, J. (2013) 'Is there still a budget emergency?', Address to the National 
Press Club of Australia, 9 October 2013, accessed October 2013, from 
http://grattan.edu.au/static/files/assets/50962fa6/534_speech_press_cl
ub_JD_budget_emergency_131009.pdf 
Daley, J. and Edis, T. (2011) Learning the hard way: Australia's policies to 
reduce emissions, Grattan Institute, accessed 8 November 2013, from 
http://grattan.edu.au/static/files/assets/3ae75b49/077_report_energy_le
arning_the_hard_way.pdf 
Daley, J. and Lancy, A. (2011) Investing in regions:Making a difference, Grattan 
Institute  
Daley, J., McGannon, C. and Ginnivan, L. (2012a) Game-changers: Economic 
reform priorities for Australia, Grattan Institute, accessed 2 October 
2013, from http://grattan.edu.au/publications/reports/post/game-
changers-economic-reform-priorities-for-australia/ 
Daley, J., McGannon, C. and Ginnivan, L. (2012b) Game-changers: Economic 
reform priorities for Australia - supporting analysis, Grattan Institute, 
accessed October 2013, from 
http://grattan.edu.au/publications/reports/post/game-changers-
supporting-materials/ 
Daley, J., McGannon, C. and Savage, J. (2013) Budget pressures on Australian 
governments, Grattan Institute, accessed October 2013, from 
http://grattan.edu.au/publications/reports/post/budget-pressures-on-
australian-governments/ 
Davidson, P. (2000) 'Tax reform: a retrospective', UNSW Law Journal, 23(2), p 
264-274 
Davidson, S. (2010) 'The RSPT is a Brown Tax', accessed September 2013, 
from http://catallaxyfiles.com/2010/05/13/the-rspt-is-a-brown-tax/ 
Balancing budgets: tough choices we need   
Grattan Institute 2013 89 
Davies, A. (2010) 'Why do major infrastructure projects fail?', accessed October 
2013, from http://blogs.crikey.com.au/theurbanist/2010/09/02/why-do-
major-infrastructure-projects-fail/ 
Davies, A. (2012) 'Why is infrastructure so bloody expensive?', accessed 
September 2013, from 
http://blogs.crikey.com.au/theurbanist/2012/02/16/why-is-infrastructure-
so-bloody-expensive/ 
Davies, A. (2013) 'Are cost estimates for transport projects reliable?', accessed 
September 2013, from 
http://blogs.crikey.com.au/theurbanist/2013/09/17/are-cost-estimates-
for-transport-projects-reliable/ 
Debelle, G. and Vickery, J. (1998) 'The Macroeconomics of Australian 
Unemployment', in Unemployment and the Australian Labour Market, 
G. Debelle and J. Borland, Eds., Reserve Bank of Australia and the 
Centre for Economic Policy Research, ANU, p 235-265 
Department of Health - UK (2010) Achieving World Class Productivity in the NHS 
2009-10 – 2013-14: Detailing the Size of the Opportunity, 
McKinsey&Co, accessed 20 November 2013, from 
http://www.rightcare.nhs.uk/index.php/2010/07/achieving-world-class-
productivity-in-the-nhs-200910-201314-detailing-the-size-of-the-
opportunity/ 
Deutsche Bank (2013) Commodities Weekly, 16 September 2013, Deutsche 
Bank Markets Research  
DHS (2013a) 'Age Pension', accessed 31 October 2013, from 
http://www.humanservices.gov.au/customer/services/centrelink/age-
pension 
DHS (2013b) 'Income test for Family Tax Benefit Part A', accessed October 
2013, from 
http://www.humanservices.gov.au/customer/enablers/centrelink/family-
tax-benefit-part-a-part-b/ftb-a-income-test 
DHS (2013c) 'Income test for Family Tax Benefit Part B', accessed October 
2013, from 
http://www.humanservices.gov.au/customer/enablers/centrelink/family-
tax-benefit-part-a-part-b/ftb-b-income-test 
DIT (2009) Public road-related expenditure and revenue in Australia, 
Department of Infrastructure and Transport, Australian Government 
Dixon, P., Rimmer, M. and Picton, M. (2004) 'Payroll taxes: Thresholds, firm 
sizes, deadweight losses and Commonwealth Grants Commission 
Funding', Economic Record, 80(250),  
Dixon, R., Freebairn, J. and Lim, G. C. (2004) An employment equation for 
Australia: 1966-2001, Department of Economics Working Papers Series 
892, University of Melbourne Faculty of Business and Economics, 
accessed August 2013,  
Djankov, S., Ganser, T., McLiesh, C., Ramalho, R. and Shleifer, A. (2010) 'The 
Effect of Corporate Taxes on Investment and Entrepreneurship', 
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2(July 2010), p 31-64 
Dobes, L. (2008) A century of Australian cost-benefit analysis, Working papers in 
cost-benefit analysis. WP 2008-01, Office of Best Practice Regulation, 
Department of Finance and Deregulation, Australian Government, 
accessed 18 November 2013, from 
www.finance.gov.au/obpr/docs/Working-paper-1-Leo-Dobes.pdf 
DoHA (2013) Portfolio Budget Statements 2013-14: Health and Ageing, 
Department of Health and Ageing, Australian Government, accessed 
October 2013, from 
http://www.health.gov.au/internet/budget/publishing.nsf/Content/2013-
2014_Health_PBS 
DoI (2013) State/territory resource rent charges, Department of Industry, 
Australian Government, accessed 30 October 2013, from 
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/enhancing/taxation/govt_responsibilitie
s/st-rent/Pages/StateTerritoryResourceRentCharges.aspx 
Doran, C., Byrnes, J., Cobia, L., Vandenberg, B. and Vos, T. (2013) 'Estimated 
impacts of alternative Australian alcohol taxation structures 
consumption, public health and government revenues', The Medical 
Journal of Australia, 199(9), p 619-622 
DTF NT (2012) Territory Budget Papers 2012-13, Department of Treasury and 
Finance, Northern Territory Government 
DTF SA (2012) State Budget Papers 2012-13, Department of Treasury and 
Finance, Government of South Australia 
DTF Tasmania (2012) State Budget Papers 2012-13, Department of Treasury 
and Finance, Tasmanian Government 
DTF Victoria (2012) State Budget Papers 2012-13, Department of Treasury and 
Finance, Government of Victoria 
Duckett, S., Breadon, P., Ginnivan, L. and Venkataraman, P. (2013) Australia's 
bad drug deal: high pharmaceutical prices, Grattan Institute  
Balancing budgets: tough choices we need   
Grattan Institute 2013 90 
Duckett, S., Breadon, P., Weidmann, B. and Nicola, I. (Forthcoming) Costly 
Care, Grattan Institute  
Dungey, M. and Pitchford, J. (1998) Prospects for Output and Employment 
Growth with Steady Inflation, Centre for Economic Policy Research 
Discussion Paper 387, Australian National University Research School 
of Economics, accessed August 2013,  
Eddington, R. (2006) The case for action: Sir Rod Eddington's advice to 
Government, The Eddington Transport Study, accessed October 2013, 
from 
http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20100408160254/http:/www.dft.g
ov.uk/about/strategy/transportstrategy/eddingtonstudy/ 
Ellis, L. (2013) 'Housing and Mortgage Markets: The Long Run, the Short Run 
and the Uncertainty in Between', Address to the Citibank Property 
Conference, 23 April 2013, accessed 21 November 2013, from 
http://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2013/sp-so-230413.html 
Emmerson, C., Keynes, S. and Tetlow, G. (2013) 'The fiscal targets', in IFS 
Green Budget: February 2013, C. Emmerson, P. Johnson and H. Miller, 
Eds., Institute for Fiscal Studies, p 91-118 
Engineers Australia (2010) Australian Infrastructure Report Card 2010, 
Engineers Australia, accessed 21 November 2013, from 
http://www.engineersaustralia.org.au//infrastructure-report-card 
Ergas, H. and Robson, A. (2010) 'The social losses from inefficient infrastructure 
projects: Recent Australian experience', Strengthening evidence-based 
policy in the Australian federation, Canberra, accessed 15 November 
2013, from 
http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/96203/roundtable-
proceedings-volume1.pdf 
Eslake, S. (2010) 'Infrastructure investment and productivity', Address to the 
Economic Society’s Annual Tasmanian Economic Forum 3 December 
2010, accessed October 2013, from 
http://grattan.edu.au/static/files/assets/0ed085c4/061_eslake_tasecofor
um.pdf 
Eslake, S. (2011) 'Australia's tax reform challenge', Australian Parliamentary 
Library Lecture, 21 September 2011, accessed October 2013, from 
http://grattan.edu.au/static/files/assets/ce5572a5/111_eslake_tax_refor
m_parl_library.pdf 
Eslake, S. (2013) 'Australian Housing Policy: 50 years of failure. Address to the 
122nd Annual Henry George Commemorative Dinner, The Royal 
Society of Victoria, Melbourne', 2 September 2013, accessed via 
author,  
Eslava, M. (2011) 'The political economy of fiscal deficits: a survey', Journal of 
Economic Surveys, 25(4), p 645-673 
European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact (1997) Resolution of the 
European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact, 97/C 236/01, 
accessed 29 October 2013, from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31997Y0802(01):
EN:HTML 
Evans, C. (2002) 'Taxing capital gains: One step forwards or two steps back?', 
Journal of Australian Taxation, 5(1), p 114-135 
EY (2012) Impact of removing the LVT on GST revenues, Report for the 
National Retail Association, Ernst & Young, accessed 21 November 
2013, from 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssetsPI/Impact_of_removing_the
_LVT_on_GST_revenues/$FILE/Impact-of-removing-the-LVT-on-GST-
revenues 
Eyraud, L. and Lusinyan, L. (2011) Decentralising spending more than revenue: 
does it hurt fiscal performance?, Working Paper WP/11/226, 
International Monetary Fund  
FaHCSIA (2013) Portfolio Budget Statements 2013-14: Families, Housing, 
Community Services and Indigenous Affairs Portfolio, Department of 
Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, 
Australian Government, accessed October 2013, from 
http://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/05_2013/fahcsia_p
ortfolio_budget_statements_2013-14.pdf 
Fifield, M. (2013) 'A Better Deal for Australians With Disability', 20 November 
2013, accessed 21 November 2013, from 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/programs/national-press-club/ 
Flyvbjerg, B. (2009) 'Survival of the unfittest: why the worst infrastructure gets 
built - and what we can do about it', Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 
25(3), p 344-367 
Freebairn, J. (2012) 'Personal income taxation', Economic Papers, 30(1), p 18-
23 
Balancing budgets: tough choices we need   
Grattan Institute 2013 91 
Freebairn, J. (2013a) 'Illogical tax tinkering won't lead to a sustainable super 
system', The Conversation, 5 April, 2013, accessed 21 November, 
2013, from http://theconversation.com/illogical-tax-tinkering-wont-lead-
to-a-sustainable-super-system-13274 
Freebairn, J. (2013b) 'A larger GST in a tax-mix change', Insights: Melbourne 
Business and Economics 13(April), p 39-43 
Fuel Watch WA (2013) 'Petrol Prices - Perth Metropolitan', accessed 30 October 
2013, from 
http://www.fuelwatch.wa.gov.au/fuelwatch/pages/public/historicalPriceS
earch.jspx 
Gabbitas, O. and Eldridge, D. (1998) Directions for State Tax Reform, Staff 
research paper, Productivity Commission, accessed August 2013, from 
http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/7725/statetax.pdf 
Goldman Sachs (2013) Iron age continues until structural oversupply in 2014, 
Goldman Sachs Commodities Research  
Gordon, R. J. (2012) Is US economic growth over? Faltering innovation 
confronts the six headwinds, NBER Working Paper No 18315, August 
2012, accessed 12 November 2013, from 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18315 
Greber, J. and Heath, J. (2013) 'It's tougher than the '90s, says Hockey', 
Australian Financial Review, 27 October 2013, accessed 31 October 
2013, from 
http://m.afr.com/p/business/sunday/hockey_confident_of_good_christm
as_B5cmW2tfgQyTQAKgbtXzDO 
Gregory, B. (2012) 'Unpublished presentation to the Melbourne Institute on 
Ageing', from  
Griffiths, E. (2013) 'Abbott vows to tackle 'budget emergency'', accessed 31 
October 2013, from http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-05-16/abbott-
vows-to-keep-tax-cuts/4694860 
Gruen, D. and Sayegh, A. (2005) The evolution of fiscal policy in Australia, 
Treasury working paper, The Treasury, Australian Government, 
accessed 28 October 2013, from 
http://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/1033/HTML/docshell.asp?UR
L=TW_2005-04.htm 
Gruen, D. and Soding, L. (2011) 'Compulsory Superannuation and National 
Saving', in Economic Roundup Issue 3, 2011,  
Gruen, N. (1997) 'Making fiscal policy flexibly independent of government', 
Agenda, 4(3), p 297-307 
Haggard, S. and Webb, S. (1993) 'What do we know about the political economy 
of economic policy reform?', The World Bank Research Observer, 8(2), 
p 143-168 
Henry, K. (2011) 'Remarks to the Tax Forum', Remarks to the Tax Forum, 5 
October 2011, accessed October 2013, from 
http://www.futuretax.gov.au/content/Content.aspx?doc=TaxForum/trans
cripts/ken_henry.htm 
Hensher, D. A. and Mulley, C. (2013) 'Complementing distance based charges 
with discounted registration fees in the reform of road user charges: the 
impact for motorists and government revenue', Transportation, April 
2013,  
Hensher, D. A., Rose, J. M. and Collins, A. T. (2013) 'Understanding Buy-in for 
Risky Prospects: Incorporating Degree of Belief into the ex-ante 
Assessment of Support for Alternative Road Pricing Schemes', Journal 
of Transport Economics and Policy, 47(3), p 453-473 
HILDA (2012) Survey of Household Income and Labour Dynamics Australia, 
Melbourne Institute 
Hockey, J. and Cormann, M. (2013) 'Coalition commences National Commission 
of Audit', Australian Government, 22 October 2013, accessed October 
2013, from http://jbh.ministers.treasury.gov.au/media-release/009-2013/ 
Hockey, J. and Robb, A. (2013) 'Final update on federal Coalition election policy 
commitments', Liberal Party of Australia, 5 September 2013, accessed 
October 2013, from http://www.liberal.org.au/latest-
news/2013/09/05/final-update-federal-coalition-election-policy-
commitments 
Hockey, J. and Sinodinis, A. (2013) 'Restoring integrity in the Australian tax 
system', Australian Government, 6 November 2013, accessed 20 
November 2013, from http://jbh.ministers.treasury.gov.au/media-
release/017-2013/ 
Horin, A. (2010) 'Raising pension age 'will not work'', Sydney Morning Herald,  
from http://www.smh.com.au/national/raising-pension-age-will-not-work-
20100818-12f8j.html 
Horne, N. (2012) The Commonwealth efficiency dividend: an overview, 
Parliamentary Library of Australia, accessed August 2013, from 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/P
arliamentary_Library/pubs/BN/2012-2013/EfficiencyDividend 
Balancing budgets: tough choices we need   
Grattan Institute 2013 92 
Horne, N. (2013) Public sector staffing reductions in the states and territories, 
Parliamentary Library of Australia, accessed October 2013, from 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/prspub/1910283/upl
oad_binary/1910283.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22librar
y/prspub/1910283%22 
Hutchings, R. and Kouparitsas, M. (2012) Modelling Aggregate Labour Demand, 
Treasury Working Paper 2012-02, The Treasury, Australian 
Government, accessed August 2013, from 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Publications%20and%20
Media/Publications/2012/Modelling%20Aggregate%20Labour%20Dem
and/Downloads/PDF/Labour_Demand_Model_WP.ashx 
IMF (2013a) 2013 Article IV Consultation with Australia - Preliminary Concluding 
Statement, International Monetary Fund, accessed 22 November 2013, 
from http://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2013/112013.htm 
IMF (2013b) Reassessing the role and modalities of fiscal policy in advanced 
economies, IMF Policy Paper, International Monetary Fund, accessed 
30 October 2013, from 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/072113.pdf 
Infrastructure Australia (2012) Australia's public infrastructure: part of the answer 
to removing the infrastructure deficit, Infrastructure Australia, Australian 
Government, accessed 31 October 2013, from 
http://www.infrastructureaustralia.gov.au/publications/files/Australias_P
ublic_Infrastructure-
Part_of_the_Answer_to_Removing_the_Infrastructure_deficit.pdf 
Infrastructure Australia (2013) National Infrastructure Plan, June 2013, 
Infrastructure Australia, Australian Government, accessed October 
2013, from 
http://www.infrastructureaustralia.gov.au/coag/files/2013/2013_IA_COA
G_Report_National_Infrastructure_Plan_LR.pdf 
Jefferson, T. (2012) 'Private retirement savings in Australia: current policy 
initiatives and gender equity implications', Australian Bulletin of Labour, 
38(3), p 234 
Jensen, B., Weidmann, B. and Farmer, J. (2013) The myth of markets in school 
education, Grattan Institute, accessed October 2013, from 
http://grattan.edu.au/publications/reports/post/the-myth-of-markets-in-
school-education/ 
Jones, K. and Prasser, S. (forthcoming) Audit Commissions: Reviewing the 
reviewers, Connor Court 
Kahneman, D. (2012) Thinking, fast and slow, Penguin Books 
Kamener, L. and Tan, S.-l. (2012) Strategies for taming government deficits, 
BCG Perspectives, Boston Consulting Group, accessed 28 October 
2013, from http://www.bcg.com/documents/file119676.pdf 
Karanassou, M. and Sala, H. (2008) Labour Market Dynamics in Australia: What 
drives unemployment?, School of Economics Discussion Paper: 
2008/26, UNSW: Australian School of Business, accessed August 
2013, from 
http://wwwdocs.fce.unsw.edu.au/economics/Research/WorkingPapers/
2008_26.pdf 
Karvelas, P. (2013) 'Family tax ripe for budget axe, NATSEM modelling finds', 
The Australian, 28 February 2013, accessed August 2013, from 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/policy/family-tax-ripe-
for-budget-axe-natsem-modelling-finds/story-fn59nsif-1226587257174 
Kelly, J.-F., Harrison, C., Hunter, J. and Donegan, P. (2013) Renovating Housing 
Policy, Grattan Insitute  
Kelly, J.-F., Mares, P., Harrison, C., O'Toole, M., Oberklaid, M. and Hunter, J. 
(2013) Productive cities: opportunity in a changing economy, Grattan 
Institute, accessed October 2013, from 
http://grattan.edu.au/static/files/assets/c422f26b/188_productive_cities.
pdf 
Kelly, J.-F., Weidmann, B. and Walsh, M. (2011) The housing we'd choose, 
Grattan Institute, accessed 1 November 2013, from 
http://grattan.edu.au/publications/reports/post/the-housing-we-d-
choose/ 
King, S. (2013) 'When wealth disappears', New York Times, 6 October 2013,   
Kohler, A. (2013) 'Family Biz: Full frontal innovation', Business Spectator, 18 
April, 2013,  from 
http://www.businessspectator.com.au/article/2013/4/18/family-
business/family-biz-full-frontal-innovation  
Koziol, M. (2013) 'How do you increase the GST without increasing the GST?', 
accessed October 2013, from http://www.politifact.com.au/truth-o-
meter/statements/2013/sep/21/colin-barnett/how-do-you-increase-gst-
without-increasing-gst/ 
KPMG Econtech (2010) CGE Analysis of the Current Australian Tax System,  
from 
http://www.taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/Content.aspx?doc=html/c
ommissioned_work.htm 
Balancing budgets: tough choices we need   
Grattan Institute 2013 93 
Leigh, A. (2013) Battlers and Billionaries. The Story of Inequality in Australia, 
Black Inc. 
Lester, T. (2010) 'What’s missing –the changes the government rejected', 
Sydney Morning Herald, 2 May 2010, accessed 31 October 2013, from 
http://www.smh.com.au/business/whats-missing--the-changes-the-
government-rejected-20100502-u10p.html 
Lewis, D. (2012) 'Talking dollars and strategy: the challenging link in defence 
planning', Speech by the Secretary of Defence to the Australin Strategic 
Policy Institute Annual Dinner, 23 August 2012, accessed October 
2013, from 
http://www.aspi.org.au/admin/eventFiles/Secretary%20of%20Defence%
20ASPI%20speech.pdf 
Lewis, P. E. T. and MacDonald, G. (2002) 'The Elasticity of Demand for Labour 
in Australia', The Economic Record, 78(1), p 18-30 
Lignier, P. and Evans, C. (2012) 'The rise and rise of tax compliance costs for 
the small business sector in Australia', Australian Tax Forum, 27(3), p 
615-672 
Loughnane, B. (2013a) The Coalition's Policy for Paid Parental Leave, Liberal 
National Coalition, accessed OCtober 2013, from http://lpaweb-
static.s3.amazonaws.com/The%20Coalition%E2%80%99s%20Policy%
20for%20Paid%20Parental%20Leave.pdf 
Loughnane, B. (2013b) The Coalition's policy for stronger defence, Liberal-
National Coalition, accessed 15 November 2013, from http://lpaweb-
static.s3.amazonaws.com/13-09-
02%20The%20Coalition%27s%20policy%20document%20for%20Stron
ger%20Defence.pdf 
Loughnane, B. (2013c) Our plan: real solutions for all Australians, Liberal-
National Coalition from 
http://lpa.webcontent.s3.amazonaws.com/realsolutions/LPA%20Policy
%20Booklet%20210x210_pages.pdf 
Lowe, P. (2012) 'The changing structure of the Australian economy and 
monetary policy', Address to the Australian Industry Group 12th Annual 
Economic Forum, Sydney, 7 March 2012, accessed 18 November 
2013, from http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2012/mar/pdf/bu-
0312-9.pdf 
Ludlow, M. (2013) 'Infrastructure 'gold plating is blowing out costs: Qld', 
Australian Financial Review, 2 October 2013, accessed October 2013, 
from 
http://www.afr.com/p/national/infrastructure_gold_plating_is_blowing_n
2LToG8xEAIBcPQZAoxUoJ 
MacDermott, K. and Stone, C. (2013) Death by a thousand cuts: how 
governments undermine their own productivity, Occasional Paper 30, 
Centre for Policy Development, accessed October 2013, from 
http://cpd.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/CPD_OP30_Death-by-
1000-cuts.pdf 
Macfarlane, I. (2006) 'Economic news: do we get too much of it?', Notes for a 
talk to the Australian Financial Review Leaders' Luncheon, 28 April 
2006, accessed 15 October 2013, from 
http://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2006/sp-gov-280406.html 
Mannheim, M. (2013) 'Public service may not be cut so deeply', Canberra Times, 
9 September 2013, accessed October 2013, from 
http://www.canberratimes.com.au/national/public-service/public-service-
may-not-be-cut-so-deeply-20130908-2teiy.html 
Martin, P. (2013) 'Here's a back-up if Hockey's audit is too rushed', Sydney 
Morning Herald, 26 October 2013, accessed 31 October 2013, from 
http://www.smh.com.au/business/heres-a-backup-if-hockeys-audit-is-
too-rushed-20131025-2w78k.html 
Mather, J. (2013) 'NDIS trial highlights hurdles and $10m blow-out', Financial 
Review, 21 November 2013, p 11, accessed 21 November, from 
http://www.afr.com/p/national/ndis_trial_highlights_hurdles_and_ptHzwf
IdwBPb9BgiPcmvHI 
Mauro, P. (2011) 'Conclusion', in Chipping away at public debt: sources of failure 
and keys to success in fiscal adjustment, P. Mauro, Ed. John Wiley & 
Sons, p 249-258 
Megalogenis, G. (2012) The Australian Moment, Penguin Australia 
Minifie, J., Cherastidtham, I., Mullerworth, D. and Savage, J. (2013) The mining 
boom: impacts and prospects, Grattan Institute, accessed 30 October 
2013, from http://grattan.edu.au/static/files/assets/2111d9d3/194-
mining-boom-impacts-and-prospects.pdf 
Mirrlees, J., Adam, S., Besley, T., Blundell, R., Bond, S., Chote, R., Gammie, M., 
Johnson, P., Myles, G. and Poterba, J. (2011) Tax by design, Mirrlees 
Review Volume 2, Institute for Fiscal Studies, accessed 18 November 
2013, from http://www.ifs.org.uk/mirrleesreview/design/taxbydesign.pdf 
Balancing budgets: tough choices we need   
Grattan Institute 2013 94 
NICE (2013a) 'Cost saving guidance', accessed 23 October 2013, from 
http://www.nice.org.uk/usingguidance/benefitsofimplementation/costsav
ingguidance.jsp 
NICE (2013b) 'NICE 'do not do' recommendations', accessed 10 November 
2013, from 
http://www.nice.org.uk/usingguidance/donotdorecommendations/index.j
sp 
Nickell, S. (1997) 'Unemployment and labor market rigidities: Europe versus 
North America.', The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(3), p 55-74 
Norton, A. (2012) Graduate winners: Assessing the public and private benefits of 
higher education, Grattan Institute, accessed 17 August 2013, from 
http://grattan.edu.au/static/files/assets/4c182f07/162_graduate_winners
_report.pdf 
Norton, A. (2013) 'Don’t sell off HECS: reforming student loans could bring in 
real savings', accessed 12 November 2013, from 
http://theconversation.com/dont-sell-off-hecs-reforming-student-loans-
could-bring-in-real-savings-19682 
OECD (2006) Taxation of Capital Gains of Individuals: Policy Considerations 
and Approaches, OECD Tax Policy Studies, No. 14, OECD  
OECD (2010) Health care systems: Getting more value for money. OECD 
Economics Department Policy Notes, Category Number, 
OECD (2012a) OECD Economic Surveys: Australia, OECD, accessed 28 
October 2013, from http://www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/australia2012.htm 
OECD (2012b) Value for money in government: Australia 2012, OECD 
Publishing, accessed 31 October 2013, from http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/governance/value-for-money-in-government-australia-
2012_9789264178809-en 
OECD (2013a) Climate and carbon: aligning prices and policies, OECD, 
accessed 12 November 2013, from http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/environment-and-sustainable-development/climate-and-
carbon_5k3z11hjg6r7-en 
OECD (2013b) OECD Economic Outlook Volume 2013/2, OECD Publishing, 
accessed 20 November 2013, from 10.1787/eco_outlook-v2013-2-en 
OECD (2013c) 'Productivity by enterprise size class', in Entrepreneurship at a 
glance 2013, OECD, Ed. OECD Publishing 
Officer, R. R., Alexander, E. A., Fraser, J. A. and Newman, M. L. (1996) Report 
of the National Commission of Audit, National Commission of Audit, 
accessed October 2013, from 
http://www.finance.gov.au/archive/archive-of-publications/ncoa/toc.htm 
Palmer, J. (2010) The acceptability of road pricing: an application of a theoretical 
and analytical framework to the realities of decision making in Sydney, 
Research report ITLS-RR-10-2, Institue of Transport and Logistics 
Studies, University of Sydney, accessed 20 November 2013, from 
http://sydney.edu.au/business/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/94461/ITLS-
RR-10-02.pdf 
PBO (2013a) Estimates of the structural budget balance of the Australian 
Government 2001-02 to 2016-17, Parliamentary Budget Office, 
Australian Government, accessed 11 November 2013, from 
http://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/05%20About%20Parliament/54%20Parl
iamentary%20Depts/548%20Parliamentary%20Budget%20Office/Parlia
mentary%20Budget%20Office%20Stuctural%20Budget%20Balance.as
hx  
PBO (2013b) Post-election report of election commitments: 2013 general 
election, Parliamentary Budget Office, Parliament of Australia, 
accessed 18 November 2013, from 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/P
arliamentary_Budget_Office/2013_Election 
PC (2013) An Ageing Australia: Preparing for the Future, Productivity 
Commission, accessed 22 November 2013, from 
http://www.pc.gov.au/research/commission/ageing-australia 
Phillips, B. and Nepal, B. (2012) Going without: financial hardship in Australia, 
Prepared for Anglicare Australia, Catholic Social Services Australia, 
The Salvation Army and UnitingCare Australia, NATSEM, University of 
Canberra, accessed 15 November 2013, from 
http://www.natsem.canberra.edu.au/storage/2-
Going%20Without%20MCP%20Report_Aug%202012.pdf 
Phillips, B. and Toohey, M. (2013) Working Australia: What the Government 
Gives and Takes Away, Research Note R13/1, NATSEM, accessed 
October 2013, from 
http://www.natsem.canberra.edu.au/storage/NATSEM-Other-Pub-R13-
1-Typical_Low_and_Middle_Income_FBT.pdf 
Pincus, J. (2012) 'The Treasury-KPMG Econtech Modelling of the Excess 
Burden of Mining Taxation: Some Doubts', Agenda, 19(2),  
Balancing budgets: tough choices we need   
Grattan Institute 2013 95 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2010) Review of urban water security strategies, 
Infrastructure Australia, accessed October 2013, from 
http://www.infrastructureaustralia.gov.au/water/files/UrbanWaterSecurit
yReportForInfrastructureAustralia.pdf 
Productivity Commission (2005) Economic Implications of an Ageing Australia, 
Productivity Commission, accessed 21 August 2013, from 
http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/69401/ageing.pdf 
Productivity Commission (2011) Economic structure and performance of the 
Australian retail industry, Productivity Commission, accessed October 
2013, from http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/retail-industry/report 
Productivity Commission (2012) Trade and Assistance Review 2010-11, 
Productivity Commission, accessed August 2013, from 
http://www.pc.gov.au/annual-reports/trade-assistance/trade-assistance-
review-2010-11 
Productivity Commission (2013a) Major Project Development Assessment 
Processes: Draft Report, Productivity Commission, accessed October 
2013, from http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/major-projects/draft 
Productivity Commission (2013b) 'Public inquiry: public infrastructure', accessed 
16 November 2013, from 
http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/infrastructure 
Productivity Commission (2013c) Trade and Assistance Review 2011-12, 
Productivity Commission, accessed August 2013, from 
http://www.pc.gov.au/annual-reports/trade-assistance/2011-12 
PwC (2013) Protecting prosperity: Why we need to talk about tax, PwC, 
accessed 2 October 2013, from 
http://www.pwc.com.au/tax/assets/Protecting-prosperity-22Jul13.pdf 
Rawdanowicz, à., Wurzel, E. and Christensen, A. K. (2013) The equity 
implications of fiscal consolidation, OECD Economics Department 
Working Papers no 1013, OECD Publishing, accessed 15 November 
2013, from http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k4dlvx2wjq0-en 
RBA (2013a) Indicator Lending Rates,  Statistics Table F5, Reserve Bank of 
Australia 
RBA (2013b) Lending and Credit Aggregates,  Statistics Table D2, Reserve 
Bank of Australia 
RBA (2013c) Lending Commitments - All Lenders,  Statistics Table D6, Reserve 
Bank of Australia 
Roxon, N. (2013) '10 housekeeping tips for a future Labor Government', The 
John Button Memorial Lecture, 16 October 2013, accessed 1 
November 2013, from http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-10-16/roxon-
ten-tips/5026972 
Saez, E., Slemrod, J. and Giertz, S. (2012) 'The Elasticity of Taxable Income 
with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review', Journal of 
Economic Literature, 50(1), p 3-50 
Sancak, C., Liu, L. Q. and Nakata, T. (2011) 'Canada: a success story', in 
Chipping away at public debt: sources of failure and keys to success in 
fiscal adjustment, P. Mauro, Ed. John Wiley & Sons, p 1-30 
Segal, L. (2004) 'Why it is time to review the role of private health insurance', 
Australian Health Review, 27(1), p 3-15 
Stacey, G. and Downes, P. (1995) Wage determination and the labour market in 
the Treasury Macroeconomic (TRYM) Model, Modelling Section, 
Macroeconomic Analysis Branch, The Treasury, Australian 
Government, accessed August 2013, from 
http://epsa.treasury.gov.au/documents/239/PDF/paper13.pdf 
Sullivan, M. (2013) 'The Times is working on ways to make numbers-based 
stories clearer for readers', New York Times, 18 October 2013, 
accessed 21 October 2013, from 
http://publiceditor.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/18/the-times-is-working-
on-ways-to-make-numbers-based-stories-clearer-for-readers/ 
Swan, W. and Shorten, B. (2013) 'Reforms to make the superannuation system 
fairer', Australian Government, 5 April 2013, accessed 20 November 
2013, from 
http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2
013/020.htm&pageID=&min=brs&Year=&DocType=0 
Tapper, A., Fenna, A. and Phillimore, J. (2013) 'Age bias in the Australian 
welfare state', Agenda, 20(1),  
Taylor, C., Bradley, C., Dobbs, R., Thompson, F. and Clifton, D. (2012) Beyond 
the boom: Australia's productivity imperative, McKinsey Global Institute, 
accessed October 2013, from http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/asia-
pacific/australia_productivity_imperative 
Thomson, M. (2013) The Cost of Defence: ASPI Defence Budget Brief 2013-14, 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, accessed August 2013, from 
http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publication_details.aspx?ContentID
=359&pubtype=3 
Balancing budgets: tough choices we need   
Grattan Institute 2013 96 
Tingle, L. (2012) Great Expectations: Government, entitlement and an angry 
nation,  Quarterly Essay, 48 
Treasury (1996) Documentation of the Treasury Macroeconomic (TRYM) Model 
of the Australian Economy, Modelling Section, Macroeconomic Analysis 
Branch, The Treasury, Australian Government, accessed August 2013, 
from http://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/236/PDF/part01.pdf 
Treasury (2002) History of fuel taxation in Australia: Background paper to the 
Fuel Taxation Inquiry, The Treasury, Australian Government 
Treasury (2010a) Australia's Future Tax System,   
Treasury (2010b) Australia's future tax system - Report to the Treasurer, The 
Treasury, Australian Government, accessed October 2013, from 
http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/Content.aspx?doc=html/pubs_r
eports.htm 
Treasury (2011) Mid-year economic and fiscal outlook 2011-12, The Treasury, 
Australian Government, accessed August 2013, from 
http://www.budget.gov.au/2011-12/content/myefo/html/index.htm 
Treasury (2012a) Commonwealth Budget Papers 2012-13, The Treasury, 
Australian Government, accessed October 2013, from 
http://www.budget.gov.au/2012-13/ 
Treasury (2012b) GST Distribution Review - Final Report, The Treasury, 
Australian Government, accessed 18 August 2013, from 
http://www.gstdistributionreview.gov.au/content/reports/finaloctober201
2/downloads/GST_final_consolidated.pdf 
Treasury (2012c) Low Value Parcel Processing Taskforce Final Report, The 
Treasury, Australian Government accessed 20 November 2013, from 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Publications%20and%20
Media/Publications/2012/Low%20Value%20Parcel%20Processing/Dow
nloads/PDF/LVPP.ashx 
Treasury (2013a) Commonwealth Budget Papers 2013-14, The Treasury, 
Australian Government, accessed October 2013-14, from 
http://budget.gov.au/2013-14/ 
Treasury (2013b) Final budget outcome 2012-13, The Treasury, Australian 
Government, accessed October 2013, from 
http://www.budget.gov.au/2012-13/content/fbo/download/2012-
13_FBO_Consolidated.pdf  
Treasury (2013c) Pre-election economic and fiscal outlook 2013, The Treasury, 
Australian Government, accessed August 2013, from 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Publications%20and%20
Media/Publications/2013/Pre-
Election%20Economic%20and%20Fiscal%20Outlook%202013/Downlo
ads/PDF/PEFO_2013.ashx 
Treasury (2013d) A Super Charter: Fewer changes, better outcome, Chapter 2, 
from http://www.treasury.gov.au/Policy-
Topics/SuperannuationAndRetirement/supercharter/~/media/Treasury/
Policy%20Topics/Superannuation/supercharter/Downloads/PDF/super_
charter_report.ashx 
Treasury (2013e) Tax Expenditures Statement 2012, The Treasury, Australian 
Government, accessed 2 October 2013, from 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Publications%20and%20
Media/Publications/2013/TES/downloads/PDF/TES_2013_Consolidate
d.ashx 
Treasury (multiple years) Tax Expenditures Statement, The Treasury, Australian 
Government, accessed 7 November 2013, from 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/PublicationsAndMedia/Publications 
Treasury ACT (2012) Territory Budget Papers 2012-13, Chief Minister and 
Treasury Directorate, Australian Capital Territory Government 
Treasury and Trade Qld (2012) State Budget Papers 2012-13, Queensland 
Treasury and Trade, Queensland Government 
Treasury NSW (1999) The Case for Payroll Tax, Office of Financial Management 
Research and Information Paper TRP 99-3, The Treasury, Government 
of New South Wales, accessed August 2013, from 
http://www.treasury.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/6650/TRP9
9-3_Pay_Roll_Tax.pdf 
Treasury NSW (2011) NSW Government submission to the 2011 Tax Forum, 
The Treasury, Government of New South Wales, accessed October 
2013, from 
http://www.futuretax.gov.au/content/TaxForum/statements/state_territor
y/NSW_Government.pdf 
Treasury NSW (2012) State Budget Papers 2012-13, The Treasury, Government 
of New South Wales 
Balancing budgets: tough choices we need   
Grattan Institute 2013 97 
Treasury NSW (2013) Interstate Comparison of Taxes, The Treasury, 
Government of New South Wales, accessed August 2013, from 
http://www.treasury.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/24349/TRP
13-01_Interstate_Comparison_of_Taxes_2012-13_dnd.pdf 
Treasury WA (2012) State Budget Papers 2012-13, Department of Treasury, 
Government of Western Australia 
Turner & Townsend (2012) International construction cost survey 2012, Turner & 
Townsend, accessed September 2013, from 
http://www.turnerandtownsend.com/construction-cost-
2012/_16803.html 
University of Sydney (2012) 'Sydney motorists support congestion charges', 
accessed 18 November 2011, from 
http://sydney.edu.au/news/84.html?newsstoryid=9509 
Uren, D. (2012) 'Secret government plan to end big bureacracy', The Australian, 
28 August 2012, accessed 31 October 2013, from 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/state-politics/secret-
government-plan-to-end-big-bureaucracy/story-e6frgczx-
1226459386354 
Uren, D. (2013) 'Setting fiscal targets proves impotent in averting global debt 
crises', The Australian, 17 October 2013, accessed 29 October 2013, 
from http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/opinion/setting-fiscal-
targets-proves-impotent-in-averting-global-debt-crises/story-e6frg9qo-
1226741250841 
Veerman, J. L. and Cobiac, L. J. (2013) 'Removing the GST exemption for fresh 
fruits and vegetables could cost lives', Medical Journal of Australia, 
199(8), p 534-535 
Victorian Government (2013) State Budget Papers 2013-14, Department of 
Treasury and Finance, Victoria 
Whiteford, P. (2013) Australia: Inequality and prospecrity and impacts in a 
radical welfare state, Social Policy Action Research Centre, Crawford 
School of Public Policy, ANU, accessed October 2013, from 
https://crawford.anu.edu.au/public_policy_community/content/doc/Austr
alia_Inequality-and-Prosperity_final-15-March-13.pdf 
Wiggins, J. (2013) 'Governments fail on infrastructure analysis: Ken Henry', 
Australian Financial Review, 1 October 2013, accessed 1 October 
2013, from http://www.afr.com/p/australia2-
0/governments_fail_on_infrastructure_y3HVAbaSoDLDbsiOT4KdnI 
Wood, G., Stewart, M. and Ong, R. (2006) Housing Taxation and Transfers,  
Final Report, Research Study for the Review of Australia's Future Tax 
System, Melbourne Insititute 
Wood, T., Hunter, A., O'Toole, M., Venkataraman, P. and Carter, L. (2012) 
Putting the customer back in front: How to make electricity cheaper, 
Grattan Institute, accessed October 2013, from 
http://grattan.edu.au/static/files/assets/7a8390e0/178_energy_putting_t
he_customer_back_in_front.pdf 
Wood, T. and Mullerworth, D. (2012) Building the bridge: a practical plan for a 
low-cost, low-emissions energy future, Grattan Institute, accessed 10 
November 2013, from 
http://grattan.edu.au/publications/reports/post/building-the-bridge-a-
practical-plan-for-a-low-cost-low-emissions-energy-future/ 
 
 
